The Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment and Article 1, Section 26 of the North Carolina Constitution prohibit the exercise of peremptory challenges to strike prospective jurors based on their race. See Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79, 89 (1986), as modified by Powers v. Ohio, 499 U.S. 400 (1991). Batson established a three-step framework for trial courts to apply in determining whether a peremptory strike was impermissibly motivated by a juror’s race.
Batson’s three-step framework. At step one, the party objecting to the strike must present a prima facie showing of purposeful discrimination. The trial court may rule on this matter without making extensive findings. State v. Campbell, 384 N.C. 126, 138 (2023). At step two, the burden shifts to the party exercising the peremptory challenge to provide a race-neutral reason for the strike. After the striking party offers a race-neutral explanation, the objecting party may attempt to show the other party’s explanations for the challenge are pretextual. At step three, the trial court must determine, based on the totality of the evidence, whether the objecting party has established that it is more likely than not that the strike was motivated in substantial part by discriminatory intent. A trial court may not summarily rule at step three but must instead explain how it weighed the totality of the circumstances surrounding the prosecution’s use of peremptory challenges. State v. Hobbs, 374 N.C. 345, 358 (2020) (Hobbs I).
Mootness. When the State provides race-neutral reasons under step two and the trial court considers them and rules at step three, the question of whether a defendant initially established a prima facie case of discrimination becomes moot. Hobbs I, 374 N.C. at 499. Thus, on appeal, the appellate courts will consider only the trial court’s analysis and findings at step three.
Post facto reasons. If the trial court rules that the objecting party has failed to establish a prima facie case at step one and subsequently orders the striking party to state race-neutral reasons for the record, that party’s reply will not be considered as part of the appellate court’s review of the trial court’s ruling at step one. Campbell, 384 N.C. at 136 (noting that “the Batson inquiry should have concluded when the trial court first determined that defendant failed to make a prima facie showing” and stating that “we do not consider at step one the State’s post facto reply to the trial court’s request for a step two response”). Instead, the appellate courts will review only the trial court’s initial determination based on the information in the record relevant to step one, giving deference to the trial court’s determination. Id.
But what if the striking party provides race-neutral reasons before the trial court rules at step one? Does that thrust the trial court to step three of the analysis, thereby mandating more robust analysis and findings? The North Carolina Supreme Court answered that question last month in State v. Wilson, ___ N.C. ___, 920 S.E.2d 832 (2025), holding that the step one is mooted only when the trial court and both parties proceed to fully complete the three-step Batson process as if the trial court had found a prima facie showing at step one.
This post will unpack the North Carolina Supreme Court’s analysis in Wilson and consider how it informs a trial court’s response to Batson objections.
Facts. Mario Wilson was indicted for two counts of first-degree murder and related charges in Cleveland County. The case was tried in February 2020. During jury selection the State exercised peremptory challenges to excuse two black female jurors, Juror No. 9 who knew Wilson’s relatives, and Juror No. 10, who stated during voir dire that she paid a fine for an open container charge rather than attending court for it because she “‘did not have time for that’” as she had a baby. Id. at __; 920 S.E.2d at 836.
Wilson objected to those challenges pursuant to Batson. Defense counsel pointed out that both jurors were black females and that the State struck another prospective black female juror for cause. He argued as to Juror No. 9 that the State did not strike other jurors who knew Wilson’s family members. As to Juror No. 10, he noted that this juror said she had child-care issues and the State did not strike other jurors who also had those issues.
At that point, the trial court asked the State if it wanted to be heard. The State responded by stating that it was not going to keep anyone on the jury who knew a member of the defendant’s family. As to Juror No. 10, the State noted that she had yawned several times and that behavior, combined with her response about the open container matter, raised concerns about whether she would pay attention and take the proceedings seriously.
The defendant stated in response that the State would strike a lot of black people if jurors were excused based on knowing Wilson’s family because the family was black.
The trial court then ruled that the defendant had not made a prima facie case. It stated “[f]or the record” that “[t]he State has not targeted race as a component of its questioning,” and that “[t]he Court did note the demeanor of Juror No. 10 during questioning and certainly was concerned about her.” Id. at ___; 920 S.E.2d at 837.
Wilson was convicted and sentenced to consecutive sentences of life without parole.
Procedural history. Wilson appealed, arguing that the trial court made inadequate Batson findings in light of Hobbs I. In a divided opinion, the Court of Appeals agreed, reversing the defendant’s convictions and remanding the case for further proceedings. State v. Wilson, 291 N.C. App. 279 (2023), rev’d, __ N.C. __, 920 S.E.2d 832 (2025). Writing for the majority, Judge Murphy noted that unlike the situation in Campbell, the trial court in Wilson sought the State’s input before ruling on whether the defendant had made a prima facie case. The Court of Appeals concluded that even though the trial court stated that it was ruling at step one, “the fact that it issued the ruling after hearing the State’s race-neutral reasons made the ruling, in substance, a ruling on the third step of Batson.” Id. at 293. Thus, it held that the trial court was required to engage in a full analysis of defendant’s arguments that the State employed its peremptory strikes in a racially discriminatory manner. Id. at 294. Judge Dillon concurred, writing separately to state that the trial court could have ruled at step one even after hearing race-neutral reasons from the State, but “here it appears the trial court did consider . . . the State’s step-two evidence,” indicating that the trial court moved beyond step one. Id. at 297 (Dillon, J., concurring).
