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Court of Appeals Holds that State Constitution Prohibits Substitution of Alternate Jurors After Deliberations Begin

Author’s Note: The North Carolina Supreme Court in State v. Chambers, 56PA24,  __ N.C. __ (May 23, 2025), reversed the opinion below, holding that provisions of G.S. 15A-1215(a) permitting the substitution of an alternate juror after the jury has begun deliberations comport with the state constitutional requirement for unanimous jury. The Supreme Court’s opinion is summarized here.

When a deliberating juror in Eric Chambers’ April 2022 murder trial told the presiding judge that he could not be available in court the next day because of a medical appointment, the trial judge discharged the juror, substituted an alternate juror, and instructed the jury to restart its deliberations. In doing so, the trial judge followed the procedures set forth in G.S. 15A-1215(a) for substituting an alternate juror after deliberations have begun. Chambers, who represented himself at trial, did not object. The reconstituted jury subsequently found Chambers guilty of first-degree murder and a related felony assault, and the judge sentenced Chambers to life in prison.

Chambers failed to properly enter a notice of appeal and subsequently sought certiorari review by the North Carolina Court of Appeals. The Court granted review and reversed Chambers’ conviction based on the substitution of the alternate juror. State v. Chambers, No. COA22-1063, ___ N.C. App. ___ , ___ S.E.2d ___ (2024). The Court held that notwithstanding statutory amendments to G.S. 15A-1215(a) enacted in 2021 to authorize the substitution of alternate jurors after deliberations begin, it was bound by the North Carolina Supreme Court’s holding in State v. Bunning, 346 N.C. 253 (1997), that substitution of an alternate juror in a capital sentencing proceeding after deliberations began was structural error. This post will review the holding in Chambers, the precedent upon which it relied, and the provisions of G.S. 15A-1215(a) that Chambers, if it remains undisturbed, effectively eviscerates.

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Ramos v. Louisiana and the Jim Crow Origins of Nonunanimous Juries

Ramos v. Louisiana, decided by the U.S. Supreme Court last Monday and summarized here, holds that the Sixth Amendment impartial jury guarantee gives defendants a right to a unanimous jury verdict in state trials. The case is making waves for reasons tangential to the dispute between the parties: in a dizzyingly split opinion, the justices argue more over the meaning of stare decisis (the court’s obligation to follow its prior holdings) than whether defendants in state courts may be convicted by a less-than-unanimous jury. This aspect of the opinion has been widely discussed (see analysis here, here, here, and here), and foreshadows the justices’ likely battle over an upcoming reproductive rights case. Since the divergent perspectives on stare decisis have been covered elsewhere, I will consider another issue that split the justices: the legal relevance of the nonunanimous jury law’s Jim Crow origins.

First, a pop quiz

Did North Carolina ever allow non unanimous jury verdicts in criminal trials? Read on for the answer.

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Letting the Jury Know about “Collateral” Consequences of a Conviction

Under North Carolina law a criminal defendant has the right to inform the jury of the punishment for the crime being tried. In State v. McMorris, 290 N.C. 286 (1976), the North Carolina Supreme Court traced this right back to the mid-19th century. Back then, the legislature took umbrage at a judge’s refusal to allow a lawyer to argue both the law and facts to the jury and enacted what is now G.S. 7A-97. That statute states that “the whole case as well of law as of fact may be argued to the jury.” The Supreme Court in McMorris held that this provision gave the defendant the right to inform the jury of the statutory punishment in the case. The Court observed: “In a real sense the sanction prescribed for criminal behavior is part of the law of the case.” 290 N.C. at 287.

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The Old Bailey: A Typical Trial Docket in an Atypical Setting

Earlier this week, the students and I spent the afternoon at Central Criminal Court in London, formerly called the Old Bailey and located at the intersection of Old Bailey and Newgate streets in the heart of London’s law district. I can guarantee that this post will not be as captivating as Rumpole of the Bailey, the British television series about fictional barrister Horace Rumpole. But, like most trips to court, it was certainly interesting.

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Harmless Error and Jury Unanimity in DWI Cases

Shortly after I published last week’s post on State v. Babich, an astute reader asked about the court’s harmless error analysis. How, he inquired, could the improper admission of expert testimony that the defendant had an alcohol concentration of 0.08 be harmless error? Did the jury’s verdict indicate that it found the defendant guilty only under the “under the influence” prong of impairment rather than under the “alcohol concentration of 0.08 or more” prong? To answer these questions, I had to dig into the record on appeal and provide a bit of background on the requirement for jury unanimity in DWI cases. I thought others might be interested in my response.

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