This post summarizes the published criminal opinions from the Court of Appeals of North Carolina released on October 15, 2025.
(1) The trial court could meaningfully conduct a retrospective competency hearing occurring more than five years after the trial date given adequate evidence presented; (2) the trial court did not err in concluding that the defendant was competent to proceed to trial.
State v. Hollars, No. COA24-929 (N.C. Ct. App. Oct. 15, 2025) (Hampson). In this Watauga County case, the defendant challenged the trial court’s conclusions made after a retrospective competency hearing held more than five years after the trial date. On January 8, 2018, the first day of the defendant’s trial, defense counsel raised concerns about the defendant’s competency. The next morning, however, defense counsel stated he no longer had concerns. The trial court did not conduct a competency hearing, and the defendant was convicted of various sexual offenses. On appeal from the original trial, the Court of Appeals concluded that the trial court erred by failing to sua sponte conduct a competency hearing before or during trial. See State v. Hollars, 266 N.C. App. 534, 543-44 (2020). The Court of Appeals remanded to the trial court to determine whether it was possible to hold a meaningful retrospective determination of the defendant’s competency at trial and, if so, to determine whether the defendant was competent during his 2018 trial. The State appealed from this decision, and the North Carolina Supreme Court affirmed.
The retrospective competency hearing was held in July 2023. The trial court concluded that (1) it was possible to meaningfully determine the defendant’s competency to stand trial in 2018 and (2) the defendant was competent to stand trial. On appeal from the order finding the defendant competent to stand trial, the defendant challenged both of these conclusions, emphasizing the trial court’s failure to make a finding regarding a June 2017 competency evaluation in which the defendant was found incapable to proceed. However, the Court of Appeals stressed that the defendant was found capable of proceeding in August 2017. The trial court heard testimony from two expert witnesses, one of whom reviewed medical evidence dating from August 2017 to January 2018, including medication administration records, assessments, and treatment notes, some of which dated from January 4 and 6, 2018. The defense counsel, prosecutor, and judge from the original trial also testified at the hearing. The Court of Appeals concluded that there was “ample evidence” from which the trial court could determine the competency of the defendant to stand trial in January 2018 and that the trial court did not err in concluding the defendant was competent.
(1) The trial court did not have an obligation to inquire into the defendant’s competency to proceed where no substantial evidence showed she may have been mentally incompetent at the time of trial; (2) for related reasons, the trial court did not err in proceeding with trial in the defendant’s absence; (3) the trial court erred in calculating the defendant’s prior record level; (4) the trial court erred by imposing punishment for possession of methamphetamine where the offense was a lesser included offense of possession of controlled substance on jail premises, and the defendant was convicted of the latter.
State v. Stanley, No. COA25-158 (N.C. Ct. App. Oct. 15, 2025) (Tyson). In this Johnston County case, the defendant challenged the trial court’s decision to proceed with trial without holding a competency hearing and in the defendant’s absence, as well as aspects of sentencing. The defendant was convicted after trial of possession of a controlled substance on jail premises, possession of methamphetamine, possession of drug paraphernalia and habitual felon. The defendant contended that her statements and behaviors at the beginning of trial should have caused the trial court to sua sponte inquire into her competency. Some of these factors included the defendant’s prior drug use, statement that her “mental ain’t up to” testifying, reported side effects from mental health medication, and generally irrational and bizarre behavior. In addition, the defendant was late from lunch break on the first day of trial, prompting a warning from the judge that the trial would continue in her absence if she were late again. The defendant was again late on the second day of trial, and the trial proceeded in the defendant’s absence. When she arrived, she claimed she had a dispute with her roommate and was unable to find supervision for her dog.
The Court of Appeals held that despite some of the defendant’s unusual behaviors, there was a lack of “substantial evidence” showing the defendant may have been mentally incompetent at the time of trial. Noting that the inquiry was “temporal” in nature, the appellate court did not place weight on the defendant’s prior drug use and noted that the defendant stated she didn’t believe her medications were interfering with her ability to understand the charges and proceedings. The Court of Appeals concluded that the trial court was not compelled to inquire into the defendant’s competency. For similar reasons, the court held that it was not error to proceed with trial in the defendant’s absence once the defendant was late to court for the second time.
As to the defendant’s challenges to her sentencing, the Court of Appeals agreed that her prior record level was incorrectly calculated as her conviction for sale of a Schedule III controlled substance was misclassified as a Class G felony rather than a Class H felony. When properly calculated, the defendant’s prior record level was IV rather than V. Furthermore, the Court of Appeals agreed that the defendant should not have been convicted of both possession of a controlled substance on jail premises and possession of methamphetamine because the latter was a lesser-included offense of the former. The Court of Appeals remanded for resentencing.
The trial court erred in dismissing the charge of possession of a firearm by a felon under G.S. 14-415.1 as the statute was not unconstitutional as applied to the defendant under either the federal or state constitution.