Judge Stading dissented, noting that it was the State, not the trial court, that proceeded to step two. Judge Stading reasoned that precedent did not “indicate that the trial court forfeits the ability to redirect the proceedings back to an earlier analytical step” where the trial court itself has not proceeded beyond the initial inquiry in its analysis. Id. at 299 (Stading, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). He would have held that step one was not moot and would have determined that the trial court made its prima facie determination before offering any commentary on juror demeanor. He would have further found that the trial court’s ruling fell within the “parameters of the great deference afforded to trial judges.” Id. at 300 (Stading, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
The State sought review by the North Carolina Supreme Court, which granted review and reversed the Court of Appeals.
North Carolina Supreme Court’s analysis. The state supreme court limited its review to the issue on which there was division below, namely whether the trial court’s ruling at step one was moot.
The court noted that step one only is mooted if the striking party proffers race-neutral reasons and the trial court both considers those reasons and rules on the ultimate question of intentional discrimination. Wilson, ___ N.C. at ___; 920 S.E.2d at 841 (citing Hernandez v. New York, 500 U.S. 352, 359 (1991) (plurality op.)). The court explained that mootness is an exception to “normal appellate review of a trial court’s Batson determination;” thus, the court’s prior decisions, such as Campbell, “do not establish exclusive circumstances” in which the step one analysis is not moot. Id. Rather, the default rule is that step one is not moot.
Because the trial court in Wilson made no step three determination, the court concluded that step one was not mooted. The court emphasized that it was appropriate for the trial court at step one to solicit the State’s response as to whether the defendant had made a prima facie showing. The court noted that the trial court has no control over how the State responds to such a solicitation and stated that it would be inappropriate for a trial court to limit the State’s argument to something other than all relevant circumstances. In addition, the court noted that the trial court may rely on its own observations of juror conduct in ruling at step one. Consideration of such matters is not altered by the State’s recounting of observed juror conduct as a rationale for its strike. Finally, the court held that the mere fact that the trial court in the case below issued its step one ruling after hearing the State’s race-neutral reasons did not transform that ruling into a third-step determination.
The court reasoned that the trial court clearly ruled that the defendant failed to establish a prima facie case. There was no indication that the trial court moved to step two or that it ruled on whether the State’s justifications were pretextual at step three. Thus, step one was not mooted.
Because the lead opinion from the Court of Appeals did not address whether the trial court clearly erred in determining that the defendant failed to establish a prima facie case, the North Carolina Supreme Court remanded the matter to the Court of Appeals for consideration of that issue.
The dissent. Justice Earls, joined by Justice Riggs, dissented. The dissent characterized the primary focus for mootness as whether the trial court “engaged with pretext,” reasoning that “if the State has already come forward with justifications . . . then step one has done its job and there is no need to go back and ask whether the defendant met the initial burden.” Id. at __; 920 S.E.2d at 846 (Earls, J., dissenting). The dissent would have held that step one was moot in the case below as the trial court heard, evaluated, and credited the State’s race-neutral reasons–without engaging in the analysis required by Hobbs I.
Dueling footnotes. Footnotes in the majority and dissenting opinion illustrate philosophical differences in the justices’ approach to Batson issues. The majority stated that its “repeated adherence to the principle that step-one mootness is the exception rather than the rule reflects the fundamental maxim ‘incorporated in our Constitution: that we are all equal, and should be treated equally before the law without regard to our race.’” Id. at ___; 920 S.E.2d at 841 n.3 (citing Students for Fair Admissions, Inc. v. President and Fellows of Harvard College, 600 U.S. 181, 277 (2023) (Thomas, J., concurring)). The majority criticized the dissent’s “’race-infused world view’”, stating that it “boils down the Batson process down to a single step: was the challenged juror part of a cognizable racial group?” Id.
The dissent countered that “[r]equiring trial courts to conduct the comparative juror analysis that Hobbs and Flowers [v. Mississippi, 588 U.S. 284 (2019)] demand–rather than accepting facially race-neutral explanations without scrutiny–is not ‘racial determinism’; it is fidelity to Batson’s constitutional command that strikes not be ‘motivated in substantial part by discriminatory intent.’” Id. at ___; 920 S.E.2d at 845 n.1 (citing Flowers, 588 U.S. at 303).
Takeaways. The trial court decides when the Batson analysis moves past step one. A trial court may at step one solicit a response from the striking party regarding whether the objecting party has established a prima facie showing of discrimination. The striking party’s unsolicited proffer of race-neutral reasons at this step does not propel the trial court to steps two and three. Even in the face of such a proffer, the trial court may resolve the case at step one. The matter moves to step three only if the trial court considers the race-neutral reasons proffered by the State and rules on the ultimate question of intentional discrimination.
While the Wilson Court stated that it was not imposing upon trial court judges and trial attorneys “a requirement of surgical precision during a Batson inquiry,” id. at ___; 920 S.E.2d at 843, trial courts may wish to adopt measures to clarify matters for appellate review. After hearing from the proponent of a Batson objection, the court may solicit a response from the other party. If it does so, the court may wish to specify that it is inviting a response “on the issue of whether the [objecting party] has established a prima facie case.” Thereafter, if the trial court rules at step one by relying in part on its own observations of juror demeanor, the court may wish to state on the record that it is relying on its own observations, particularly if those observations happen to coincide with explanations proffered by the striking party.
The opinion in Wilson opens by recognizing the deference afforded to trial judges in ruling on Batson motions, which is afforded because those judges “‘observe firsthand the reactions, hesitations, emotions, candor, and honesty of lawyers and veniremen during voir dire questioning.’” Id. at ___; 920 S.E.2d at 835 (quoting State v. Smith, 328 N.C. 99, 127 (1991). Hand-in-hand with that front line position is the trial courts’ “primary responsibility to enforce Batson and prevent racial discrimination from seeping into the jury selection process.” Flowers v. Mississippi. 588 U.S. 284, 302 (2019).
