Judges can continue prayer for judgment in any case. Except when they can’t. Continue reading
Tag Archives: PJC
With three words—PER CURIAM. AFFIRMED.—the Supreme Court of North Carolina last week added a new wrinkle to two already perplexing areas of the law: sex offender registration and PJCs. In Walters v. Cooper, the high court affirmed the court of appeals’ conclusion that a conviction for which a person receives a prayer for judgment continued (PJC) does not require registration as a sex offender.
The details of the case are set out in this prior post, but I will recap them briefly here. Paul Walters received a PJC for his 2006 conviction of misdemeanor sexual battery. He did not register at that time, but was later required to register. He sought declaratory relief in superior court, arguing that a PJC was not a “final conviction” within the meaning of G.S. 14-208.6(4). The trial judge rejected that argument and required him to continue registering. Over a dissent, the court of appeals reversed, concluding that a “true PJC” like the one received by Mr. Walters was not a final conviction for sex offender registration purposes.
The supreme court affirmed, adopting the view of the court of appeals majority that the legislature’s use of the word “final” before “conviction” in G.S. 14-208.6(4) was intended to exclude convictions followed by a PJC. With that interpretation in place, sex offender registration stands as an exception to the general rule that a PJC is the functional equivalent of a conviction for virtually all subsequent purposes, including:
- Prior record points. State v. Hatcher, 136 N.C. App. 524 (2000); State v. Canellas, 164 N.C. App. 775 (2004).
- Evidence Rule 609. State v. Sidberry, 337 N.C. 779 (1994) (holding that a PJC entered after a guilty plea counts as a conviction for Rule 609 impeachment purposes).
- Prohibition on handgun permits for felons. Friend v. State, 169 N.C. App. 99 (2005).
Courts generally come to that conclusion on the theory that the underlying determination of guilt, not the judgment, is the conviction.
The supreme court declined to adopt the thinking of Judge Steelman’s court of appeals dissent. In it, the judge reasoned that whether a PJC is a “final conviction” for sex offender registration purposes was beside the point in Mr. Walters’ case, because he didn’t receive a true PJC. Recall that a PJC is converted into a judgment when it includes conditions that amount to punishment—which certainly includes conditions like imprisonment or a fine, State v. Brown, 110 N.C. App. 658 (1993), but has also been deemed to include lesser things like a curfew or a requirement to write a letter of apology, State v. Popp, 197 N.C. App. 226 (2009).
Judge Steelman would have concluded that the condition on Mr. Walters’ PJC that he “not have any contact with, communicate with, in any shape, form, or fashion, the victim, [and] not be on her property or contact any member of her immediate family” was a sufficient enough limitation on Walters’ rights of association and movement to convert the purported PJC into a final judgment. The State noted the “conditions amounting to punishment” issue as an alternative argument in its appellate brief, but did not cite to Popp. Previously I would have said in light of Popp that about the only conditions that do not convert a PJC into a judgment are a requirement to pay costs, G.S. 15A-101(4a), and a requirement to obey the law, Brown, 110 N.C. App. at 659. The supreme court’s affirmance of Walters has me wondering if the case can be viewed as setting a slightly higher floor for what constitutes a non-punitive condition.
I’m headed to High Point today to teach a session for magistrates on crimes related to sex offender registration. I’m glad I looked at the slip opinions from the court of appeals before I left. A case decided today answers a somewhat frequently asked question about sex offender registration: Does a PJC for a sex crime count as a “final conviction” for purposes of the sex offender registration law? The answer, according to the majority of the panel in Walters v. Cooper, is no.
Walters involved a Franklin County man who pled guilty to misdemeanor sexual battery in 2006. (His offense date was March 2006—just a few months after that crime was made a reportable offense, effective for offenses committed on or after December 1, 2005. S.L. 2005-130.) Prayer for judgment was continued in the case, upon condition that he pay costs and attorney fees and not have any contact with the victim or her immediate family. He was not told to register as a sex offender at that time, and he didn’t.
In November 2011, the sheriff’s office told Mr. Walters that he needed to register because of his sexual battery conviction. So he did. But a few months later he filed a civil action seeking declaratory judgment that he was not required to register for a conviction for which prayer for judgment had been continued, and an order directing the attorney general’s office to remove him from the registry. The trial judge granted summary judgment for the AG. Mr. Walters appealed.
