This post summarizes published criminal opinions released by the North Carolina Court of Appeals on November 19, 2025.
In defendant’s trial for possession with intent to manufacture, sell, or deliver methamphetamine, (1) the trial court did not err by refusing to instruct the jury about the different isomers of methamphetamine or that the State must prove the presence of a controlled substance by a scientifically valid chemical analysis; (2) The trial court did not err by denying defendant’s motion to dismiss on the basis that the State failed to present sufficient evidence of a controlled substance.
State v. Dean, No. COA24-654 (N.C. Ct. App. Nov. 19, 2025) (Stading). The defendant in this Johnston County case was convicted in a jury trial of possession with intent to manufacture, sell, or deliver methamphetamine and possession of drug paraphernalia. The jury further found the defendant had obtained habitual felon status. After entering a defective notice of appeal, the defendant petitioned the court of appeals for certiorari review, which it granted. The defendant argued that the trial court erred by (1) declining to deliver the special jury instructions distinguishing among different isomers of methamphetamine and specifying that the State had to prove the presence of a controlled substance by a “‘[s]cientifically valid analysis’” and (2) denying his motion to dismiss the charge of possession with intent to sell and deliver methamphetamine “as the State failed ‘to produce evidence that the seized substance contained an illegal isomer . . . as opposed to a legal isomer.’” (Slip op. at 4. 7.)
(1) The court of appeals found no error in the trial court’s refusal to instruct the jury that “[m]ethamphetamine-D is a controlled dangerous substance under Chapter 90 of North Carolina General Statutes” while “[m]ethamphetamine-L is not a controlled dangerous substance under Chapter 90 of North Carolina General Statutes.” (Slip op. at 4.) The defendant’s request followed testimony by a defense expert that methamphetamine exists in two isomer forms, D-isomer and L-isomer, and that the isomers have different effects on the body. The State and defense drug chemistry experts agreed that the testing performed by the State did not differentiate between isomers.
The court of appeals characterized the issue of whether the State must discern between isomers of methamphetamine when instructing the jury as an issue of first impression. The North Carolina Controlled Substances Act classifies methamphetamine as a Schedule II controlled substance and defines it to include “‘its salts, isomers, and salts of isomers.’” (Slip op. at 9-10 (quoting G.S. 90-90(3)(c)). The term “isomer” is defined to mean “‘the optical isomer, unless otherwise specified.’” (Slip op. at 10 (quoting G.S. 90-87(14a)). The court cited research stating that D- and L-methamphetamine are optical isomers. Thus, the court concluded that both isomers of methamphetamine are controlled substances. For this reason, the court found that the pattern instructions delivered by the trial court appropriately addressed whether the substance was methamphetamine and the instruction that the defendant requested regarding methamphetamine-L was incorrect in law.
The court of appeals likewise found that the trial court did not err by refusing to instruct the jury that the State must prove the presence of a controlled substance by a scientifically valid chemical analysis. The appellate court noted that the pattern jury instructions delivered by the trial court informed the jury that they must be satisfied beyond a reasonable doubt as to every element of the offense, including the identification of the controlled substance. The trial court further instructed the jury that they were the sole judge of the weight and credibility of the evidence, including testimony from the State and defense experts. The court of appeals stated that these instructions captured the essential substance of the law and therefore the trial court did not err in declining the defendant’s request for this special instruction.
Finally, the court of appeals concluded that even if it assumed error in the trial court’s denial of the defendant’s request for special instructions, the defendant had failed to show prejudice as there was no reasonable possibility that the jury would have reached a different result had the instructions he requested been given.
(2) The court of appeals rejected the defendant’s argument that the trial court erred in denying his motion to dismiss the charge of possession with intent to sell or deliver methamphetamine on the ground that the State failed to present sufficient evidence of a controlled substance. The defendant based his argument on the State’s failure to differentiate between the isomers of methamphetamine. The court noted that a forensic scientist with the State Crime Laboratory testified that she performed testing on the substance seized from the defendant and determined that it was methamphetamine. She further testified that she reviewed the report prepared by the defendant’s expert witness who testified at trial that methamphetamine exists in two isomer forms that have different effects on the body and that the testing done by the State could not differentiate between the isomers. The State’s expert stated that this report did not change her scientific opinion as to the identity of the substance, testifying: “‘It is still identified as methamphetamine.’” (Slip op. at 17.) The court of appeals concluded that the evidence supported a reasonable inference that the defendant possessed a controlled substance—methamphetamine.
(1) The trial court erred in denying the defendant’s motion to dismiss a charge of communicating threats as the State presented no evidence that the officer the defendant threatened believe the alleged threat; (2) The defendant failed to show that he was prejudiced by the trial court’s delivery of a jury instruction regarding false, contradictory, or conflicting statements.
State v. Matthews, No. COA24-961(N.C. Ct. App. Nov. 19, 2025) (Zachary). The defendant in this Moore County case was convicted in a jury trial of possession of methamphetamine, carrying a concealed gun, and two counts each of resisting a public officer and communicating threats. The drug and gun charges arose from evidence discovered during a traffic stop; the remaining charges arose from defendant’s actions when two officers arrested him for those offenses. On appeal, the defendant argued that the trial court erred by (1) denying his motion to dismiss one of the charges of communicating threats and (2) delivering Pattern Jury Instruction 105.21, which informs the jury that it may consider false, contradictory, or conflicting statements by a defendant as a circumstance tending to reflect the mental process of a person with a guilty conscience.
