Articles related to sixth amendment - Page 2 of 2

Alleging Aggravating Factors in a DWI Prosecution (October 26, 2016)

A defendant charged in district court with the misdemeanor crime of driving while impaired cannot ascertain from the charging document whether he is subject to sentencing at Level A1 (the most serious level) or Level 5 (the least serious). That’s because the aggravating factors that lead to elevated sentencing aren’t considered elements of the offense and thus are not required to be alleged in the charging instrument. Yet because those factors can increase the maximum punishment a defendant may receive, they must be proved beyond a reasonable doubt and, with the exception of prior convictions, be determined by a jury in superior court. And, for most charges of impaired driving prosecuted in superior court, the State must provide notice of its intent to seek aggravating factors. A case decided by the court of appeals last June, however, identifies an exception to this requirement for certain aggravating factors in driving while impaired prosecutions initiated in superior court.

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Egregious Aggravation Is Unconstitutional (May 12, 2016)

In 2008 the General Assembly created the new crimes of rape and sexual offense with a child by an adult offender (G.S. 14-27.2A and -27.4A, respectively). S.L. 2008-117. They have special sentencing rules, described here, including the possibility of a higher maximum sentence if the judge finds “egregious aggravation” in the case. Discussing the law immediately after it passed in 2008, John Rubin wrote (here, on page 3) that placing the responsibility for determining egregious aggravation on the judge—not the jury—was “likely unconstitutional” under Blakely v. Washington. As my kids like to say, “Nailed it.” State v. Singletary, decided by the court of appeals last week (and mentioned briefly in last week’s News Roundup), ratified John’s view.

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Fourth Circuit: New Trial Required When Defense Lawyer Sleeps Through “Substantial Portion” of a Trial (March 14, 2016)

On Friday, the Fourth Circuit, deciding “an issue of first impression,” ruled that a new trial is required when a defense lawyer sleeps through a substantial portion of a trial. The opinion in United States v. Ragin is available here. This post summarizes and discusses the case.

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Padilla Comes to North Carolina (December 8, 2015)

The title I gave this post is actually not quite accurate. Five years ago, in its 2010 decision in Padilla v. Kentucky, 559 U.S. 356 (2010), the U.S. Supreme Court established that criminal defense attorneys have an obligation, as part of the Sixth Amendment guarantee of effective assistance of counsel, to advise noncitizen clients about the immigration consequences of the criminal charges against them. In its recent decision in State v. Nkiam, ___ N.C. App. ___ (Nov. 3, 2015), temp. stay allowed, ___ N.C. ___ (Nov. 23, 2015), the North Carolina Court of Appeals found that the defendant’s counsel failed to meet this obligation. Although Nkiam seems like a straightforward application of Padilla, it has caught people’s attention because it is the first North Carolina appellate decision to address the merits of a Padilla claim of ineffective assistance of counsel. (In previous cases, the North Carolina Court of Appeals found it unnecessary to address the merits of the defendant’s claim, holding that Padilla did not apply retroactively and did not afford relief to a person whose conviction was final before Padilla was decided. State v. Alshaif, 219 N.C. App. 162 (2012); accord Chaidez v. United States, ___ U.S. ___, 133 S. Ct. 1103 (2012).)

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