The castle doctrine statute, G.S. 14-51.2, provides that it is presumptively reasonable for the lawful occupant of a home or motor vehicle to respond to an intruder with deadly force. State v. Phillips, 386 N.C. 513, 527 (2024). Two recent decisions examine the scope of this protection. In State v. Carwile, No. COA23-885 (N.C. Ct. App. Dec. 17, 2024), the Court of Appeals held that the castle doctrine did not apply when the defendant was outside his home. By contrast, in State v. Williams, COA24-50 (N.C. Ct. App. Dec. 31, 2024), the Court of Appeals held the castle doctrine did apply though the defendant was outside of his car. This post seeks to harmonize Carwile and Williams.
Joseph L. Hyde
Unilateral Conspiracy and Money Laundering
North Carolina is a bilateral conspiracy jurisdiction. Defining conspiracy as a combination of two or more persons to do an unlawful thing means that if the only other participant is an undercover officer or an informant – that is, one who lacks criminal intent – then there is no conspiracy. Under a new statute effective December 1, 2024, however, it is no defense to conspiracy to commit money laundering that the person with whom the defendant is alleged to have conspired was a law enforcement officer or acting at the direction of a law enforcement officer. G.S. 14-118.8(i). The new statute thus adopts the unilateral approach to conspiracy taken by the Model Penal Code and some other states. This post considers the new statute and its innovation in the law of conspiracy.
News Roundup
The top story this week is the arrest on Monday of Luigi Mangione, 26, accused of fatally shooting UnitedHealthcare CEO Brian Thompson outside a Manhattan hotel on December 4. Multiple news outlets, including ABC, BBC and CBS, have reported on the investigation, noting that Mangione’s fingerprints matched prints found near the crime scene, that the gun Mangione was carrying when arrested matched shell casings from the crime scene, and that handwritten pages he possessed appear to claim responsibility for the shooting. Read on for more criminal law news.
Confession and Avoidance: Self-defense in State v. Myers
The defendant presented competent evidence tending to show that he was acting in self-defense when he shot Raquan Neal, the Court of Appeals recently said in State v. Myers, No. COA24-435 (N.C. Ct. App. Nov. 19, 2024), and the trial court’s failure to instruct on self-defense was error. Reciting both the common law and the statutory test for self-defense, the opinion in Myers seems to represent a straightforward application of settled law – except for one thing. The defendant “testified he was not trying to kill Neal.” Myers, Slip Op. 3. Under the common law, a defendant was not privileged to use deadly force unless he believed at the time that it was necessary to kill his assailant. Prior cases found no error in the trial court’s denying an instruction on self-defense when the defendant thus disavowed the requisite intent. This post considers the opinion in Myers.
A Movable Traffic Stop: Relocating the Search and Seizure in State v. Jackson
In State v. Jackson, No. COA23-637 (Oct. 1, 2024), the Court of Appeals considered whether an officer had reasonable suspicion to detain the defendant for trespassing. Mitchell County Sheriff’s deputies responded to a report that a suspicious vehicle had driven up an unpaved, privately-owned logging trail. “Lieutenant Beam, in his four-wheel-drive truck, drove up to the end of the trail, where he found Defendant, a female companion (“Passenger”), and Defendant’s Volkswagen Bug (the “Bug”) covered in mud and dirt.” Jackson, Slip Op. p. 2. The defendant eventually consented to a search of the car, during which officers found methamphetamine. The issue was whether the defendant was unlawfully seized when he gave consent. This post considers the opinion in Jackson.
Indictment Technicalities: Gone Today and Here Tomorrow
Singleton was supposed to make things simpler. As previously reported, in that case our Supreme Court attempted to eliminate some “obsolete technicalities” of the common law by abrogating the jurisdictional indictment rule, whereby a defective pleading deprives the trial court of jurisdiction. My colleague Danny Spiegel called it a sea change. The Court of Appeals decided two cases in September that illustrate continuing complexity in this area. In State v. Pierce, COA23-348 (N.C. Ct. App. Sept. 3, 2024), the court held the trial court did not lack jurisdiction to accept a pro se defendant’s waiver of indictment, despite a statutory prohibition on such uncounseled waiver. And in State v. Wilkins, COA23-839 (N.C. Ct. App. Sept. 17, 2024), the court found the trial court lacked jurisdiction due to a fatally defective indictment. This post considers those two cases.
Outsourcing Reasonableness: Redefining Defensive Force in State v. Phillips.
Coke claimed the common law was the perfection of reason. Our Supreme Court began its recent opinion in State v. Phillips, No. 281A23 (N.C. Aug. 23, 2024), by citing Coke, albeit for a different proposition (i.e., a person’s home is his castle). Construing G.S. 14-51.2, our Supreme Court held that the legislature has abrogated the common law rule that prohibited excessive force in defense of the home. The trial court erred therefore in instructing the jury that the defendant homeowner did not have the right to use excessive force. This post examines the recent opinion in Phillips.
Character is Destiny: Improper Argument in State v. Anderson
Evidence of prior bad acts is admissible unless the only reason for introducing the evidence is to show the defendant’s propensity for committing the crime. In a trial involving a defendant’s sexual assault of children, the prosecutor told the jury, “[t]he best predictor of future behavior is past behavior.” Is that an inaccurate statement of law? The Court of Appeals recently held that it was. This post considers the rule – that incorrect statements of law in closing argument are improper – and its application in this case, State v. Anderson, No. COA23-821 (N.C. Ct. App. Aug 6, 2024).