Articles in the Procedure category - Page 6 of 77

Increasingly, public defender offices are bringing social workers in-house. As part of a growing interest in holistic defense, these offices are relying on social workers to assist with the representation of their clients in a variety of ways. Social workers can locate housing, find appropriate treatment for substance use disorder or mental illness, and improve client communication by building trust and sensitivity to clients’ needs. This work may support the presentation of mitigation evidence at sentencing, and beyond that, break cycles of involvement with the criminal justice system.

North Carolina is in the midst of a major, legislatively-funded expansion of its public defender system. The School’s Criminal Justice Innovation Lab is supporting NC Indigent Defense Services by evaluating the implementation of social work positions in public defender offices to learn more about the ways the inter-professional collaboration functions, how social work positions are structured, and common benefits and challenges of using social work staff.

During this work, a question has arisen on several occasions: how should the inter-professional defense team navigate a situation, such as learning of child abuse, where mandatory reporting laws require notification to the local department of social services (DSS) or law enforcement? Should social workers comply with state statutes and follow their own ethical code by making a report? Or does the attorney’s obligation to keep client confidences and provide effective assistance of counsel “trump” the social worker’s duty to report?

In previous posts, I’ve addressed the expedited scheduling requirements and opportunities for permanent release of motor vehicles seized pursuant to G.S. 20-28.3. Today, I’ll address the ways a motor vehicle may be released temporarily pending trial or final disposition of the underlying offense. Generally speaking, this temporary release permits a motor vehicle owner to obtain temporary possession of the vehicle conditioned on meeting certain prerequisites and agreeing to return the motor vehicle on the day of the forfeiture hearing. Read on for more. 

Some time ago, I received an email from a researcher asking whether a minor may consent to the search of his or her cell phone. The question made me realize how little I knew about children’s authority to consent to searches more generally. So I cracked some law books, and wrote this post as a primer for anyone who may be as uninformed as I was.

In every case where a person is charged with felony speeding to elude arrest pursuant to G.S. 20-141.5(b) or (b1), the motor vehicle driven is subject to seizure and forfeiture. This is also true in DWI cases where, at the date of offense, the defendant’s driver’s license was revoked for an impaired driving revocation or the defendant did not have a valid license nor insurance. When in district court, these cases have expedited calendaring requirements (discussed here). This is in part to preserve the vehicle’s value while the case is pending. Upon seizure, the vehicle is usually first towed to a local storage facility, then transferred to the facilities of a state contractor within a few days. There are fees for towing, as well as accruing fees for storage. Whether the motor vehicle is released to its owner, a lienholder, or forfeited to the county board of education, these towing and storage fees must be paid. Often, these fees are paid out of the proceeds of the sale of the vehicle. While expediting the underlying case towards resolution is one way to minimize these fees, another is release of the vehicle before case disposition. This post addresses the circumstances under which a vehicle may be fully released pretrial and does not have to be brought back for a later forfeiture hearing.

I recently completed a series of posts on issues surrounding confidential informants (“CI’s”), discovery, and motions to reveal the CI’s identity. In this “bonus” post, I will discuss a related […]

With a teaser like that, who could resist reading more? The 2025 edition of my online guide to expunctions is now available on the School of Government’s website at https://www.sog.unc.edu/resources/microsites/relief-criminal-conviction/. It is a free resource on expunctions and other forms of relief from the consequences of a criminal conviction. Compared to previous years, the 2024 legislative session was relatively quiet on the expunction front, but the General Assembly made some important changes, discussed briefly below and in more detail in the revised guide.

For the final installment of this series on confidential informants, motions to reveal identity, and discovery, we will look at a unique statute in North Carolina concerning when the identity of a confidential informant (CI) must be revealed: G.S. 15A-978(b). This statute only applies to motions to suppress, rather than trial. Recall back to Part I of this series, which addressed Roviaro v. U.S., 353 U.S. 53 (1957). Roviaro established the basic factors to consider when deciding whether the State must disclose the identity of the CI to the defendant to ensure a fair trial. Another U.S. Supreme Court case decided ten years later, however, McCray v. State of Ill., 386 U.S. 300 (1967), addressed the separate but related question of when the defendant is entitled to learn the CI’s identity to have a fair opportunity to litigate a motion to suppress.

