This post summarizes the published criminal opinions from the North Carolina Court of Appeals released on June 4, 2025. Previously, summaries were added to Smith’s Criminal Case Compendium, but due to personnel changes and resource limitations, that resource is no longer available. We will continue to post and archive new summaries here on the blog.
A prosecutor’s arguments concerning a witness’s truthfulness were not improper vouching. They properly highlighted the fact that the witness’s testimony matched the physical evidence.
State v. Arrington, __ N.C. App. __ (June 4, 2025) (Collins). During closing arguments in the defendant’s murder trial, the prosecutor argued that a specific prosecution witness was the “most credible witness that testified in this trial,” and that he “told [the jury] the truth.” Defense counsel did not object and the defendant was convicted. On appeal, the defendant argued that this was improper vouching for the credibility of the witness, and that the trial judge erred by failing to intervene ex mero motu. The Court of Appeals determined that the prosecutor’s arguments were proper. Viewed in context, they were not statements of “personal belief” in the witness’s honesty. Rather, they were proper arguments highlighting the fact that the witness’s testimony matched the physical evidence.
A trial judge correctly stated the law concerning the need to acknowledge guilt in order to claim diminished capacity, and did not plainly err in instructing the jury on insanity.
State v. Copenhaver, __ N.C. App. __ (June 4, 2025) (multiple authors). The defendant stabbed her mother 95 times and left her body in a closet. She was charged with murder. Initially, the trial court found that she lacked capacity to proceed, but her capacity subsequently was restored. Defense counsel advised her to pursue an insanity defense, but the defendant refused and instead sought to advance a diminished capacity defense. The trial judge held a colloquy with the defendant, asking her whether she understood that to support diminished capacity, she would need to concede that she was “responsible for the death of the victim.” After some back and forth, the defendant agreed that her counsel could acknowledge her guilt to the extent necessary to pursue diminished capacity. At trial, she introduced evidence her history of behavioral health problems. The trial judge instructed the jury on both insanity and diminished capacity, and the defendant was convicted of first-degree murder.
On appeal, the defendant first argued that the trial court erred during its pretrial colloquy with her by promising that a diminished capacity defense would “guarantee” an instruction on second-degree murder, and conversely, by indicating that without a diminished capacity defense, the jury would not be instructed on second-degree murder. The Court of Appeals, quoting extensively from the transcript and highlighting the trial judge’s qualifying statements like “possibly” and “likely,” determined that the judge’s comments, “taken as a whole, accurately state the law.”
The defendant next argued that the trial judge erred by instructing the jury on insanity. Although prior to trial the defendant had opposed relying on the insanity defense, at the charge conference defense counsel did not object to the issuance of the instruction, so the Court of Appeals reviewed for plain error. Assuming arguendo that the trial court erred by giving the instruction, the Court of Appeals determined that it did not rise to the level of plain error. The jury rejected both diminished capacity and the insanity defense and found that the defendant had the culpable mental state required for first-degree murder.
Finally, the defendant contended that her attorney provided ineffective assistance of counsel by (1) acknowledging her guilt, to the extent required to claim diminished capacity, without her fully informed consent, and (2) failing to object to the insanity instruction. The Court of Appeals determined that the record was sufficient to address these claims on direct appeal. It rejected the first because the colloquy between the trial judge and the defendant showed that she understood the consequences of pursuing a diminished capacity defense. It rejected the second because it saw no prejudice to the defendant.
Judge Hampson dissented in part and would have dismissed the ineffective assistance claims without prejudice so that they could be considered in the first instance in superior court.
The trial court properly instructed the jury only on armed robbery where the evidence showed the defendant openly brandished a rifle while taking the victim’s property.
State v. Gamble, __ N.C. App. __ (June 4, 2025) (Tyson). The victim’s teenage daughter and the defendant entered the victim’s bedroom. The defendant was masked and carried a rifle. The defendant did not speak or point the rifle at the victim, but the victim feared for her life and fled. The defendant and the victim’s daughter stole two of the victim’s purses. They were apprehended nearby after a vehicle pursuit. The defendant was charged with armed robbery, conspiracy to commit armed robbery, and fleeing to elude. He was convicted and appealed.
First, he argued that the trial judge erred in refusing to instruct the jury on the lesser included offense of common law robbery. Such an instruction must be given if the evidence supports it, but not if the evidence is “positive” as to every element of the greater offense. The defendant claimed that there was doubt as to whether he threatened the victim’s life because he did not point the rifle at her. The Court of Appeals disagreed. The defendant openly brandished a weapon so that the victim could see it; that was a threat to her life.
Second, he asserted that the trial judge erred by refusing to instruct the jury that mere possession of a deadly weapon during a robbery is insufficient to support a verdict of armed robbery. The Court of Appeals noted that the defendant was “holding the rifle in plain sight,” rendering the mere possession instruction inapplicable. Similarly, the reviewing court discerned no prejudicial error in the trial judge’s refusal to give a mere possession instruction in response to the jury’s question about the element of threatening or endangering the life of another.
There was sufficient evidence that the defendant was a male where his girlfriend used masculine pronouns to refer to him.
