An experienced attorney from another state recently remarked on her surprise at learning that there was no statute of limitations barring the prosecution of felony offenses in North Carolina after the passage of a specified period of time. This attorney’s comment reminded me that while the no-statute-of-limitations-state-of-affairs may be well-known among experienced practitioners of criminal law in NC, it isn’t necessarily known by others.
Procedure
Eleventh Circuit Weighs in on the Constitutional Parameters for Bail Systems
Interest in bail reform is heating up in North Carolina. The Chief Justice’s North Carolina Commission on the Administration of Law and Justice recommended implementing evidence-based pretrial justice reform, and reform already is happening in several counties. The North Carolina Courts Commission took up the issue at its September 2018 meeting and Attorney General Josh Stein recently announced a stakeholder Roundtable on the topic. Among the reasons for the interest is this: Litigation risk. Advocates of bail reform have racked up wins in other jurisdictions. In March, I wrote (here) about a recent Fifth Circuit decision holding that the bail system in Harris County Texas violated due process and equal protection. (That opinion was superseded after rehearing but the court’s holding remains essentially the same). In August, the Eleventh Circuit decided Walker v. City of Calhoun, GA, ___ F.3d ___, 2018 WL 4000252 (11th Cir. Aug. 22, 2018). Here’s what happened there:
The Old Bailey: A Typical Trial Docket in an Atypical Setting
Earlier this week, the students and I spent the afternoon at Central Criminal Court in London, formerly called the Old Bailey and located at the intersection of Old Bailey and Newgate streets in the heart of London’s law district. I can guarantee that this post will not be as captivating as Rumpole of the Bailey, the British television series about fictional barrister Horace Rumpole. But, like most trips to court, it was certainly interesting.
Unpublished Cases: What’s the Law?
As far as I know, July 21, 2015, was a pretty normal day at the North Carolina Court of Appeals. The court published around a dozen opinions. Most of them dealt with issues like worker’s compensation and equitable distribution, but there were a few criminal cases. One of them was State v. Saldierna, a juvenile interrogation case, which was later reversed. Bob Farb blogged about that here.
In other words, just another day at the office.
The court also released more than 30 additional opinions on the same day, on the same website, written by the same judges, and many of them addressed hot-button criminal topics like lay witness identification of drugs, custodial interrogations of juveniles, sufficiency of a drug indictment, and improper closing arguments.
But those cases were marked as “unpublished,” so we all pretty much just ignored them and pretended they didn’t happen.
Wait… what? What are unpublished cases? We’re told that citing to them is “disfavored,” so are they good law or not? Who decides which cases make the cut for publication? And more importantly — why? In a digital world where cases are available online, what does “unpublished” really mean? And why are we talking about July 21, 2015?
So many questions. I have one or two answers.
State v. Hobson and the Presentment Controversy
Presentments have been a hot topic lately and the court of appeals just issued a decision involving a presentment. This post explains the controversy and the significance of the recent opinion.
Turner Reversed
Last week, the state supreme court unanimously reversed State v. Turner, __ N.C. App. __, 793 S.E.2d 287 (2016), and held that any “any criminal pleading that establishes jurisdiction in the district court should toll the two-year statute of limitations” set forth in G.S. 15-1. It did so in a case named State v. Curtis. This post recaps the Turner controversy and unpacks the ruling in Curtis.
G.S. 15A-928: One crime, two charges, one judgment?
Whenever a prior offense “raises an offense of lower grade to one of higher grade and thereby becomes an element” of the current offense (e.g., habitual larceny, habitual misdemeanor assault, habitual DWI, and second or subsequent charges for certain other offenses such as stalking, shoplifting, or carrying a concealed firearm), the state must plead and try the case in compliance with G.S. 15A-928. In short, this statute requires that: (i) an “improvised” name for the alleged offense must be used to avoid referring to any prior convictions; (ii) any prior offenses must be alleged in a separate indictment (or at least as a separate count within the indictment); (iii) the defendant must be separately arraigned on the alleged priors outside the presence of the jury; and (iv) if the defendant admits to the prior convictions, then that element has been proved and the state may not present evidence on it, nor will it be submitted to the jury.
Shea Denning has previously posted about G.S. 15A-928 and some of the key cases interpreting its requirements here and here, but last week I received an interesting procedural question on this topic.
When the state complies with these pleading rules, the result will be two separate indictments (or counts) pending in court, but of course there is really only one criminal offense being charged, and the defendant may only receive one punishment for it. What is the recommended procedure for how the charge(s?) and sentence(s?) should be reflected in the plea transcript or verdict form, and how should the court structure its judgment? This post offers a few thoughts and suggestions.
Marsy’s Law Is on the Ballot; Voters Will Decide Whether it Goes on the Books
There will be six constitutional amendments on the ballot this November. One of them, S.L. 2018-110 (H 551), expands the constitutional rights of crime victims. Voters will be asked to vote for or against a “Constitutional amendment to strengthen protections for victims of crime; to establish certain absolute basic rights for crimes; and to ensure the enforcement of these rights.” If House Bill 3, ratified yesterday, becomes law no additional explanation of the amendment will appear on the ballot, though the Constitutional Amendments Publication Commission will prepare an explanation of the amendment at least 75 days before the election. If you just can’t wait that long to learn more about the amendment and its effect on existing law, this post is for you.
Does a Stipulation to Lab Results Waive Confrontation Rights?
Defendants can lose confrontation rights a number of ways. Under the various notice and demand statutes, failure to object and demand the presence of the witness in a timely manner following receipt of the State’s notice results in waiver of the right to personally confront the witness. See, e.g., G.S. 90-95(g); G.S. 20-139.1(e1) (among others). A defendant can also forfeit his or her right to confrontation by wrongdoing—where the State can prove that the defendant’s conduct resulted in the unavailability of a witness, the defendant loses the right to confront that witness. Giles v. California, 554 U.S. 353 (2005). Stipulations to the admissibility of evidence, the subject of today’s post, are another form of waiver. When the defendant stipulates to a lab result, the right to personally confront the analyst is lost. What process is due before the judge accepts such a stipulation? Is the stipulation itself sufficient to waive confrontation rights? Or should the trial judge personally engage the defendant to ensure the waiver of confrontation rights is knowing and voluntary before accepting the stipulation? The Court of Appeals answered that question in a recent case.
May a Defendant Appeal an Infraction to Superior Court?
Suppose a defendant is found responsible in district court for one of the many infractions codified in Chapter 20. Take your pick: speeding, a seat belt violation, jaywalking, improper passing, or one of the many other non-criminal motor vehicle offenses. The defendant wishes to appeal that adjudication. May she appeal the case to superior court?