House Bill 239 would reduce the number of judges on the court of appeals from 15 to 12. It has passed the House and awaits Senate consideration. Proponents of the bill (mostly Republicans) say that the court should contract because the number of appeals has fallen in recent years. The bill’s opponents (mostly Democrats) say that the court remains extremely busy, and that the real purpose of the bill is to prevent Governor Cooper from appointing replacements for three Republican judges who are nearing mandatory retirement age. This post presents some historical and statistical information that may help readers assess the bill for themselves. [Update: I have received several comments pointing out other factors, beyond caseload, that should be considered when determining the size of a court. Clearly, factors like disposition times, number of law clerks and staff attorneys, and case mix are all pertinent. This post presents caseload data because caseload information is relevant and readily available, but it isn’t intended as a complete analysis — interested readers are encouraged to consider the full spectrum of pertinent information. To get a sense of how complex measuring and comparing court performance is, see, e.g., W. Warren H. Binford et al., Seeking Best Practices among Intermediate Courts of Appeal: A Nascent Journey, 9 J. App. Prac. & Process 37 (2007) (noting that “[c]ourt productivity is difficult to define, let alone measure,” but finding the Court of Appeals of North Carolina to be above average in both “productivity” and “efficiency”).]
News Roundup
A deadly terrorist attack outside the British Parliament in London is dominating international headlines this week. As the New York Times reports, a British-born man, Khalid Masood, has been identified as the perpetrator and the Islamic State has claimed responsibility for the attack. Three people were killed, including a Utah man, when Masood drove a vehicle into pedestrians on Westminster Bridge and then fatally stabbed a police constable. Masood was shot and killed by police. Keep reading for more news.
If You Gave Me a Magic Wand (Some Unsolicited Thoughts on Reforming the Sentencing Laws)
The School of Government is a nonpartisan, non-advocacy institution. That’s a tradition I take seriously. If you can find something in the nearly 400 blog posts I’ve written here since 2009 that makes you think otherwise, I hope you’ll let me know.
That said, I am occasionally asked what I would do if someone gave me a magic wand and told me to make our sentencing law better. “Better” can be a tough concept to navigate while staying true to the School’s policy-neutral underpinnings. But I don’t mind sharing a few ideas focused on the mechanics of the sentencing law—largely as a thought experiment designed to call attention to some of the more confusing aspects of existing law.
How DWIs Are Actually Sentenced
This blog is full of posts about the laws governing sentencing for misdemeanor DWI. Until now, however, I haven’t written much about how DWIs are actually sentenced. That’s because I didn’t know. While the North Carolina Sentencing and Policy Advisory Commission (“Sentencing Commission”) annually publishes a statistical report on the sentencing of felonies and misdemeanors, that report doesn’t include information about DWI sentences, which are governed by G.S. 20-179 rather than the Structured Sentencing Act. Thanks to the Sentencing Commission’s recent focus on DWI sentencing, however, I now have statistics about how DWIs are sentenced in courtrooms across North Carolina. And I think you’ll be interested in what they show.
Mistrial Leads to Double Jeopardy Violation in State v. Schalow
In State v. Schalow (Dec. 20, 2016), the trial court’s error in declaring a mistrial led to a successful claim of double jeopardy by the defendant and allowed him to avoid further prosecution for attempted murder. Schalow sheds light on the relatively obscure (at least to me) law of mistrials and double jeopardy.
Gorsuch Confirmation Hearing to Start Today
The confirmation hearing for Supreme Court nominee Neil Gorsuch will begin today before the Senate Judiciary Committee. This post tells you what you need to know about the hearing.
News Roundup
A Wilmington traffic stop involving an Uber driver has received national attention over the past two weeks because officers involved in the stop falsely told the driver, who happened to be a lawyer, that it was illegal to film police. Jesse Bright, a criminal defense attorney and part-time Uber driver, was using his cellphone to record his traffic stop when an officer told him to stop recording because it violated a recently enacted law. In fact, there is no such law and Wilmington and New Hanover County law enforcement officials later released statements confirming that it is legal to record encounters with police and encouraging citizens to do so.
Sex Offender Registration for Out-of-State Juvenile Adjudications
When, if ever, must a person register as a sex offender in North Carolina because of a juvenile adjudication from another state?
Harmless Error and Jury Unanimity in DWI Cases
Shortly after I published last week’s post on State v. Babich, an astute reader asked about the court’s harmless error analysis. How, he inquired, could the improper admission of expert testimony that the defendant had an alcohol concentration of 0.08 be harmless error? Did the jury’s verdict indicate that it found the defendant guilty only under the “under the influence” prong of impairment rather than under the “alcohol concentration of 0.08 or more” prong? To answer these questions, I had to dig into the record on appeal and provide a bit of background on the requirement for jury unanimity in DWI cases. I thought others might be interested in my response.
Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals Rules That an Officer Was Not Entitled to Summary Judgment in a Civil Lawsuit for an Arrest Allegedly Made Without Probable Cause
The Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals recently ruled (2-1) in Smith v. Munday, 848 F.3d 248 (4th Cir. Feb. 3, 2017), that a North Carolina officer was not entitled to summary judgment in a civil lawsuit for arresting the plaintiff allegedly without probable cause. This case is the subject of this post.