At a motion to suppress, the considerations are somewhat different from trial. The last several posts addressed the question of when testimony from the CI is material in determining whether or not the defendant is guilty. In contrast, the question at the motion to suppress stage is not the guilt or innocence of the defendant. The question in CI cases is usually whether a search or seizure violated the defendant’s Fourth Amendment rights. The issues to be decided may be whether law enforcement had good reason to rely on information provided by the CI, whether law enforcement corroborated the information, or whether the officers are being truthful about their interactions with the CI. G.S. 15A-978(b) addresses a related, but narrow question: can we rely on the officer’s assertion that the CI exists?

The “48-hour rule,” as it is known in domestic violence cases, has been covered on this blog numerous times over the years (see here, here, and here). The rule shifts the responsibility of setting conditions of pretrial release from magistrates to judges in certain cases involving allegations of domestic violence. The rule is set out in G.S. 15A-534.1, which provides that a judge—rather than a magistrate—must set a defendant’s pretrial release conditions during the first forty-eight hours after arrest for certain offenses.

Judicial officials and practitioners who handle criminal domestic violence cases should be familiar with both the statute and the long-standing ruling in State v. Thompson, 349 N.C. 483 (1998), that required dismissal of charges where G.S. 15A-534.1 was violated. Last year, the court of appeals decided State v. Tucker, 291 N.C. App. 379 (2023), which takes a different approach to determining the outcome of a domestic violence case that involves a 48-hour violation. This brief post details the facts of both cases and what Tucker suggests for domestic violence cases moving forward.

This is Part V of a multi-part series on confidential informants (“CI’s”), motions to reveal the identity of CI’s, and discovery.

As discussed in earlier posts in this series (here and here), the defense is more likely to win a motion to reveal the identity of CI when the defendant is able to tie the potential CI testimony to a particular theory of defense and explain how it furthers that defense. In the landmark case of Roviaro v. U.S., the U.S. Supreme Court listed a variety of ways in which the CI’s testimony might be helpful for the defense and ruled that the CI’s identity must be turned over. However, North Carolina appellate courts have repeatedly stated that the defense cannot merely speculate about how the CI’s testimony might be relevant; the defense must clear an initial hurdle of showing how the testimony might resolve a material conflict at trial in order to prevail on a motion to reveal the identity of the CI. See State v. Dark, 204 N.C. App. 591, 593 (2010); State v. Watson, 303 N.C. 533 (1981). While defenders may invoke their federal due process rights in challenging whether this should be a requirement, they should be aware of what North Carolina appellate courts are demanding.

An interesting strategic implication of Dark and Watson is that in CI cases, the defense may benefit from committing to a particular theory of defense and “showing its cards” to the state in a pretrial hearing. Defenders are often reluctant to call their client to the stand, even in a pretrial hearing, unless the defendant’s testimony appears to be necessary or exceptionally persuasive. Defenders may be concerned about the risk of damaging cross-examination and the possibility that the testimony of an unsavvy client might hurt the case, even where the client is telling the truth (discussions of this dilemma in the media can be found here and here). In cases where there is a viable motion to reveal the identity of the CI, though, the risk will sometimes be worth the possible reward. The prospect of winning a dismissal, a concession in plea negotiations, or suppression of key evidence may counterbalance a tendency by the defense to avoid putting the client on the stand in a pretrial hearing.

Singleton was supposed to make things simpler. As previously reported, in that case our Supreme Court attempted to eliminate some “obsolete technicalities” of the common law by abrogating the jurisdictional indictment rule, whereby a defective pleading deprives the trial court of jurisdiction. My colleague Danny Spiegel called it a sea change. The Court of Appeals decided two cases in September that illustrate continuing complexity in this area. In State v. Pierce, COA23-348 (N.C. Ct. App. Sept. 3, 2024), the court held the trial court did not lack jurisdiction to accept a pro se defendant’s waiver of indictment, despite a statutory prohibition on such uncounseled waiver. And in State v. Wilkins, COA23-839 (N.C. Ct. App. Sept. 17, 2024), the court found the trial court lacked jurisdiction due to a fatally defective indictment. This post considers those two cases.