The court of appeals reversed, concluding that a “true PJC” like the one received by Mr. Walters was not a “final conviction” within the meaning of G.S. 14-208.6(4).
The appellate court first grappled with the question of whether Mr. Walters had actually received what it termed a “true PJC.” The court acknowledged the rule, discussed here, that a PJC can be converted into a final judgment if it includes conditions that amount to punishment. Notwithstanding cases like State v. Popp, 197 N.C. App. 226 (2009), in which the court has said that most anything other than costs and a requirement to obey the law converts a PJC into a judgment, the Walters court determined that “none of the conditions imposed upon the Plaintiff in this case appear to be punitive in nature . . . ,” and Mr. Walters had thus received a true PJC. Slip op. at 5–6. (The dissent disagreed on this point, as I’ll discuss in a moment.)
The court then moved on to the question of the meaning of the term “final conviction” in the sex offender registration law. The phrase is undefined, so the court reviewed how it had interpreted similar language in North Carolina’s motor vehicle statutes. Mainly the court looked to Florence v. Hiatt, 101 N.C. App. 539 (1991), where it had held that a PJC did not, under G.S. 20-24 as it was written at the time, constitute a “final conviction” triggering a license revocation by DMV. Chapter 20 defines “conviction” differently today (see G.S. 20-4.01(4a)), but the court presumed that when the General Assembly wrote the sex offender registration law in 1995, it was aware that modifying the word “conviction” with the adjective “final” would, in light of Florence, exclude convictions followed by true PJCs. Slip op. at 8 (distinguishing other statutory references to mere “convictions,” like Rule 609 and the possession of firearm by a felon law in G.S. 14-415.1).
Judge Steelman dissented. He disagreed that Mr. Walters’ PJC was a true PJC within the meaning of G.S. 15A-101(4a), which says that “[p]rayer for judgment continued upon payment of costs, without more, does not constitute the entry of judgment.” Here, the judge wrote, there was “more”—the “trial judge placed several explicit conditions upon the entry of the prayer for judgment continued,” slip op. at 2 (Steelman, J., dissenting), and thus converted the purported PJC into an entered judgment, see State v. Brown, 110 N.C. App. 658 (1993) (“When, however, the trial judge imposes conditions amounting to punishment on the continuation of the entry of judgment, the judgment loses its character as a PJC and becomes a final judgment.” (internal quotations omitted)). The dissent would have concluded that the condition prohibiting Mr. Walters from contacting the victim or the victim’s family was clearly punishment, and thus rendered Walters’ PJC a “final conviction” for all purposes. No need to wade into the registration consequences of a “true PJC,” because Walters didn’t get one.
The dissent may set up review by the supreme court. For the moment, however, Walters bucks the clear trend that a PJC is the functional equivalent of a conviction in almost every way that matters.
I am sometimes asked if a conviction for which prayer for judgment has been continued (a PJC) can be expunged. It’s a sensible question, given—as I’ll discuss in a moment—that a PJC is treated like a conviction for most purposes in North Carolina. A person has virtually the same incentive to seek expungement of a PJC as he or she does for any other conviction. The general view (at least among the judges and lawyers who have posed the question to me) appears to be that a PJC may not be expunged.
I think there’s a decent argument that at least some PJCs may be expunged.
First, I should clarify which type of expunction I’m talking about. If anything, I think a PJC would fall under G.S. 15A-145 (for expunction of misdemeanor convictions for first-time offenders under age 18), not G.S. 15A-146 (for expunction of dismissed or acquitted charges). Indeed, the crux of the argument for expungeability is that a PJC is a conviction. A judge can only continue prayer for judgment after the defendant’s guilt has been established, and the courts have now held that a guilty verdict—not entry of judgment—is the touchstone of a conviction. See State v. McGee, 175 N.C. App. 586 (2006) (“[U]nder the traditional definition, ‘conviction’ refers to the jury’s or factfinder’s guilty verdict.”). That’s the rationale for why a PJC counts as a conviction for prior record level points, State v. Hatcher, 135 N.C. App. 524 (2000) (as I discussed here). [Note: In 2009, the first version of the bill (H 726) that was eventually passed this year as an act to “clarify expunctions” would have amended G.S. 15A-146 (not -145) to say that the record of a defendant’s charge could be expunged if prayer for judgment was continued in the case—treating the PJC the same as a dismissal or finding of not guilty. By the time the bill reached its third iteration that provision was gone—sensibly, I think, given that a PJC is not like a dismissal or acquittal, and the incongruity between expunging records of a defendant’s charge for a PJC that would certainly be treated as a conviction for future prior record level calculations.]
