This post summarizes the published criminal opinions released by the Supreme Court of North Carolina on October 17, 2025.
Criminal defendants may not subpoena body camera footage and other recordings in the custody of law enforcement agencies; they must use the procedures set forth in G.S. 132-1.4A.
State v. Chemuti, __ N.C. __ (Oct. 17, 2025) (Dietz). Mooresville officers arrested Charlotte Chemuti for resisting a public officer. Prior to trial, she served a subpoena on the police department for any pertinent BWC footage. The town responded in writing that it would not produce recordings except pursuant to the procedures set forth in G.S. 132-1.4A. A district court judge eventually ordered the town to produce any relevant recordings, reasoning that the procedure laid out in G.S. 132-1.4A provides one avenue for obtaining recordings but that a subpoena is also a valid means of compulsory process.
The town appealed. The Court of Appeals dismissed the appeal as premature. The town sought review in the Supreme Court of North Carolina, which determined that the appeal was timely.
On the merits, the Supreme Court ruled that the statutory procedure in G.S. 132-1.4A “supplants the use of a subpoena and is now the exclusive means to obtain [agency] recordings for use in a criminal case.” Chemuti argued that a court-issued subpoena was a court order that satisfied the statute, but the Supreme Court said that in context, the only acceptable kind of order was one issued pursuant to G.S. 132-1.4A itself. Further, the court noted that the statute provides for the direct release of recordings to the district attorney and does not provide for comparable direct release to criminal defendants, supporting the idea that the legislature intended the defense to access recordings through the procedures set out in the statute.
The court next considered whether this reading of the statute compromised a defendant’s right to present a defense through compulsory process. Relying on Pennsylvania v. Ritchie, 480 U.S. 39 (1987) (holding that it was permissible to require a defendant to seek judicial in camera review before obtaining the disclosure of exculpatory evidence contained in child abuse/neglect files), the court found no constitutional problem. It observed that the state has a “compelling interest in limiting access to [agency] recordings,” which may reveal “places that are not open to public view [including] people’s cars, their workplaces, even their bedrooms.” Officers may also interact with “people at their lowest or most vulnerable points,” including “victims and their suffering.” Requiring defendants to go through the statutory process may be somewhat burdensome, but any burden is justified by the confidentiality concerns just noted. Furthermore, any constitutional concern is alleviated by the fact that superior court judges considering requests for access to recordings must rule on those requests “consistent with the defendant’s constitutional rights to due process and compulsory process.” Specifically, “if a defendant is constitutionally entitled to the records, then the superior court must enter an order for their release, regardless of whether the statute’s criteria permit it.”
Justice Riggs dissented, joined by Justice Earls. The dissenters would have held that the statutory procedure is not exclusive and that a subpoena is an appropriate way to seek video footage.
Trial judge’s statement that impeachment evidence offered by the defense in a statutory rape case was “more prejudicial than probative” misstated the law under Rule 403; exclusion of the evidence was prejudicial error requiring a new trial.
State v. Lail, __ N.C. __ (Oct. 17, 2025) (per curiam). This Catawba County case arose when a 13-year-old girl reported that the defendant, apparently an older family member of some kind, had sexually abused her. A nurse practitioner examined the girl and found a scar on her hymen consistent with blunt force trauma. The defendant was charged with statutory rape, incest, and other offenses.
The case went to trial. The girl testified to the sexual abuse. The defendant testified and denied it. During the girl’s testimony, the defendant sought to introduce on cross examination a note the girl admitted was in her handwriting. It read in part, “I looked out my open window to see my boyfriend Larry in his car. . . . I quickly got in his car.” On voir dire, the girl said that she did not remember writing the note and had never met “Larry” in person, but that the note could have been a fictional story “or it could have been a dream I had or anything really.”
The parties disputed the admissibility of the note, with the defense seemingly contending that the note undermined the girl’s credibility and perhaps suggested an alternate explanation for the damage to her hymen. The State apparently asserted that the note was likely fictional and risked confusing the jury. The trial judge sided with the State and excluded the note, stating that “[a]t best it might be fanciful or fantasy,” and that “I also think it’s more prejudicial than probative.”
