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Self-defense, Intent to Kill and the Duty to Retreat

Consider the following scenario: Driver Dan is traveling down a dark county two-lane road in his sedan. Traffic is light but slow due to the cold weather and mist. Another driver in a truck appears behind Dan and starts tailgating him, getting within a few feet of his bumper. After unsuccessfully trying to pass Dan, the other driver begins tailgating Dan even more, now staying within inches of his bumper. When the cars ahead turn off and the road is clear,  slows to let the other driver pass, but the other driver continues closely riding Dan’s bumper for several miles, flashing high beams at times. Eventually, the other driver pulls alongside Dan and begins “pacing” him, staying beside Dan’s car instead of passing. The other driver then begins to veer into Dan’s lane, forcing Dan’s passenger-side tires off the road. As Dan feels the steering wheel begin to shake, he fears losing control of his car and decides to defend himself with his (lawfully possessed) pistol. He aims through his open window at the other driver’s front tire and shoots, striking it and halting the other vehicle. The other driver stops without further incident, and Dan leaves. Dan is eventually charged with shooting into an occupied and operating vehicle, a class D felony and general intent crime.

Pop quiz: taking the evidence in the light most favorable to the defendant, is Dan entitled to a self-defense instruction?

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Vote here, and then read on for the answer.

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Defensive Force in the Home

We now have a number of appellate opinions interpreting the defensive force statutes enacted by the North Carolina General Assembly in 2011. In State v. Kuhns, ___ N.C. App. ___ (July 3, 2018), we have our first opinion squarely addressing the provisions of G.S. 14-51.2, which deals with defensive force in a home, workplace, or motor vehicle. This post focuses on the home, where the conflict in Kuhns occurred, but some of the same principles apply to the workplace and motor vehicles.

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Some Clarity on Self-Defense and Unintended Injuries

Earlier this year, in State v. Gomola, ___ N.C. App. ___, 810 S.E.2d 797 (Feb. 6, 2018), the Court of Appeals addressed a self-defense issue that has sometimes puzzled the North Carolina courts. The question in Gomola was whether a person can rely on self-defense to a charge of involuntary manslaughter. The Court answered with a decisive yes . . . if the basis for the involuntary manslaughter charge is an unlawful act such as an assault or affray.

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A Lose-Lose Situation for “Felonious” Defendants Who Act in Self-Defense

I previously wrote here about the statutory felony disqualification for self-defense in North Carolina, adopted in 2011 by the General Assembly alongside expanded castle protections and clearer stand-your-ground rights for law-abiding citizens. The felony disqualification, in G.S. 14-51.4, states that a person loses the right of self-defense if he or she “[w]as attempting to commit, committing, or escaping after the commission of a felony.” A literal interpretation of the provision places “felonious” defendants in a lose-lose situation: if they defend themselves, they can be prosecuted for their use of force even if the force is otherwise permissible; if they don’t defend themselves, they could suffer injury or even death. In my earlier blog post, I suggested that the felony disqualification may include a “nexus” requirement—that is, that the disqualification applies only if the defendant’s felony in some way creates or contributes to the assault on the defendant and the resulting need for the defendant’s use of force. The Court of Appeals in the recent case of State v. Crump took a literal approach, appearing to make the felony disqualification an absolute bar to self-defense if the defendant contemporaneously engages in a felony.

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Self-Defense and Retreat from Places Where the Defendant Has a “Lawful Right to Be”

Our appellate courts are beginning to issue decisions concerning the impact of the General Assembly’s 2011 changes to North Carolina law on self-defense. A case earlier this summer addressed whether a defendant has a duty to retreat before using deadly force in self-defense in a place where he or she has a “lawful right to be.” See State v. Bass, ___ N.C. App. ___, 802 S.E.2d 477, temp. stay and rev. granted, ___ N.C. ___, 800 S.E.2d 421 (2017). In Bass, the Court of Appeals held that the defendant did not have a duty to retreat and further had the right to have the jury instructed that he did not have a duty to retreat.

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Self-Defense Provides Immunity from Criminal Liability

So say two statutes enacted by the General Assembly in 2011 as part of its revision of North Carolina’s self-defense law. G.S. 14-51.2(e) and G.S. 14-51.3(b) both state that a person who uses force as permitted by those statutes—in defense of home, workplace, and vehicle under the first statute and in defense of self or others under the second statute—“is justified in using such force and is immune from civil or criminal liability for the use of such force . . . .” What does this protection mean in criminal cases? No North Carolina appellate cases have addressed the self-defense immunity provision. This blog post addresses possible implications.

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A Warning Shot about Self-Defense

Suppose John is facing a deadly assault and fears that he will be killed or suffer great bodily harm. John has a firearm but, rather than shoot his assailant, he fires a warning shot. The shot goes awry, strikes John’s assailant, and kills him. May John rely on self-defense if charged with murder? The answer may be surprising.

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Is “Justification” a Defense to Possession of a Firearm by a Person with a Felony Conviction?

North Carolina law prohibits a person who has been convicted of a felony from possessing a firearm. The prohibition, set forth in G.S. 14-415.1, contains narrow exceptions, such as for antique firearms. The question has arisen in several cases whether a person with a prior felony conviction may possess a firearm if necessary to defend himself or others—in other words, whether the person may rely on a justification defense.

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The Statutory Felony Disqualification for Self-Defense

I am working on a new edition of the self-defense book I wrote in 1996. As in the story of Rip Van Winkle, a lot has changed in twenty years. Most notably, the General Assembly adopted new statutes in 2011 on self-defense and related defenses. This blog post addresses one of those provisions, in G.S. 14-51.4, which disqualifies a person from relying on self-defense while committing, attempting to commit, or escaping from the commission of a felony. North Carolina appellate courts have not yet considered the meaning of this provision. Cf. State v. Rawlings, ___ N.C. App. ___, 762 S.E.2d 909 (2014) (felony disqualification did not apply to case in which defendant’s offense predated enactment of provision, and court expressed no opinion on proper construction of provision).

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Two Thoughts about the Trayvon Martin/George Zimmerman Case

George Zimmerman, a neighborhood watch volunteer in Sanford, Florida, recently shot and killed Trayvon Martin, an unarmed black 17-year-old who was walking through Zimmerman’s neighborhood. Martin was returning from a convenience store to the home of his father’s fiancee. The shooting has been in the news so much, and has stirred such strong emotions, that … Read more