This post summarizes published criminal law and related cases released by the Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals during September 2025. Cases of potential interest to state practitioners are summarized monthly. Previous summaries of Fourth Circuit cases are available here.
Former law criminalizing improper voting by felons violated equal protection principles and was properly enjoined
Philip Randolf Institute v. North Carolina State Board of Elections, ___ F.4th ___; 2025 WL 2627027 (Sept. 12, 2025). People convicted of a felony are not permitted to vote in North Carolina until their citizenship rights have been restored. N.C. Const. art. VI, § 2(3). A convicted felon’s citizenship rights are automatically restored by law once the person’s sentence is complete. G.S. 13-1. Before 2024, North Carolina law imposed felony liability on a felon who improperly votes, regardless of whether the person knew they were ineligible to vote. G.S. 163-275(5) (2019). The plaintiffs, two advocacy groups, sued the North Carolina State Board of Elections and the district attorneys of the state, arguing that G.S. 163-275(5) violated equal protection and due process protections in the Fourteenth Amendment. The district court denied a motion to dismiss by the district attorneys, and the case proceeded to summary judgment. Before summary judgment was decided, the General Assembly amended the statute to add a knowledge element. As amended, G.S. 163-275(5) (2024) criminalizes the act of voting by a person convicted of a felony who knows that their citizenship rights have not yet been restored. After additional briefing in response to the legislative change, a magistrate judge recommended denying the plaintiffs’ motion for summary judgment as moot and dismissing the matter. The district court disagreed with that recommendation and ruled that the risk of prosecutions under the older version of the law meant that the controversy was still live. The district court granted the plaintiffs summary judgment in full, finding the statute unconstitutional under the Fourteenth Amendment and enjoining its enforcement. The defendants appealed.
On appeal, a unanimous panel of the Fourth Circuit affirmed. The Board of Elections admitted that criminal prosecutions for violations of the statute occurring before the amendment were still a possibility. The plaintiffs successfully showed that such prosecutions would chill community participation in voter registration drives. They also demonstrated that confusion among community members about their eligibility to vote diverted the resources of the plaintiffs towards educating perspective voters about the law and away from their more typical voter registration and get-out-the-vote efforts. Finally, enforcement of the pre-2024 law could discourage eligible voters from participating in elections. This meant that the matter was not moot, according to the court. “Enjoining enforcement of the Challenged Statute would forestall these obstacles to the Institute’s ‘core mission’ of ‘increasing political participation by members of low income, minority communities.” A. Philip Randolf Slip op. at 16 (internal citation omitted).
After an extensive review of the history of felon disenfranchisement in North Carolina, the court concluded that the law violated the Equal Protection Clause. The felony disenfranchisement was originally enacted in 1877 with discriminatory intent against Black North Carolinians. A subsequent version of the statute in 1899 was likewise motivated by racial animus against Black voters. The Board of Elections did not contest that the law continues to disproportionately impact Black North Carolinians. Despite the racial motivations of the original disenfranchisement laws, the defendants argued that North Carolina’s ratification of a new constitution in 1971 purged the taint of the earlier versions of the law. The court rejected this argument, noting that the legislature did not fundamentally change the felony disenfranchisement law when adopting a new constitution (although the law’s reach was broadened to apply to more offenses). “Put plainly, there has been no direct, substantive change to the Challenged Statute itself since 1899.” Id. at 24 (emphasis in original). Because the enactment of the statute was “motivated by a desire to discriminate against Black North Carolinians and continues to this day to have that effect,” it violated the Equal Protection Clause. Id. at 25 (cleaned up). Because the court agreed with the district court as to the equal protection argument, it declined to decide the due process issue.
The district court’s judgment was therefore affirmed on equal protection grounds only.
Federal ban on transporting a firearm in interstate commerce while under a felony indictment does not violate the Second Amendment
U.S. v. Jackson, 152 F.4th 564 (Sept. 12, 2025). In this case from the District of Maryland, the defendant was charged with transporting a gun across state lines while under a state felony indictment pursuant to 18 U.S.C. 922(n). The defendant moved to dismiss the federal indictment, arguing it violated his Second Amendment rights. The district court rejected that motion and the defendant entered a conditional guilty plea, preserving his right to appeal the denial of his motion to dismiss. On appeal, the Fourth Circuit affirmed. The government argued that the defendant’s challenge should fail because the conduct at issue was unprotected by the Second Amendment. The court disagreed. “By traveling with his gun, Jackon ‘kept’ it in the constitutional sense; he ‘retained’ it in his ‘custody.’ So the Second Amendment’s plain text covers his conduct.” Jackson Slip op. at 6. However, the court determined that there was a historic analogy tradition comparable to the challenged law. In U.S. v. Rahimi, 602 U.S. 680 (2024), the U.S. Supreme Court analogized surety law in existence at the time of the Founding used to disarm dangerous people to the federal ban on possession of firearms by a person under a domestic violence protective order. The Fourth Circuit has since gone even further, holding that felons may categorically be disarmed consistent with the Second Amendment. U.S. v. Hunt, 123 F.4th 697, 707 (4th Cir. 2024).
