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Case Summaries: N.C. Supreme Court (Oct. 18, 2024)

This post summarizes the published criminal opinions from the Supreme Court of North Carolina released on October 18, 2024. These summaries will be added to Smith’s Criminal Case Compendium, a free and searchable database of case summaries from 2008 to the present.

Supreme Court per curiam affirms the Court of Appeals decision regarding exigent circumstances justifying warrantless blood draw.

State v. Burris, 198A23, ___ N.C. ___ (Oct. 18, 2024). The Supreme Court per curiam affirmed the Court of Appeals decision State v. Burris, 289 N.C. App. 535 (2023). In that decision, the Court of Appeals majority held that denying defendant’s motion to suppress the results of a warrantless blood draw did not represent error because the State established sufficient evidence of exigent circumstances. Further discussion about the Court of Appeals decision and the applicable legal standard is in this blog post by Prof. Shea Denning.

Trial judge’s finding of aggravating factors in violation of the DWI sentencing statute did not automatically entitle a defendant to a new sentencing hearing; G.S. 20-179(a1)(2) does not provide defendant greater protection than required under Blakely and requires only harmless error review.

State v. King, 119A23, ___ N.C. ___ (Oct. 18, 2024). In this Buncombe County case, the Supreme Court reversed the Court of Appeals decision vacating defendant’s convictions for driving while impaired (DWI) and reckless driving due to errors by the trial court in finding aggravating factors while sentencing. The Court remanded to the Court of Appeals for a new hearing to determine whether the error was harmless.

In August of 2021, defendant was convicted in district court of DWI, reckless driving, and possession of marijuana and paraphernalia. Defendant appealed, and at superior court a jury found him guilty of DWI and reckless driving but acquitted him of the other charges. During sentencing, the trial judge found three aggravating factors and no mitigating factors, and sentenced defendant to a Level III punishment. The Court of Appeals took up defendant’s appeal and found error, as aggravating factors must be found by a jury under Blakely v. Washington, 542 U.S. 296 (2004); the court also noted G.S. 20-179(a1)(2) was amended to prevent trial judges from determining aggravating factors. The majority held that a violation of G.S. 20-179 entitled defendant to a new sentencing hearing, while the dissenting judge argued the error was harmless, Blakely errors only lead to a harmless error review, and defendant was not entitled to not automatic resentencing. The State appealed, leading to the current opinion.

The Supreme Court explained the issue at hand as “whether a trial judge’s finding of aggravating factors in violation of the DWI sentencing statute automatically entitles a defendant to a new sentencing hearing.” Slip Op. at 6. The Court held that “[t]he finding of aggravating factors by a trial judge contrary to [G.S.] 20-179(a1)(2) does not constitute reversible error if the error was harmless.” Id. at 7. To reach this conclusion, the Court examined the text of the statute, emphasizing that “the provision nowhere states that a violation automatically entitles a defendant to a new sentencing hearing.” Id. at 8. The Court noted that the current text of the statute was intended to comply with Blakely’s requirements, but disagreed with the Court of Appeals majority that the General Assembly intended “to provide protection beyond what the Sixth Amendment requires.” Id. Looking to legislative history and intent, the Court pointed to similar language in the Structured Sentencing Act as evidence that the intent was not to expand protection beyond harmless error review. The Court also overruled State v. Geisslercrain, 233 N.C. App. 186 (2014), to the extent that it conflicted with the conclusions in the current opinion. Slip Op. at 14-15.

Justice Earls, joined by Justice Riggs, dissented and agreed with the interpretation that G.S. 20-179(a1)(2) provides greater protection than required under Blakely, and that even if harmless error were the standard, defendant was entitled to a new sentencing hearing. Id. at 16.