G.S. 15A-145 refers only to “convictions” (there is no requirement for entry of judgment) and applies to any otherwise eligible person who “pleads guilty to or is guilty of a misdemeanor other than a traffic violation.” It seems to me that if a PJC is a conviction for other purposes, it arguably falls within the conviction language of G.S. 145.
I am not, however, prepared to say that all PJCs can be expunged. There are different kinds of PJCs.
First, if a purported PJC included conditions amounting to punishment, it wasn’t really a PJC at all. As Jessie discussed in this post, almost anything other than a requirement to pay costs (per G.S. 15A-101(4a)) or a general requirement to “obey the law,” State v. Brown, 110 N.C. App. 658 (1993), will convert a PJC into an entered judgment. State v. Popp, 676 S.E.2d 613 (2009). And if the PJC was really an entered judgment, there’s little doubt it can be expunged under G.S. 15A-145 (assuming the petitioner is otherwise eligible).
What about true PJCs, ones with no conditions attached, and for which judgment clearly has not been entered? Even among those there are different types. There is the “dispositional” PJC—one which all parties believe to be the final outcome of the case, entered with the idea that no further sentencing will occur. Then there’s the PJC “from term to term,” entered with the understanding that the state may later pray judgment if the defendant commits a new crime or engages in some other bad behavior. And finally there’s a PJC to allow the judge to obtain additional information needed for sentencing—really a simple continuation of the sentencing hearing itself.
Regarding the final type, it’s pretty clear that those shouldn’t be expunged. It’s unlikely to come up, I think, given that G.S. 15A-145 requires that a person must wait at least two years from the date of conviction before petitioning for an expunction. But even if a judge did need to continue a case for that long, I don’t think G.S. 15A-145 should operate to short-circuit the judge’s discretion. Similarly, when prayer for judgment has been continued from term to term and the state could still reasonably act on it by praying judgment, an expunction would seem improper. Exactly how long the state has to act has been the subject of a few cases in North Carolina, including one just last week. In State v. Craven, the court of appeals determined that a two-year delay was not unreasonable when the defendant consented to the continuation and never requested sentencing. In an earlier case the court said a five-year delay was reasonable when the defendant was not prejudiced by the delay. State v. Lea, 156 N.C. App. 178 (2003).
So the expunction process probably shouldn’t be used to pull the conviction rug out from under the judge or the state when entry of judgment is still possible. If, however, the court entertaining an expunction petition for a defendant who received a PJC is able to determine (a) that neither it (nor any other judge) is still awaiting information for sentencing; and (b) that the PJC was at its inception or has become, on account of a delay that would make entry of judgment unreasonable, dispositional in nature, I think an otherwise eligible conviction for which prayer for judgment has been continued could be expunged under G.S. 15A-145.
There are probably arguments to the contrary that I haven’t thought of, and I hope you’ll raise them in the comments. If nothing else, the Attorney General has noted in an opinion letter that the expunction statute operates as an exception to the general prohibition against alteration of records, and should thus be strictly construed. That same letter, though, notes that the expunction statute is remedial in nature and should thus be subject to a rule of liberal construction.
Defendants are generally pretty happy to get a PJC. When a judge continues prayer for judgment the defendant avoids punishment and is often able to sidestep a car insurance rate hike. That’s not to say a PJC is a total free pass. I wrote before about how a PJC will certainly count as a prior conviction if the defendant is later sentenced for another crime, and I’m still unclear about how a judge can later “dismiss” a PJC if a defendant behaves for a certain amount of time. But more often than not, a PJC is a welcome act of judicial mercy.