A divided panel of the Court of Appeals ruled that the trial judge erred in excluding the note and ordered a new trial. The majority reasoned that the trial judge applied the wrong legal standard: the judge said that the note was “more prejudicial than probative,” but Rule 403 allows the exclusion of evidence when “its probative value is substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice” or other harms. (Emphasis supplied.) Under the correct standard, the note should have been admitted because “[t]he contradictions within the Note and created by the Note are highly probative of Complainant’s credibility.” The reference to “Larry” could have referenced an “actual encounter” and cast doubt on the girl’s testimony that she did not have a boyfriend at the time. The dissenting judge would have ruled that the admissibility of the note was not preserved and that the trial judge did not err.
The Supreme Court then reviewed the case. The per curiam opinion (representing four Justices’ views, as three Justices dissented) affirmed the Court of Appeals. The opinion states that (1) the defendant’s objection was preserved, (2) the trial court applied the wrong standard when applying Rule 403, rendering the ruling an abuse of discretion, and (3) that there was a reasonable possibility that exclusion of the evidence would have changed the outcome of the case given the “potential impact of that evidence on the key witness’s credibility.”
Chief Justice Newby, joined by Justice Allen, dissented in part, agreeing on points (1) and (2) but not (3); they would have reversed the court of appeals on the issue of prejudice. Justice Riggs agreed on point (1) but would have ruled that the trial judge’s reference to “more prejudicial than probative” was “unfortunate phrasing” but did not indicate a misapprehension of the correct legal standard. She therefore would have held that the trial court properly exercised its discretion and would have reversed the Court of Appeals.
[Editor’s note: This summary draws on both appellate opinions to provide a fuller presentation of the facts and legal arguments of the parties.]
A search warrant was supported by probable cause even without the evidence obtained during a knock and talk, rendering it unnecessary to decide whether the knock and talk was constitutional.
State v. Norman, __ N.C. __ (Oct. 17, 2025) (Newby). This Henderson County case began when perpetrators broke into a store and stole cigarettes, lottery tickets, and cash from an ATM. A few days later, a woman attempted to redeem one of the stolen tickets at a different store. This triggered an alert to the store, and the store declined the redemption request and notified law enforcement. The second store’s surveillance video showed that the woman had arrived in a black Dodge Durango. An officer drove in the direction that the Durango had gone after leaving the store and saw a black Durango parked at a residence a few minutes down the road. The officer determined that the Durango had a fictitious tag. He called for backup.
The lead officer approached the front door of the residence and knocked, but no one answered. He then walked to the Durango, parked in the driveway, to verify the tag. Through a window, he saw cigarettes and lottery ticket that matched the kinds that had been stolen in the break-in. He went to prepare a search warrant application, leaving two other officers on scene. Those other officers conducted further investigation, not pertinent to the legal issues before the Supreme Court, that led to the discovery of the defendant inside the home along with power tools and other evidence consistent with the break-in.
Meanwhile, a magistrate issued a search warrant for the Durango. A search revealed “cutting wheels/blades, a large hammer, a ‘strong arm’ battery, ski masks, gloves, five unopened packs of Marlboro Gold cigarettes, a drill bit,” and more.
A few weeks later, based on the above evidence and a report from an anonymous tipster, the lead officer obtained a search warrant for the residence and uncovered additional evidence. The defendant was charged with crimes related to the break-in. The defendant moved to suppress virtually all the evidence against him, arguing that it was all the fruit of what he saw as improper observations made of his residence and vehicle during the officers’ initial approach to the home to conduct a knock and talk. His motion was denied and he pleaded guilty, reserving his right to appeal. A divided panel of the Court of Appeals affirmed.
The Supreme Court declined to “decide whether the officers’ conduct during the knock and talk exceeded constitutional bounds.” Instead, it ruled that the search warrant for the Durango was supported by probable cause even without the evidence obtained during the knock and talk at the residence, including the proximity of the Durango to the store where the woman attempted to redeem the lottery ticket and the fictitious tag.
Justice Earls, joined by Justices Dietz and Riggs, concurred but would have addressed the propriety of the knock and talk. They would have ruled that the officers “lingered” in the driveway and walked around the car after no one answered the door, thereby exceeding the scope of the implied license for any visitor to approach a residence and violating the Fourth Amendment.
If the state constitution’s search and seizure provisions imply any exclusionary rule at all, it is subject to a good faith exception; State v. Carter is overruled.
State v. Rogers, __ N.C. __ (Oct. 17, 2025) (Newby). In this New Hanover County case, an officer investigating suspected drug trafficking sought a court order allowing him to access the defendant’s cell site location information (CSLI). A superior court judge found that the officer’s application was supported by probable cause and issued the order. The CSLI revealed that the defendant traveled to California and quickly returned to North Carolina, where he was apprehended with trafficking amounts of cocaine in his vehicle. The defendant was charged with drug offenses and moved to suppress the CSLI. A superior court judge denied the motion and the defendant pleaded guilty, reserving his right to appeal.