State v. Gardner, __ N.C. App. __ (June 4, 2025) (Hampson). The defendant choked his girlfriend and was charged with assault on a female. Both the prosecutor and defense counsel referred to the defendant exclusively using masculine pronouns, and the girlfriend also used “he” and “him” to refer to the defendant. At the close of the State’s evidence, the defendant moved to dismiss based on insufficient evidence that he was a male. The trial court denied the motion, the defendant was convicted, and he appealed. The defendant’s notice of appeal was premature, so he sought certiorari review, which the Court of Appeals granted after an extended discussion. However, the court declined to consider the defendant’s constitutional challenges – that the assault on a female statute is vague and violates the Equal Protection Clause – because those constitutional claims were not preserved below.
The Court of Appeals did consider the defendant’s claim of insufficient evidence, but found that the girlfriend’s use of male pronouns was sufficient circumstantial evidence that the defendant was a male. The defendant also asserted that he received ineffective assistance of counsel, but the Court of Appeals dismissed that claim without prejudice to allow the defendant to present it to a trial court with an appropriate evidentiary record.
Judge Freeman dissented in part, arguing that certioarari review should not have been granted.
The defendant’s plea was knowing and voluntary despite some ambiguity concerning the scope of his appellate rights. His consent to search his phone was also voluntary.
State v. Hannah, __ N.C. App. __ (June 4, 2025) (Carpenter). The defendant came under suspicion after he sold a stolen gun to a gun shop. Police located his car, watched it, and stopped it after a traffic violation. The defendant was inside with drugs, two other men, and a 14-year-old girl. Police arrested the defendant in connection with the stolen gun.
While interviewing him, they requested consent to search his phone, telling him that absent his consent, the phone would not be returned immediately and they would seek a search warrant for it. He consented, and officers found explicit text messages between the defendant and the girl. The officers questioned him about the messages, both that day and a few months later, and he made incriminating admissions.
He was charged with statutory rape of a person 15 years old or younger and related offenses. He filed pretrial motions, including several motions to suppress, one of which was granted. On the cusp of trial, he agreed to plead guilty, reserving his right to appeal.
His first claim, raised via petition for certiorari, was that his guilty plea was not knowing and voluntary. He contended that the trial judge wrongly told him, and he believed, that he was preserving his right to appeal the denial of all his pretrial motions – when in fact, the law allowed him to appeal only the denial of his motions to suppress. After an extended discussion of the standard for issuance of a writ of certiorari, the court of appeals declined to issue the writ because the defendant could not show that “error was probably committed below.” Reviewing the trial court’s colloquy with the defendant as a whole, the trial judge was clear that the defendant was preserving his right to appeal the denial of his motions to suppress. Although the judge did at least once refer to the appeal of “pretrial motions” more generally, overall the defendant was adequately informed of the scope of his appeal rights.
The defendant’s second argument concerned the denial of his motion to suppress the evidence seized from his phone. He contended that his consent to search the phone was invalid because it was given during an unlawful detention. The Court of Appeals disagreed, deeming the detention lawful. Officers had probable cause to arrest the defendant in connection with the stolen gun, and that investigation was ongoing. Furthermore, they had reasonable suspicion to detain him based on the fact that his lock screen picture was of the girl, which suggested an improper relationship.
Finally, the defendant appealed the denial of his motion to suppress based on the claim that his consent was coerced. He pointed to the officers’ statements that his phone would not immediately be returned if he did not consent and that they would seek a search warrant for the phone. The Court of Appeals rejected this argument too, reasoning that the defendant’s desire to get his phone back promptly, while understandable, did not rise to the level of coercion. Further, the officers had a right to seek a search warrant if the defendant refused consent, so it was not coercive to tell him so.
There was sufficient evidence of a “serious injury” where a bullet wound caused pain, difficulty walking, and inability to work for a month.
State v. Maloye, __ N.C. App. __ (June 4, 2025) (Stading). The defendant pointed a gun at the victim in a convenience store parking lot in an attempt to rob him. The two fought over the gun and it discharged. The bullet grazed the victim’s leg. He was treated on the scene and later at a doctor’s office, but was never hospitalized. For a month after the incident he had to bandage the wound, took ibuprofen, had trouble walking, and missed work. The defendant was convicted of AWDWISI and other charges and appealed.
The defendant contended that the evidence was insufficient to establish a “serious injury,” but the Court of Appeals disagreed. The court noted that whether an injury is “serious” is a factual determination to be made by the jury after consideration of various factors. Hospitalization is not required. In light of the victim’s pain, difficulty walking, and inability to work, there was substantial evidence supporting the jury’s verdict.
The prosecutor’s recitations provided a sufficient factual basis to support the defendant’s guilty plea. Although the information was drawn largely from the defendant’s indictments, it contained “factual details” beyond the elements of the offenses.
State v. Owens, __ N.C. App. __ (June 4, 2025) (Arrowood). The defendant pled guilty to common law robbery and was sentenced as a habitual felon. He filed a timely pro se notice of appeal, but it did not list all the correct case numbers and was not served on the State. Therefore, he also petitioned for a writ of certiorari. The essence of his claim was the allegation that the State presented an inadequate factual basis to support the plea.
The Court of Appeals agreed to conduct certiorari review but rejected the defendant’s argument. The defendant noted that the factual basis consisted largely of the prosecutor reading from the defendant’s indictments. The court acknowledged that this might be insufficient if the indictments lacked factual details, but in this case, they contained “factual details [that] go beyond the charge alleged,” such as the nature of the property taken and the identity of the rightful owner. Although the prosecutor’s recitations contained “minor inaccuracies and omissions,” overall, the necessary information was provided.
Judge Freeman dissented in part, opining that there were no “extraordinary circumstances” in this case to justify certiorari review.