But suppose the defendant doesn’t want a PJC. Maybe she wants to go into the military, which may consider the PJC to be an unresolved legal matter, and therefore an impediment to enlistment. Or maybe the PJC had unforeseen employment consequences for, say, a commercial driver. Maybe he wants to appeal the case, but is being told he can’t – as something other than a final judgment, a PJC cannot be appealed. State v. Pledger, 257 N.C. 634 (1962). Whatever the reason, sometimes the defendant just needs judgment to be entered. Under G.S. 15A-1416(b) the State can make a motion for appropriate relief for imposition of sentence when prayer for judgment has been continued, but there’s no corresponding statute allowing the defendant to do so. If the judge is unwilling to enter judgment, and the State is unwilling to pray judgment, is the defendant really stuck with the PJC?
The black-letter rule that has emerged over the years is that “North Carolina courts have the power to continue prayer for judgment without the defendant’s consent, so long as no conditions are imposed on the defendant.” State v. Van Trusell, 170 N.C. App. 33 (2005). (Of course, in many cases the inclusion of conditions would convert a would-be PJC into entry of judgment, as the court of appeals reminded us in State v. Popp. So let’s assume we’re talking about a truly conditionless PJC.) But if you go back in time and look at the cases cited in support of the rule, you see it begin to unravel. To the DeLorean…
Van Trusell cites to State v. Griffin, 246 N.C. 680 (1957) – the leading case on a judge’s authority to continue prayer for judgment. In Griffin the supreme court wrote that “[i]n the event the court, after a conviction or plea, finds it desirable not to pass judgment immediately, it may continue the prayer for judgment from one term to another without the defendant’s consent if no terms or conditions are imposed.” Sounds pretty similar to the rule stated in Van Trussel, right? But notice the parts I italicized. It seems to me that Griffin wasn’t talking about a judge’s authority to continue prayer for judgment forever, but rather the authority to take additional time, if needed, to decide a case. In fact, elsewhere in Griffin the court says “the inherent power of a court having jurisdiction to suspend judgment or stay execution of sentence on conviction in a criminal case for a determinate period and for a reasonable length of time has been recognized and upheld in this jurisdiction.”
Griffin cites to State v. Burgess, 192 N.C. 668 (1926). In that case the judge continued prayer for judgment after a defendant was convicted of an assault with a deadly weapon. The defendant “excepted” to the PJC, wanting to appeal the conviction. The supreme court held that the defendant “had a substantial right that some final judgment be rendered so as to enable him to preserve his right under the law.” The court went on to say that a judge could continue a prayer for judgment “from one term to another” without a defendant’s consent – but again, it appears to me that the court is talking about a delay, not a disposition.
I won’t go back any further than that for now, but suffice it to say there are some gaps in the “inherent authority” grounding of the permanent, unwelcome PJC. In closing I’ll also point out Klopfer v. North Carolina, 386 U.S. 213 (1967), a Supreme Court case arising out of North Carolina’s “nolle prosequi with leave” procedure. In that case the State entered a nolle prosequi with leave – “a declaration on the part of the solicitor that he will not at that time prosecute the suit farther,” State v. Klopfer, 266 N.C. 349, 350 (1966) – in a misdemeanor trespass case. The defendant, a Duke professor and civil rights activist, wanted the State to go ahead and prosecute his case, complaining that the continued “pendency of the indictment greatly interfered with his professional activities and with his travel here and abroad.” The state supreme court said the defendant could not compel the State to proceed. Id. The Supreme Court disagreed, holding on speedy trial grounds that the State could not “indefinitely prolong this oppression.” Klopfer, 386 U.S. at 222. Concurring in the result of the case, Justice Harlan wrote that “this unusual North Carolina procedure, which in effect . . . put[s] a person under the cloud of an unliquidated criminal charge for an indeterminate period, violates the requirement of fundamental fairness assured by the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.” Could a similar argument be made in the PJC context?
This post benefits from research done by School of Government law clerk Chris Heagarty.
Editor’s note: Today’s post discusses a recent case about the unique-to-North-Carolina phenomenon of Prayer for Judgment Continued, or PJC. For a terrific earlier post about PJCs — it’s the single most popular post in the history of this blog — see Jamie Markham’s discussion, here.
