blank

Iryna’s Law and Pretrial Release

Last month, the General Assembly passed Session Law 2025-93 (H 307), also known as Iryna’s Law. The legislation makes a number of changes to proceedings involving pretrial release; adds a new aggravating sentencing factor; alters the way magistrates may be disciplined; and expands the permissible methods of execution, among other things. This post focuses on the changes affecting pretrial release, most of which will take effect on December 1, 2025.

Violent offenses

As a threshold matter, the legislation creates a new category of “violent offenses.” Violent offenses are defined in G.S. 15A-531(9) as including any of the following:

  • Any Class A through G felony that includes assault, the use of physical force against a person, or the threat of physical force against a person, as an essential element of the offense.
  • Any felony offense requiring registration as a sex offender, whether or not the person is currently required to register.
  • An offense under G.S. 14-17, and any other offense listed in G.S. 15A-533(b).
  • An offense under G.S. 14‑18.4, 14-34.1, 14-51, 14-54(a1), 14-202.1, 14-277.3A, or 14-415.1, or an offense under G.S. 90-95(h)(4c) that involves fentanyl.
  • Attempts to commit any of the listed offenses.

Under the amended law, defendants charged violent offenses are subject to specific conditions of release and may be subject to other proceedings, discussed in the remainder of this post.

Pretrial release generally

Factors to consider

When determining pretrial release conditions, a judicial official must direct the arresting law enforcement officer, a pretrial services program, or a district attorney to provide a criminal history report for the defendant. G.S. 15A-534(c). The judicial official must then consider the criminal history when setting conditions of pretrial release. This is a substantial modification of existing law, which requires the judicial official to consider a defendant’s record of convictions rather than the defendant’s entire criminal history. The law will now also require the judicial official to consider, based on available information, the defendant’s housing situation.

Types of release

The legislation eliminates written promises to appear as a permissible type of release, leaving only unsecured bonds, custody releases, secured bonds, and electronic house arrest. G.S. 15A-534(a). For many offenses, there is a statutory preference for imposition of unsecured bonds or custody releases as the least restrictive types of release. However, those options are not permitted for a defendant charged with a violent offense. G.S. 15A-534(b).

Additionally, unsecured bonds and custody releases are not permitted for a defendant who has been convicted of three or more offenses (each of which is at least a Class 1 misdemeanor) in separate sessions of court within the previous 10 years. G.S. 15A-534(b). In any order authorizing pretrial release for such a defendant, the judicial official must make written findings of fact explaining why the imposed conditions are appropriate for that defendant. G.S. 15A-534(d). The findings of fact must show that the judicial official considered the defendant’s criminal history and other factors described in G.S. 15A-534(c).

Pretrial release for violent offenses

There is a rebuttable presumption against pretrial release for defendants charged with violent offenses. G.S. 15A-534(b1). If, however, a judicial official authorizes conditions for such a defendant, the release is subject to the following limitations:

  • If a defendant is charged with a first violent offense, then the judicial official must impose either a secured bond or house arrest (with a secured bond).
  • If a defendant is charged with a second or subsequent violent offense and the defendant has been convicted of a prior violent offense, then the judicial official must impose house arrest (with a secured bond), if house arrest is available. If house arrest is not available, then the judicial official is likely within his or her authority to impose a secured bond.
  • If a defendant is charged with a second or subsequent violent offense and the defendant was on pretrial release for a prior violent offense, then the judicial official must impose house arrest (with a secured bond), if house arrest is available. If house arrest is not available, then the judicial official is likely within his or her authority to impose a secured bond.

In any order authorizing pretrial release for a defendant charged with a violent offense, the judicial official must make written findings of fact explaining why the imposed conditions are appropriate for that defendant. G.S. 15A-534(d). The findings of fact must show that the judicial official considered the defendant’s criminal history and other factors described in G.S. 15A-534(c).

Involuntary commitment proceedings

Iryna’s law also creates a new pretrial release procedure that requires judicial officials to initiate involuntary commitment proceedings for defendants upon making certain determinations. This provision was originally slated to take effect on December 1, 2025, but has since been delayed to December 1, 2026 (see section 5.3 of S.L. 2025-97 (S 449)).

Eligibility

Under new G.S. 15A-533(b1), judicial officials must initiate involuntary commitment (IVC) proceedings for any criminal defendant who:

  • Is charged with a violent offense and has previously been subject to an order of involuntary commitment within the prior three years; or
  • Is charged with any offense (including a violent offense) and the judicial official has reasonable grounds to believe the defendant is a danger to themselves or others.
Access to records

Though IVC records are generally confidential, effective October 3, 2025, G.S. 122C-54(d) was amended to permit judicial officials determining pretrial release conditions to access the defendant’s IVC records for the purposes of determining whether the defendant has been involuntarily committed within the previous three years.

Danger determination

The new provision does not define “danger to self or others,” nor is the term defined in any other criminal statute. The term is, however, defined in G.S. 122C-3(11), so judicial officials may wish to rely on this definition in making their determination.

The law also amends G.S. 15A-501(2a) (police duties upon arrest) to require a law enforcement officer to inform the judicial official determining pretrial release conditions of any relevant behavior of the defendant observed by the officer prior to, during, or after the arrest that may provide reasonable grounds for the judicial official to believe the defendant is a danger to themselves or others.

Issuing the order

For a defendant who falls into either of the two categories of eligibility listed above, the judicial official must set conditions of pretrial release and issue an order for an initial IVC examination. The order must:

  • Require the defendant to receive an initial examination by a commitment examiner to determine if there are grounds to petition for IVC of the defendant.
  • Require the arresting officer (or an officer of the same agency) to immediately transport the defendant to a facility with certified commitment examiners for the initial examination.
  • Require the commitment examiner to either petition for IVC of the defendant if there are grounds to do so or provide written notice to the judicial official that there are no grounds to petition for IVC.
  • Include terms for release depending on whether an IVC petition is filed or whether IVC is ordered.
Setting conditions of release

Magistrates and clerks are limited in their authority to set conditions of pretrial release for certain offenses. Even if not authorized to set conditions of release, magistrates and clerks will likely still be required to initiate IVC proceedings for eligible defendants.

 

If you have questions about any of these provisions, feel free to email me at bwilliams@sog.unc.edu.