A short-form murder indictment generally will not support a conviction for assault. That, at any rate, was the rule prior to State v. Singleton, 386 N.C. 183 (2024) (holding that failure of an indictment to allege each essential element of the offense charged is not a jurisdictional defect). The Court of Appeals recently reaffirmed the pre-Singleton rule, concluding in State v. Ramsey, 922 S.E.2d 176 (N.C. Ct. App. Oct. 1, 2025), that a defendant charged via short-form indictment with murder was not entitled to an assault instruction. This post considers the decision in Ramsey.
Conviction of Assault, When Included in Charge
After Singleton, the trial court’s jurisdiction does not derive from the sufficiency of an indictment but from the authority conferred by constitution or statute. State v. Singleton, 386 N.C. 183, 197 (2024). By statute, “[o]n the trial of any person for any felony whatsoever, when the crime charged includes an assault against the person, it is lawful for the jury to acquit of the felony and to find a verdict of guilty of assault against the person indicted, if the evidence warrants such finding.” G.S. 15-169. This statute was enacted to settle doubts that had arisen before 1885 as to whether on an indictment for rape a verdict of assault could be rendered. State v. Williams, 185 N.C. 685 (1923); cf. State v. Birckhead, 256 N.C. 494, 504 (1962) (examining double jeopardy consequences).
The same statute was once said to support a conviction for assault upon a charge of murder. See State v. Williams, 185 N.C. 685 (1923); State v. Fritz, 133 N.C. 725 (1903); State v. Hunt, 128 N.C. 584 (1901). This proposition was rendered problematic by State v. Watkins, 200 N.C. 692 (1931), where the Supreme Court ordered a new trial for a defendant charged with manslaughter and convicted of assault with a deadly weapon based on error in the jury instruction on deadly weapons. Concurring quaere de dubiis (i.e., to inquire into uncertainties), Chief Justice Stacy doubted whether a verdict of assault with a deadly weapon was supported by a murder indictment that failed to allege the use of a deadly weapon. He acknowledged the statute that permits a finding of assault upon trial for any felony that includes an assault (then C.S. 4693, now G.S. 15-169), and the cases applying it to murder indictments, but he said that, in all of those cases, it was observed that to warrant a lesser verdict of assault “the crime charged must include an assault against the person as an ingredient.” Id. at 700 (Stacy, C.J. concurring). Curiously, four justices (out of five) added a postscript stating that, while they were disinclined to debate an “academic question,” there was no error in the instruction that permitted a verdict of assault on the charge of manslaughter. Id. at 701.
Nevertheless, citing Chief Justice Stacy’s concurrence in Watkins, the Supreme Court later declared the question undecided whether a manslaughter indictment would support an assault conviction. In State v. Rorie, 252 N.C. 579 (1960), the defendant was charged via short form with manslaughter (i.e., that he “unlawfully, willfully, and feloniously did kill and slay” the victim) and convicted of assault with a deadly weapon. Notwithstanding G.S. 15-169, the Supreme Court concluded that the verdict was not supported by the indictment. Id. at 582. To support a conviction for assault, it said, a murder indictment must be drawn “as necessarily to include an assault . . . , or it should contain a separate count to that effect.” Id. at 581; cf. State v. Craig, 35 N.C. App. 547, 550 (1978) (assault on female conviction not supported by murder indictment).
By contrast, the defendant in State v. Whiteside, 325 N.C. 389 (1989), was charged and convicted of murder. On appeal, he argued the trial court erred by failing to submit assault as a potential verdict. Citing Rorie, the Supreme Court concluded that the murder indictment would not support a verdict of assault, and the trial court therefore did not err by denying the requested instruction. Whiteside, 325 N.C. at 403-04; see also State v. Collins, 334 N.C. 54, 63 (1993); State v. Gibson, 333 N.C. 29, 39 (1992). Section 15-169 apparently does little more than G.S. 15-170 – authorizing conviction upon the trial of any indictment of a lesser degree of the same crime or of an attempt – and neither statute applies unless there is evidence tending to show the defendant may be guilty of a lesser included offense. See State v. Lampkins, 286 N.C. 497, 506 (1975).
State v. Ramsey
The defendant in State v. Ramsey, 922 S.E.2d 176 (N.C. Ct. App. Oct. 1, 2025), was involved in a physical altercation with Billy McKay. McKay later died, and the defendant was charged via short form with murder. (The opinion says the defendant was “charged with second degree murder by a short form indictment,” but the short form admits of no distinction between first and second-degree murder. See G.S. 15-144.) The defendant was convicted of voluntary manslaughter and appealed.
Before the Court of Appeals, the defendant argued the trial court erred by denying his request for an instruction on simple assault. He acknowledged the rule from Collins and Whiteside that a defendant charged in a short-form murder indictment was not entitled to an instruction on assault. The defendant argued that Singleton required a reevaluation of this rule.
The Court of Appeals disagreed. It said the defendant’s reliance on Singleton was “misplaced.” Ramsey, 922 S.E.2d at 181. Singleton, it said, reasoned that the short form allowed the State to charge offenses and “maintain jurisdiction” without noting every element of the offense charged. Id. “Singleton did not, however, discuss or create any holdings regarding lesser-included offenses within short form indictments; rather, Singleton specified only what elements a short form indictment requires.” Id. Accordingly, the Court of Appeals concluded that the trial court did not err by denying the defendant’s request for an instruction on simple assault “because the short form indictment here did not specify a murder by assault.” Id.
Conclusion
The Court of Appeals has decided about twenty indictment cases since Singleton was issued in May 2024. Many of these are consistent with the tendency in Ramsey to limit Singleton’s effect to the particular issue it addressed: whether the omission of certain allegations rendered an indictment invalid. E.g., State v. Cornwell, 918 S.E.2d 903, 910 (N.C. Ct. App. June 18, 2025) (finding non-jurisdictional defect in CCE indictment). Overall, the Court of Appeals continues to apply pre-Singleton indictment rules in other scenarios, as noted here. See State v. Wilson, 297 N.C. App. 535 (2024) (trial court erred by instructing on uncharged theory); State v. Little, 296 N.C. App. 424 (2024) (same); but see State v. Tate, 918 S.E.2d 886 (N.C. Ct. App. June 18, 2025) (no error in instructing on uncharged theory).
Viewed in this light, Ramsey does nothing more than apply a pre-Singleton rule to a non-Singleton situation. What makes Ramsey intriguing is the existence of G.S. 15-169 (ignored in Ramsey), which since 1885 permits a conviction for assault when the crime charged includes an assault. If Collins and Whiteside, following Rorie, sidelined the statute in favor of more specific pleading rules, Singleton evinces a clear preference for statutory authority over common law technicalities. Considered in this light, the argument that Singleton requires a reevaluation is harder to dismiss.
The lesson for prosecutors is that Singleton cuts both ways. True, the Court of Appeals rejected an argument in Ramsey that Singleton supported the defendant’s request for additional instructions. But it did so by applying a pre-Singleton pleading requirement derived from the common law, the very sort of pleading requirement that Singleton indisputably rejects. To the extent Singleton severs the link between charging language and permissible verdicts, the result is as likely to benefit the defense as the prosecution. Prosecutors wishing to limit the jury’s options after Singleton may wish to consider other rationales than the discredited technicality employed in Collins and Whiteside.