Like Jamie, I get a lot of questions about PJCs. One common question is: What’s okay to include in a PJC? The question is important because a PJC is converted into a judgment if it includes conditions that amount to punishment. When that happens, no further punishment may be imposed for the crime. Earlier this week, the North Carolina Court of Appeals decided State v. Popp, further clarifying the types of conditions that amount to punishment. Popp didn’t break new ground but it did add a few things to the list of impermissible PJC conditions. The rules are as follows:
The following terms do not convert a PJC into a judgment:
- Requirements to obey the law
By contrast, the following terms or conditions constitute punishment and convert a PJC into a judgment:
- Continue psychiatric treatment
- Abide by a curfew
- Complete high school
- Enroll in an institution of higher learning or join the armed forces
- Cooperate with random drug testing
- Perform community service
- Remain employed
- Write a letter of apology
Recently, I blogged about limitations on a judge’s authority to enter a disposition of prayer for judgment continued in speeding cases depending upon the speeding charge. (You can read that post here.) The recent discussion regarding judgments in speeding cases begs the question of why specific speeds are part of the adjudication in the first place.
A person can violate the speed restrictions that apply on North Carolina roads in one of three ways: (1) by driving at a speed greater than is reasonable and prudent under existing conditions ; (2) by exceeding maximum speed limits; or (3) by operating a vehicle at less than a minimum posted speed. See G.S. 20-141. Generally speaking, speeding is an infraction — a noncriminal violation of the law — punishable by a penalty of not more than $100. Driving on a highway at a speed of more than 15 miles per hour over the speed limit or over 80 miles per hour, however, is a Class 2 misdemeanor, punishable by up to 60 days imprisonment, depending upon the person’s prior record level.
A plain reading of the statute reveals that charges involving the second variety of speeding (which is commonly referred to as exceeding the posted speed, though there is no requirement that the speed be posted unless it is higher or lower than the presumptive 35 mph inside municipal corporate limits or 55 mph outside municipal corporate limits) require only a determination of whether the person drove a vehicle on a highway in excess of the maximum speed limit by driving more than 15 mph or by driving more than 80 mph, in which case the person committed a misdemeanor criminal offense. Otherwise, the offense is an infraction.
But in many speeding cases involving charges of exceeding the maximum speed, both the charges and the determination of the person’s responsibility (in the case of an infraction) or guilt (in the case of a misdemeanor) is far more precise. The citation issued to a defendant often, but not always, specifies the rate of speed (and, indeed, may even specify the rate of speed registered by radar, which can be different from the speed “charged” on the citation). And, as noted in my earlier post, those charges may be changed by the district attorney before the case proceeds to trial. When a defendant pleads guilty to a speeding charge in which the specific speed is alleged, the defendant pleads not just to speeding but to driving a specific speed in a specific speed zone. In a bench trial in district court, the judge may find the defendant not responsible or not guilty of the charged offense or responsible or guilty of the charged offense or a lesser included offense. The infraction of exceeding the maximum speed is a lesser included offense of the misdemeanor. In addition, unless the speeding charged is speeding more than 25 miles per hour over the posted speed limit, a violation of G.S. 20-123.2, which prohibits driving a motor vehicle on a highway without a working speedometer, is a lesser included offense of speeding.
If a defendant is found guilty or responsible in district court for a violation of G.S. 20-141, the judge may find the defendant guilty or responsible not only for speeding but also for driving a particular speed, which, again, is a determination that may have collateral licensure and insurance consequences. The same holds true for the jury in superior court.
A judge may enter a prayer for judgment continued in a speeding case, subject to the limitations mentioned in the earlier post. The entry of a prayer for judgment prevents the conviction from being considered by DMV for license points and revocation purposes (until the third or subsequent prayer for judgment continued in a five-year period) and from resulting in the accumulation of points under North Carolina’s Safe Driver Incentive Plan.
It also bears mentioning that many speeding violations are waivable offenses. The Conference of Chief District Court Judges promulgates annually a list of traffic offenses for which magistrates and clerks of court may accept written appearances, waivers of trial, and pleas of guilty or admissions of responsibility. The traffic offense waiver list effective for offenses committed on or after December 1, 2008, is available here. Speeding is a waivable offense so long as the speed driven does not exceed 80 mph and is not more than 15 mph over the speed limit if the speed driven is over 55 mph. A person originally cited for a nonwaivable speeding offense may, upon the district attorney’s reduction of those charges to a waivable charge, dispose of those charges by waiving appearance and trial and pleading guilty or responsible to the magistrate or clerk and paying the applicable fine and costs.