This partial restriction on the defendant’s ability to travel with guns was akin to the surety laws discussed in Rahimi. A magistrate had to find “reasonable cause” to believe that the accused was likely to cause harm or a breach of the peace before requiring the accused to post a surety bond for their weapons, much like a grand jury had to find probable cause to believe that the defendant here had committed a felony offense. Like with surety bonds, which typically only lasted for six months, the prohibition on traveling with or receiving firearms across state lines while under indictment lasts only so long as the indictment does. Further, Section 922(g) only partially burdens a defendant’s Second Amendment rights. A person under indictment may still possess any firearms already owned at the time; they are only prohibited from traveling or receiving them across state lines while under indictment. Like common law surety rules, this temporary prohibition is aimed at prevention of crime and harm to the public. In the words of the court:
The principles that underpin surety law, lead to a rule: just as legislatures have the power to disarm those who threaten physical harm to others, so too can they disarm those who possess dangerous weapons while under felony indictment. Section 922(n), as applied to Jackson, comports with that tradition and thus Bruen. Jackson Slip op. at 24. (cleaned up).
Alternatively, just as legislatures could disarm entire classes of people deemed to present a “risk of dangerousness,” Congress could impose a “temporary and partial disarmament” on those under indictment consistent with the Second Amendment. In conclusion, the court observed: “Jackson’s conduct is entitled to Second Amendment protection, but two different regulatory traditions permit the government to punish him all the same.” Id. at 28.
The judgment of the district court was consequently affirmed by a unanimous court.
Order sealing video exhibits in excessive force case vacated and remanded with instructions to release footage to the plaintiff
Gray Media Group, Inc., d/b/a WBTV v. Loveridge, ___ F.4th ___; 2025 WL 2679331 (Sept. 19, 2025). While executing a search warrant, police officer Heather Loveridge shot another police officer, Clarence Belton, several times by mistake. Belton sued Loveridge for excessive force and various state torts in state court and Loveridge removed the case to federal court. After discovery, Loveridge moved for summary judgment. She submitted multiple exhibits to the court in support of her motion for summary judgment, including body camera video footage of the incident. She moved to seal that footage from the public. Belton joined that request and sought to seal his own video exhibits as well. Despite local rules requiring an explanation for the need for sealing and for why other alternatives would not suffice, neither party provided such explanation in their respective motions. A magistrate judge granted to sealing requests for both parties. Loveridge’s motion for summary judgment was ultimately denied and she appealed. While that appeal was pending, the plaintiff (“WBTV”) sought to intervene in the case for purposes of moving to unseal the video exhibits. Loveridge opposed the motion, arguing that her right to a fair trial outweighed WBTV’s interest in the videos. The district court denied the motion to intervene, finding that it lacked jurisdiction because the case was still on appeal from the denial of the defendant’s motion for summary judgment. The district court indicted it likely lacked jurisdiction to consider the motion to unseal on the merits, but found that WBTV lacked a common law or First Amendment right to the footage and that unsealing the footage would impair the defendant’s right to a fair trial. WBTV appealed that decision.
The Fourth Circuit agreed that the district court lacked jurisdiction to consider the motion to intervene while the case was before the Fourth Circuit. WBTV also had no right to appeal the district court’s denial of its motion to unseal. However, WBTV asked the Fourth Circuit to treat its appeal as a petition for writ of mandamus. Mandamus relief, though rare, is possible when there are no other means to obtain the relief sought, when there is a clearly established right to the relief sought, and where the court deems the writ appropriate. “[I]t is well established that nonparties, including members of the press, may petition for a writ of mandamus in cases involving the right of access under the common law or the First Amendment.” Gray Media Group, Inc. Slip op. at 10. Here, the Fourth Circuit agreed that WBTV had no other means to seek relief. The court also agreed that “[i]t is well-settled that the public and press have a qualified right of access to judicial documents and records filed in civil and criminal proceedings.” Id. at 12. While district courts have the authority to limit access to judicial documents and exhibits when their release will impair a party’s right to a fair trial, such limitation must be narrowly tailored. Loveridge’s motion seeking to seal the evidence never advanced a specific argument as to why her rights to a fair trial would be impacted by the release of the videos, and the district court’s sealing of all video evidence was not narrowly tailored to further that interest. Loveridge therefore failed to carry her burden to justify the sealing of the exhibits. Potentially prejudicial effects of the release of the videos could be cured by robust jury selection in the case. The court determined that WBTV had demonstrated grounds for the writ of mandamus to issue. Because the order sealing the videos violated the rights of both the press and the public to access court documents, that order was vacated and the matter remanded to the district court with instructions to unseal the videos.
The district court rulings were otherwise unanimously affirmed.