The Court of Appeals determined the court order was supported only by reasonable suspicion, not probable cause. It ruled that this violated the defendant’s state and federal constitutional rights, and that at least as to the state constitution, no good faith exception was available in light of State v. Carter, 322 N.C. 709 (1988).
The Supreme Court seemingly accepted the Court of Appeals’ determination that the order was supported only by reasonable suspicion and that probable cause was required. However, it ruled that suppression was not an appropriate remedy. As to any violation of the United States Constitution, the officer reasonably relied on the court order, so the good faith exception from United States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897 (1984), rendered the federal exclusionary rule inapplicable.
Turning to the state constitution, the court noted that prior to Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 (1961) (holding that the exclusionary rule applicable to violations of the United States Constitution applies to the states), there was no exclusionary rule for violations of the state constitution. In decisions after Mapp, though, the Supreme Court of North Carolina “began to sow seeds of confusion into our constitutional criminal procedure jurisprudence,” ultimately in Carter “proclaim[ing], without explanation,” that violations of the state constitution’s search and seizure provisions require suppression and that no good faith exception exists. The court viewed Carter as a confusing and analytically weak opinion that “did not evaluate Article I, Section 20’s text, consider the historical context, or reconcile itself with precedents expressly disclaiming any exclusionary rule other than as provided by statute.” Therefore, the Supreme Court overruled Carter. However, it did not rule that there is no exclusionary rule for violations of the state constitution. That issue was apparently not briefed by the parties and the court left it for another day. Instead, assuming arguendo that the state constitution does imply an exclusionary rule, the court ruled that any such exclusionary rule contains a good faith exception for the reasons set forth in Leon. Therefore, the state constitution also did not require the suppression of the CSLI in this case.
Justice Earls, joined by Justice Riggs, dissented. The dissenters would have reaffirmed Carter, the “majestic” conception of constitutional protections that it embodied, and the values of judicial integrity and constitutional legitimacy that it promoted. They also criticized the majority’s decision not to decide whether an exclusionary rule exists for violations of the state constitution but nonetheless to establish a good faith exception to the possible rule.
The trial judge did not err by finding no prima facie case in connection with a Batson challenge; step one of the Batson analysis was not moot simply because the prosecutor volunteered race-neutral reasons for peremptory challenges.
State v. Wilson, __ N.C. __ (Oct. 17, 2025) (Berger). In this Cleveland County case, the defendant was charged with murder and other offenses after he shot and killed a woman and her young son and shot and wounded another person. During jury selection, the State used peremptory challenges on two Black jurors. The defense raised a Batson challenge and the prosecutor quickly explained that the first strike was due to the juror knowing a member of the defendant’s family and the second was due to the juror yawning and not being attentive during jury selection. The trial court found no prima facie case of racial discrimination. The defendant was convicted and appealed.
A divided Court of Appeals ordered a remand for a new Batson hearing. The majority concluded that the discussion of the reasons for the prosecutor’s strikes rendered moot the first step of the Batson analysis, which considers whether the defendant has made a prima facie case, and advanced the matter to the third step of the analysis, which considers whether the defendant has carried his or her burden of showing purposeful discrimination. Because the trial court nonetheless purported to rule on the first step third step, a remand was required for the trial judge to address the third step.
The Supreme Court reversed the Court of Appeals. It emphasized that step one, concerning the existence of a prima facie case, is not moot simply because a prosecutor offers race-neutral reasons for strikes. It is moot only when the trial court “rules on the ultimate question of intentional discrimination.” Here, the court ruled only on step one. Although the trial judge asked whether the State wanted “to be heard” on the Batson issue and the prosecutor responded by giving race-neutral reasons for the strikes, the judge’s inquiry was properly seeking input on step one, and the prosecution’s decision instead to comment on later steps in the process did not lead the court to go beyond step one in its ruling.
Justice Earls, joined by Justice Riggs, dissented. The dissenters would have affirmed the Court of Appeals. They noted that after the State offered its race-neutral reasons, the trial judge – in addition to stating that there was no prima facie case – also made comments echoing or seemingly endorsing at least some of the State’s race-neutral reasons, such as when the court stated that it had noted the demeanor of the yawning juror and “was concerned about her.”