Under U.S. v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897 (1984), when an officer reasonably relies on a search warrant issued by neutral and impartial magistrate, evidence seized pursuant to the search warrant need not be suppressed even if the search warrant is later determined to be invalid under the Fourth Amendment of the U.S. Constitution. Id. at 912. Under State v. Carter, 322 N.C. 709 (1988), the same was not true for violations of Article 1, Sec. 20 of the North Carolina Constitution. State v. Rogers, 388 N.C. 453 (2025), changed that by overruling Carter and pronouncing a good faith exception to any exclusionary rule that may exist under Article I, Sec. 20. Id. at 478. My colleague Joe Hyde covered Rogers and the newfound good faith exception to the exclusionary rule for violations of the North Carolina Constitution in an earlier post, and Shea Denning covered the first post-Rogers case from the Court of Appeals applying the exception, here. Because Carter has been the law of the land for so many years, few state appellate decisions discuss the Leon good faith exception and few state practitioners have experience litigating it. When exactly does the good faith exception apply, and when does it not? What are the limits of the exception? Today’s post covers the basics of the Leon good faith exception.
The Exception Covers More than Search Warrants. As noted above, Leon addressed a facially valid search warrant that was later found to lack probable cause. But the U.S. Supreme Court and other courts have extended the good faith exception to non-warrant cases as well. For starters, the Rogers case did not involve a search warrant, only a court order authorizing release of the defendant’s cell-site location data to law enforcement. The trial court found probable cause to support the order, but the Court of Appeals ruled the trial court erred in this determination. Upon review, the North Carolina Supreme Court ultimately held that the good faith exception applied to these orders, just like it would in a search warrant case. Rogers notes that the good faith exception has been applied to other judicial orders as well, such as a nontestimonial identification order. See State v. Welch, 316 N.C. 578, 588 (1986) (so holding). Leon is therefore not limited to search warrants; its application likely extends to many types of judicial orders authorizing some official action by law enforcement.
Subsequently Invalidated Statues and Caselaw. The Supreme Court has applied the good faith exception when an officer relies on a statute or judicial precedent that is later struck down. In Illinois v. Krull, 480 U.S. 340 (1987), a state law permitted law enforcement to inspect purchase records of people engaged in the sale of cars or car parts. Acting pursuant to that law, a police officer entered a salvage yard and demanded to see purchase records. This led to the discovery of multiple stolen vehicles and the owner of the salvage yard being charged. The state trial court suppressed the evidence, following federal precedent decided the day after the search. The case made it all the way to the U.S. Supreme Court. There, the majority found that the officer was entitled to rely on the subsequently invalidated statute and that suppression was not an appropriate remedy. “The application of the exclusionary rule to suppress evidence obtained by an officer acting in objectively reasonable reliance on a statute would have as little deterrent effect on the officer’s actions as would the exclusion of evidence when an officer acts in objectively reasonable reliance on a warrant.” Id. at 349. The Court noted a possible exception for blatantly unconstitutional laws. but, in general, police officers are entitled to rely on then-existing statutes and ordinances. Id. See also, Michigan v. DeFillippo, 443 U.S. 31, 38 (1979) (“The enactment of a law forecloses speculation by enforcement officers concerning its constitutionality—with the possible exception of a law so grossly and flagrantly unconstitutional that any person of reasonable prudence would be bound to see its flaws.”)
Similarly, in Davis v. U.S., 564 U.S. 229 (2011), the Court declined to exclude evidence obtained from an illegal search incident to arrest where, at the time of the search, officers relied on then-existing but subsequently overruled precedent. “Because suppression would do nothing to deter police misconduct in these circumstances, and because it would come at a high cost to both the truth and the public safety, we hold that searches conducted in objectively reasonable reliance on binding appellate precedent are not subject to the exclusionary rule.” Davis at 232. See also U.S. v. Peltier, 422 U.S. 531, 542 (1975) (“[W]e cannot regard as blameworthy those parties who conform their conduct to the prevailing statutory or constitutional norm.”)
Clerical Errors in Court and Police Records. In Arizona v. Evans, 514 U.S. 1 (1995), police arrested the defendant during a traffic stop after discovering an outstanding arrest warrant. While arresting the defendant for that warrant, police found illegal drugs, leading to prosecution. It turned out that the arrest warrant had been quashed more than two weeks before the arrest; the court records had simply not been updated. Evidence showed that such database errors were rare and that clerks of court immediately corrected such errors when they were discovered. Upholding the application of the good-faith exception, the Court emphasized that clerks of court are not arms of law enforcement and that suppression would not change the behavior of the officer on the ground who receives such faulty information.
