Articles in the Procedure category - Page 36 of 77

Can the Police Compel You to Unlock Your Phone Using Your Fingerprint? (May 5, 2016)

I’ve written before about whether a court may order a person to provide a password to a computer or a passcode to a phone to enable an officer to complete a lawful search, such as one pursuant to a search warrant. But passwords and passcodes are so old-fashioned. The cool kids are all using biometric data like fingerprints to secure their devices. So, may a person be required to unlock his or her device using a biometric identifier? Yes, said one court recently.

READ POST "Can the Police Compel You to Unlock Your Phone Using Your Fingerprint? (May 5, 2016)"

Reverse Batson Challenge Sustained (April 19, 2016)

In the recent case of State v. Hurd, the N.C. Court of Appeals upheld a claim by a prosecutor that a defendant’s peremptory strike of a prospective White juror was racially discriminatory, which is the second time that our appellate courts have upheld such a claim. This post briefly reviews the legal requirements for challenges under Batson, analyzes the court’s reasons for sustaining the prosecutor’s challenge in Hurd, and considers the lack of appellate decisions in North Carolina upholding defense challenges to prosecutors’ peremptory strikes of jurors of color.

READ POST "Reverse Batson Challenge Sustained (April 19, 2016)"

State v. Miller Confirms that the DWI Motions Statutes are a Hot Mess (March 23, 2016)

No, Justice Ervin didn’t use the words hot mess. But anyone who slogs their way through the tortured procedural swamp that led to State v. Miller, __ N.C. __ (March 18, 2016), is bound to agree that the procedures adopted in 2006 for appeals in DWI cases have created a nearly impenetrable bog for the parties involved. I’m going to do my best here to succinctly explain what happened in Miller. Then I’ll share an idea for freeing litigants and judges from the procedural muck in which they are currently mired. 

READ POST "State v. Miller Confirms that the DWI Motions Statutes are a Hot Mess (March 23, 2016)"

Fourth Circuit: New Trial Required When Defense Lawyer Sleeps Through “Substantial Portion” of a Trial (March 14, 2016)

On Friday, the Fourth Circuit, deciding “an issue of first impression,” ruled that a new trial is required when a defense lawyer sleeps through a substantial portion of a trial. The opinion in United States v. Ragin is available here. This post summarizes and discusses the case.

READ POST "Fourth Circuit: New Trial Required When Defense Lawyer Sleeps Through “Substantial Portion” of a Trial (March 14, 2016)"

New Bulletin on Juvenile Interrogations (February 29, 2016)

Nearly five years ago, the U.S. Supreme Court decided J.D.B. v. North Carolina, a case arising from the police interrogation of a middle school student in Chapel Hill. In a 5-4 decision, the Court ruled that police officers must consider a juvenile’s age when determining whether they must read juveniles their Miranda rights before questioning them. The ruling represents a major shift in Miranda jurisprudence by establishing a different standard for evaluating police interrogations of juveniles – the reasonable child standard. In the years since J.D.B., however, lower courts have not clearly defined how the reasonable child standard impacts the assessment of whether a juvenile was “in custody.” The application of this new standard also raises questions about how North Carolina courts evaluate custody determinations in the school setting. These and other issues are addressed in “Applying the Reasonable Child Standard to Juvenile Interrogations After J.D.B. v. North Carolina” (No. 2016/01), a new Juvenile Law Bulletin.

READ POST "New Bulletin on Juvenile Interrogations (February 29, 2016)"

What to Do About Outstanding Arrest Warrants (January 5, 2016)

Have you ever been involved in a case in which the defendant was convicted of a criminal charge, did his time, and then was served with an outstanding warrant even though the warrant was pending when he was convicted of the other charge? If the warrant had been served earlier, the defendant could have taken care all of his criminal business at once. Doing so would save the court time, allow the State to come up with an appropriate resolution of all the charges, and allow the defendant to coordinate his defense and, if convicted, seek concurrent sentences or a combination of active and probationary time. If resolved before a single court at the same time, the charges could be consolidated for judgment (G.S. 15A-1340.15(b)) and also would result in fewer prior record points (G.S. 15A-1340.14(d)).

A little-noticed piece of legislation from 2015, S.L. 2015-48 (H 570), attempts to address the problem of unserved warrants. Effective October 1, 2015, the legislation directs law enforcement agencies, the Division of Adult Correction, prosecutors, and the courts to identify and attempt to resolve outstanding warrants while other charges are pending or the defendant is in custody.

READ POST "What to Do About Outstanding Arrest Warrants (January 5, 2016)"

Supreme Court: Not Unreasonable to Excuse Prospective Juror Who Was “Not Absolutely Certain” He Could Impose Death Penalty (December 15, 2015)

The Supreme Court issued a per curiam opinion yesterday, reversing the Sixth Circuit in a capital case. The opinion doesn’t necessarily break new doctrinal ground but it is an interesting application of existing law, and it provides a window into an ongoing dispute between two federal appellate courts.

READ POST "Supreme Court: Not Unreasonable to Excuse Prospective Juror Who Was “Not Absolutely Certain” He Could Impose Death Penalty (December 15, 2015)"

Field Sobriety Testing and the Fifth Amendment (November 23, 2015)

Most drivers stopped on suspicion of impaired driving are asked to submit to field sobriety tests before they are arrested.  Those tests often include the three standardized tests, which researchers have found to enhance officers’ ability to accurately identify impairment:  the one-leg stand, the walk-and-turn, and the horizontal gaze nystagmus tests. Officers sometimes use other types of field tests that have not been validated, such as asking participants to recite the alphabet or to conduct counting exercises. Evidence gained from any of these pre-arrest tests may be admitted against the defendant at trial without running afoul of the Fifth Amendment right to be free from self-incrimination.  That’s because suspects aren’t in custody for purposes of the Fifth Amendment or Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966) when they are temporarily detained for a traffic stop and are asked a moderate number of stop-related questions. Berkemer v. McCarty, 468 U.S. 420, 440 (1984); State v. Braswell, 222 N.C. App. 176 (2012). But what if the suspect is asked to perform field sobriety tests after he is arrested?  Must he first be provided Miranda warnings?

READ POST "Field Sobriety Testing and the Fifth Amendment (November 23, 2015)"