In 2007, legislative action designed to stiffen penalties for drivers charged with speeding followed close on the heels of the “Speed Unlimited” series published in the News and Observer in May 2007. Among the News and Observer’s findings was that, in 2006, only 19 percent of drivers ticketed for speeding at 100 mph or more were convicted as charged. For the year ending June 30, 2006, the newspaper reported that four of five speeding drivers had charges dismissed or reduced or were given a prayer for judgment continued.
S.L. 2007-380 (S 925) addressed two of the more prominent issues raised in the newspaper’s report: pleas to improper equipment (an infraction) and the entry of prayers for judgment continued. For offenses committed on or after December 1, 2007, the act removed a violation of G.S. 20-123.2, the statute requiring that motor vehicles be equipped with a working speedometer, as a lesser included offense of charges of speeding in excess of 25 mph over the posted speed limit. It also enacted new G.S. 20-141(p), which barred the disposition of prayer for judgment continued for a driver charged with speeding more than 25 mph over the posted speed limit. The entry of a prayer for judgment continued (if the driver does not have other prayers for judgment continued within a certain time period) prevents a driver from suffering adverse collateral consequences for license and insurance purposes resulting from a speeding conviction or adjudication. Because, however, G.S. 20-141(p) refers to the offense with which a defendant is “charged” without further specification as to the stage of the proceedings at which the charges are to be determined, questions have arisen regarding just which charge counts for purposes of limiting a judge’s authority to enter a prayer for judgment continued. “Charged” might mean the original offense charged, or it might instead refer to the offense upon which a defendant is tried or to which the defendant enters a plea of guilty or responsible.
The News and Observer followed up its 2007 series with a March 28, 2009, story, available here, in which it reported its analysis of more recent dispositions in speeding cases. The article concluded that despite the 2007 legislation, courts were “still soft” on speeders. The article alleged that “[n]early 12 percent of those charged with driving more than 25 mph over the speed limit got breaks that legislators tried to outlaw,” and referenced pleas to improper equipment and the entry of prayers for judgment continued. The article also reported that in most districts, there had been a “surge” in cases in which the charges were reduced to “10 mph or less over the limit.”
As a result of the report and varying practice among judges and districts, questions have arisen regarding whether a judge may properly enter a prayer for judgment continued when a defendant is originally charged with speeding more than 25 mph over the speed limit but pleads to speeding 25 mph or less over the speed limit.
My view is that the charge properly considered by the judge is the charge to which the person pleads guilty or responsible or upon which the defendant is tried. If that charge differs from an earlier charge, then the earlier charge does not bind the judge’s sentencing discretion. Interpreting “charged” in G.S. 20-141(p) to refer to the charge at the time the case is heard in court comports with manner in which cases are prosecuted under state law. Pursuant to G.S. 7A-61, the district attorney is the official responsible for preparing the trial dockets and prosecuting all criminal actions requiring prosecution in the superior and district courts in his or her district. The prosecutor is authorized by G.S. 15A-922 to supersede a citation and all previous pleadings in a misdemeanor case by filing a statement of charges at any time before arraignment in district court. Thus, the prosecutor has the ultimate say regarding the charges upon which the defendant is tried. The prosecutor’s amendment of the charges stated on the citation by striking through the original speed and replacing it with a different speed is procedurally akin to the filing of a statement of charges, which “may charge the same offenses as the citation, criminal summons, warrant for arrest, or magistrate’s order or additional or different offenses.” In light of the district attorney’s prosecutorial authority, and his or her ability to supersede a citation as the state’s pleading in a misdemeanor case by filing a statement of charges, see G.S. 15A-922, it seems incongruous to construe “charged” in G.S. 20-141(p) as referring to a charge that has been amended by the official responsible for prosecuting the case.