In Herring v. U.S., 555 U.S. 135 (2009), the Court later expanded that approach when the invalid arrest warrant was the result of a law enforcement database error. The arrest warrant here had been recalled five months before the defendant’s encounter with law enforcement, but the police database had not been updated. The mistake was quickly discovered by the law enforcement agency, but the defendant had already been detained and searched by that time, leading to his prosecution for guns and drugs. Upholding the admission of the evidence discovered because of the database error, the Court observed: “[T]he exclusionary rule serves to deter deliberate, reckless, or grossly negligent conduct, or in some cases recurring or systemic negligence. The error in this case does not rise to that level.” Herring at 144. Where police intentionally enter false information into a database, or where police recklessly and regularly fail to update their records, good faith would not be available. Here, though, the evidence showed the database mistake was an isolated instance of negligence, and the purposes of the exclusionary rule would again not be served by suppressing the evidence.
The Exceptions to the Exception. Leon emphasizes that an officer’s reliance on the search warrant (or other justification) must be objectively reasonable. Leon noted that there are at least four situations where reliance on the warrant would not be objectively reasonable and where suppression of evidence would remain the appropriate remedy.
Deliberate or Reckless Dishonesty by Officers. For one, if an officer presents the judicial official with an affidavit that contains intentionally or recklessly false information necessary to the existence of probable cause (or fails to include information that would defeat probable cause), then the officer may not later claim the benefit of the good faith exception. Franks v. Delaware, 438 U.S. 154 (1978). Proving a Franks violation is notoriously difficult, but it does sometimes happen. See, e.g. U.S. v. Lull, 824 F.3d 109, 118 (4th Cir. 2016) (where informant’s statements were critical to establish probable cause and the affidavit omitted information that the informant was fired as unreliable and dishonest, the omission was at least reckless, warranting suppression).
Abandonment of Judicial Neutrality. For another, if the judge or magistrate wholly abandons their neutral and detached role in reviewing the warrant application and instead acts as a “rubber stamp” for law enforcement or joins law enforcement in their investigative role, officers will not be entitled to claim the benefit of the good faith exception. See Lo-Ji Sales, Inc. v. New York, 442 U.S. 319, 327 (1979) (where magistrate joined and arguably led the search party as an “adjunct law enforcement officer,” he abandoned his judicial role and the good faith exception was unavailable).
Facially Deficient Warrants. The third situation where the good faith exception does not apply is where the warrant is so facially deficient that a reasonably well-trained officer would know not to rely on it. This situation comes up when the warrant fails to describe the place to be searched or fails to identify the things to be searched or seized. See, e.g., U.S. v. Ray, 141 F.4th 129 (4th Cir. 2025) (where military search warrant authorized the seizure of the defendant’s phone but not its search, the government could not rely on the good faith exception for evidence obtained from the search of the phone, as the warrant totally omitted the item to be searched).
Plainly Insufficient Affidavits. Finally, Leon noted that officers may not rely on the good-faith exception if the warrant is “based on an affidavit so lacking in indicia of probable cause as to render official belief in its existence entirely unreasonable.” Brown v. Illinois, 422 U.S. 590, 611 (Powell, J., concurring). This exception seems the rarest of the four, but it applies when there are merely conclusory or bare-bones allegations in the affidavit. See, e.g., U.S. v. Lopez-Zungia, 909 F.3d 906, 909 (8th Cir. 2018) (good faith exception not available where affidavit failed to connect the defendant to any illegal activities).
These four exceptions identified in Leon are not necessarily the only examples of where an officer’s actions will be deemed objectively unreasonable. As mentioned above, there may be other instances where good faith is not available, such as when an officer enforces a blatantly unconstitutional law or where police intentionally or with gross negligence fail to maintain their databases.
It will be interesting to see how the good-faith exception gets applied moving forward in North Carolina. If you missed Shea’s recent post on the Julius II decision, be sure to check that out, as it’s an excellent discussion of how a highly divided panel of the Court of Appeals grappled with our first major good-faith case post-Rogers.
I can be reached as always at dixon@sog.unc.edu for any questions, comments, or other feedback.