State v. Williams, No. COA25-38 (N.C. Ct. App. Oct. 15, 2025) (Arrowood). In this Forsyth County case, the Court of Appeals took up the State’s appeal after the trial court dismissed a charge of possession of a firearm by a felon under G.S. 14-415.1 on the grounds that the statute was unconstitutional as applied to the defendant under both the federal and state constitutions.
The defendant was charged after authorities stopped his vehicle in 2023 and found a gun at the bottom of a bag, as well as a folded dollar bill in the defendant’s pocket with trace amounts of cocaine. The defendant had previously been convicted of seven felonies between 2000 and 2005 relating to possession or sale of cocaine and possession of a firearm by a felon. In addition, the defendant had been convicted of seven misdemeanors between 2004 and 2014, including violation of a DV protective order and communicating threats.
The Court of Appeals first considered defendant’s challenge under the United States Constitution. The court reviewed the history of various tests applied by the United States Supreme Court and the Fourth Circuit to determine whether a regulation unconstitutionally restricts conduct protected under the Second Amendment. The court began with District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570 (2008), and traced the evolution of the test through New York State Rifle & Pistol Ass’n, Inc. v. Bruen, 597 U.S. 1 (2022), and United States v. Rahimi, 602 U.S. 680 (2024). Bruen established a test that originally derived from Heller: “When the Second Amendment’s plain text covers an individual’s conduct, the Constitution presumptively protects that conduct. The government must then justify its regulation by demonstrating that it is consistent with the Nation’s historical tradition of firearm regulation.” The court also stressed language in cases such as Heller, Rahimi, and Hamilton v. Pallozzi, 848 F.3d 614 (4th Cir. 2017), supporting the proposition that felon in possession of firearm statutes are presumptively lawful without the need for case-by-case inquiry into whether a particular felon may be barred from possessing firearms. The court related the Fourth Circuit’s reasoning in United States v. Hunt, 123 F.4th 697 (4th Cir. 2024), that the “pre-existing right codified in the Second Amendment protects firearms possessed by the law-abiding, not by felons.” Id. at 705. Hunt (and Rahimi) also considered historical examples supporting “categorical disarmament” of people who committed felonies. Id. at 706.
After discussing the above series of federal cases as the “necessary superstructure” for analyzing a Second Amendment matter, the court proceeded to note a conflict between prior state cases addressing G.S. 14-415.1. The Court of Appeals in State v. Fernandez, 256 N.C. App. 539 (2017), determined that the defendant fell outside of the class of “law abiding, responsible citizen[s]” protected by the Second Amendment, id. at 546-47 (note that Fernandez applied a two-step analysis used by federal courts before Bruen was decided). In contrast, the Court of Appeals in State v. Sanes, 297 N.C. App. 863 (2025), held that the defendant’s conduct was covered by the plain text of the Second Amendment as G.S. 14-415.1 revokes an individual’s right to keep and bear arms following a felony conviction (the Sanes Court nonetheless determined that the defendant’s challenge failed given the sufficient historical tradition of disarming felons and the defendant’s history of violence).
The Court of Appeals resolved this conflict by reference to caselaw governing the “rare situation” in which “two lines of irreconcilable precedent develop independently- meaning the cases never acknowledge each other or their conflict.” See State v. Gonzalez, 263 N.C. App. 527, 531 (2019). The court stated it was authorized by the Supreme Court to “follow the older of the two cases and reject the more recent precedent.” Id. The court thus concluded that the Second Amendment does not presumptively protect possession of firearms by felons and that the defendant was unable to establish that he is a “law-abiding citizen” protected by the Second Amendment. As the defendant could not pass the first step of the Bruen test, the court did not address the second step. The court concluded that the trial court erred in dismissing the charge as unconstitutional under the federal constitution as applied to the defendant.
The Court of Appeals next considered the defendant’s challenge under the North Carolina Constitution (Art. I Sec. 30). The court set forth the five-factor test to guide analysis for such as-applied challenges under Britt v. State, 363 N.C. 546, 550 (2009): (1) the type of felony convictions, particularly whether they involved violence, (2) the remoteness in time of the felony convictions, (3) the felon’s history of law-abiding conduct since the crime, (4) the felon’s history of responsible, lawful firearm possession during a time period when possession of firearms was not prohibited, and (5) the felon’s assiduous and proactive compliance with the 2004 amendment. The court distinguished between the defendant in Britt, who had been convicted of one felony count of possession with intent to sell and deliver a controlled substance 20 years prior, had no history of violence, and had a lengthy post-conviction history of respect for the law as well as 17 years of responsible, lawful firearm possession, with the defendant in State v. Whitaker, 201 N.C. App. 190, 206 (2009), who showed a “blatant disregard for the law” based on several misdemeanor convictions and three felony convictions, and who had acquired guns after the 2004 amendment that prohibited him from possessing them. The court reviewed the defendant’s history and conduct in the case at bar and concluded that the facts were much closer to those in Whitaker rather than Britt. The court thus concluded that the trial court erred in dismissing the charge as unconstitutional under the state constitution as applied to the defendant.
Thus, the Court of Appeals vacated the trial court’s order dismissing the charge and remanded the matter.