(1) The court of appeals agreed with the defendant that the trial court erred in denying the defendant’s motion to dismiss the charge of communicating threats against one of the two officers as the State presented no evidence that the officer believed the defendant’s alleged threats. Noting that an element of the offense of communicating threats under G.S. 14-277.1(a) is that the person threatened believes the threat will be carried out, the court found no evidence to support that element. The officer to whom this threat was directed did not testify and the officer who did testify did not testify about the other officer’s belief. For this reason, the court reversed one of the defendant’s convictions for communicating threats.
(2) Assuming for the sake of argument that the trial court erred in instructing the jury pursuant to Pattern Instruction 105.21 regarding false, contradictory, or conflicting statements, the court of appeals determined that the defendant could not show that he was prejudiced by the trial court’s inclusion of the instruction. The court noted that the instruction left it up to the jury as to whether the defendant made statement of this ilk and that the trial court told the jury that such statements did not create a presumption of guilt and were not, standing alone, sufficient to establish evidence of guilt.
(1) Sufficient evidence supported the defendant’s convictions–in connection with the defendant’s attempt to purchase a firearm from a pawn shop–for attempted possession of a firearm by a felon and providing materially false information; (2) The trial court committed prejudicial error when it failed to accurately instruct the jury on attempt.
State v. Vaughn, No. COA24-1089 (N.C. Ct. App. Nov. 19, 2025) (Wood). In this New Hanover County case, the defendant, who had been convicted of felony possession of cocaine 20 years earlier, put a shotgun on layaway at a pawn shop in November 2022. The defendant returned to the pawnshop in January to pay off the balance. At that time, he completed a federal application to purchase the firearm (ATF form 4473), answering no to the question of whether he had ever been convicted of a felony. The defendant’s application was denied, but the clerk was unable to explain to the defendant why. A detective at the Wilmington Police Department was notified of the defendant’s failed attempted purchase and procured warrants for the defendant’s arrest for possession of a firearm by a felon and providing false information to a firearms dealer. More than a month later, police surrounded the defendant’s home with guns drawn. The defendant came to the door confused. When the officers told him what he was charged with, he said, “I’ve never had a gun.”
The defendant was tried before a jury in April 2024 and testified in his defense. He testified that in 2013 he attended an expunction clinic and met with an attorney to have his felony conviction expunged. The defendant said he provided the attorney with details about his conviction and the attorney told him he had all he needed and the defendant did not need to return. The defendant believed his conviction had been expunged as he went on to hold jobs that required background checks.
The trial court denied the defendant’s motion to dismiss the charges for insufficient evidence. The trial court also denied the defendant’s request for instructions on attempt, including an instruction that attempt is a specific intent crime. The jury acquitted the defendant of possession of a firearm by a felon and convicted him of attempted possession of a firearm by a felon and providing materially false information. The defendant appealed, arguing that (1) the trial court erred by denying his motion to dismiss the providing false information charge and the attempted possession charge; (2) the trial court prejudicially erred when it failed to instruct the jury on the elements of attempt; and (3) G.S. 14-415.2 (prohibiting the possession of a firearm by a felon) is unconstitutional.
(1) Viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the State, the court of appeals found ample evidence to support the charges. That evidence included proof of the defendant’s prior felony conviction, evidence of the defendant’s transactions at the pawn shop, which included holding the firearm and placing it on layaway, and the defendant’s completion of ATF form 4473 on which he stated that he had never been convicted of a felony. Though the defendant testified that he believed his felony conviction had been expunged and thus he was legally allowed to answer no to the prior conviction question on the form, his credibility was for the jury to determine. Therefore, the appellate court concluded that the trial court did not err in denying the defendant’s motion to dismiss.
(2) The court of appeals agreed with the defendant that the trial court erred when it failed to accurately instruct the jury on attempt and that error was likely to mislead the jury. Notwithstanding a request from the defendant and the State to instruct the jury on attempt, the trial court did not inform the jury that, to find attempt, the jury had to find that the defendant completed an overt act going beyond mere preparation and that the defendant specifically intended to commit the substantive offense. The court rejected the State’s argument that the defendant’s handling of the firearm and placing it on layaway established the overt act. The court that the jury acquitted the defendant of possession and explained that without being instructed on the distinction between preparation and overt acts, the jury could have considered the layaway mere preparation for a possession that never occurred. As to intent, the State argued that because the jury found the defendant guilty of providing materially false information, it must have determined that the defendant knew he was a felon when he attempted to purchase the firearm. The court of appeals stated this “may have been a valid argument” absent the State’s “blatant misstatements of law during closing arguments.” (Slip op. at 15.) During those arguments, the prosecutor told the jury that “‘[e]ven if you think the defendant’s statement was credible, even if you believe every single word he said on the stand,’” his answer of no to the question of whether he had been convicted of a felony constituted making a statement he knew to be false. (Slip op. at 15-16.) The court said it could not conclude that the jury “determined the necessary intent for attempted possession in light of the State’s egregious statement,” as the jury may have reached its verdict based on reliance on this misstatement of law. (Slip op. at 17.) The court of appeals reasoned that the trial court’s failure to address these misstatements significantly increased the likelihood that the failure to instruct on specific intent for attempted possession misled the jury. For that reason, the court remanded for a new trial on the charge of attempted possession of a firearm by a felon.
The defendant requested the court of appeals to invoke Rule 2 to address the constitutionality of G.S. 14-415.1, an argument he had not raised below. The court declined to do so, reasoning that inconsistent application of Rule 2 itself leads to injustice when some similarly situated litigants benefit and others do not. The court stated that the defendant failed to differentiate his case from every other person convicted of possession of firearm by a felon, when the predicate felony conviction was for a single non-violent offense, who failed to preserve a constitutional argument at trial.