Thus, if a defendant is originally charged with driving 81 mph in a 55 mph speed zone, the district attorney reduces the charge to 70 mph in a 55 mph speed zone, and the defendant pleads guilty to the latter — and lesser — charge, the judge may lawfully enter a prayer for judgment continued.
North Carolina law prohibits convicted felons from possessing firearms. See G.S. 14-415.1. I’ve had several recurrent questions about this offense, so here’s an FAQ about FIP (felon in possession):
1. Doesn’t North Carolina allow felons to possess long guns? Not anymore. North Carolina’s FIP law used to have lots of exceptions, including exceptions for long guns and for handguns in the home or workplace. It also used to allow felons to regain the right to possess firearms five years after completion of their sentences. The last of these provisions was eliminated effective December 1, 2004, bringing the North Carolina law pretty close to the absolute and permanent prohibition that exists, in any event, under federal law. See 18 U.S.C. 922(g)(1).
2. Is the constitutionality of G.S. 14-415.1 in doubt after District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. __ (2008), in which the United States Supreme Court recently held that the Second Amendment protects an individual right to bear arms? No. The Heller Court was quite clear that the right to bear arms is “not unlimited,” and specifically noted that “nothing in our opinion should be taken to cast doubt on longstanding prohibitions on the possession of firearms by felons and the mentally ill, or laws forbidding the carrying of firearms in sensitive places such as schools and government buildings, or laws imposing conditions and qualifications on the commercial sale of arms.”
3. Does a no contest plea count as a conviction? Does a PJC? Does a conviction that is on appeal at the time of the possession? Yes, a conviction based on a no contest plea counts. See State v. Watts, 72 N.C. App. 661 (1985). Yes, a PJC counts. See State v. Friend, 169 N.C. App. 99 (2005). Although I don’t know of a case on point, I would expect our appellate courts to hold that a conviction on appeal counts, too. Legally, the statute defines “conviction” as a “final judgment,” which the entry of a criminal judgment may well satisfy. Practically, it is hard to imagine our courts adopting an interpretation that allows a felon to extend his entitlement to carry firearms for a year simply by filing a notice of appeal.
4. If, at trial, a FIP defendant offers to stipulate to the existence of a prior felony as a way of preventing the jury from finding out about the particular felony offense he committed, must the state accept the stipulation? No. See State v. Jackson, 139 N.C. App. 721 (2000), rev’d on other grounds, 353 N.C. 495 (2001). This is contrary to the rule in federal court, where the government must accept a defendant’s stipulation. See Old Chief v. United States, 519 U.S. 172 (1997).
I hope this helps. If there are other common FIP issues out there, let me know, and I’d be glad to add to the FIP FAQ.
It has become clear to me in my work with judges and lawyers around the state that use of prayer for judgment continued—a practice virtually unique to North Carolina, at least by that name—varies. The long-running James Johnson case in Wilson concluded last week with a PJC (story here), prompting me to make the first of what will probably be many posts on the subject. I thought I’d start with something we know for sure: how PJCs count for prior record level purposes.
Our appellate courts made clear in State v. Hatcher, 136 N.C. App. 524 (2000), and a number of other cases that a PJC counts for prior record points. That conclusion stems from G.S. 15A-1331(b), which reads “[f]or the purpose of imposing sentence, a person has been convicted when he has been adjudged guilty or has entered a plea of no contest.” It’s the adjudication of guilt, not the entry of judgment that matters.
I have heard the argument that PJCs for misdemeanors shouldn’t count for prior record level points because, under G.S. 15A-1340.11(7)(a), a conviction of a crime in the district court is a “prior conviction” only when the person has not given notice of appeal and the time for appeal has expired. (Unlike superior court convictions, which are deemed final regardless of pending appeal to the appellate division.) Because no judgment is entered when a misdemeanor conviction is followed by a PJC, no appeal is possible. Because no appeal is yet possible, the argument continues, the time for appeal has not technically expired, and the conviction is therefore not a prior conviction. It’s not a frivolous argument, but in State v. Canellas, 164 N.C. App. 775 (2004), the court applied the same analysis it used in Hatcher to conclude that a defendant’s PJC for assault on a female should count for prior record purposes.
The rule seems clear enough, but if there are nuances to it in practice that aren’t clear from the cases, I’d love to hear about them.