North Carolina Criminal Law Blog

We are putting the final touches on the new edition of the North Carolina Sentencing Handbook - publication date forthcoming! As part of revising and updating the DWI Sentencing portion, three updates stood out to me as warranting some more discussion. First, the legislature has expanded delegated authority for probation officers to include probationers sentenced for impaired driving under G.S. 20-179. Second, the Court of Appeals further clarified the presumption for unsupervised probation and requirements for transferring a probationer from supervised to unsupervised probation. Third, a new mitigating factor was added for voluntary pretrial installation of an ignition interlock device. Read on for more details.

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In light of the recent Court of Appeals opinion State v. Moore, this post is a follow-up to the 2018 blog post State v. Fincher: No Foundation Required for DRE Testimony by my colleague Shea Denning. Rule 702 of the North Carolina Rules of Evidence governs the admissibility of expert testimony. Rule 702(a) requires the proponent to show that the expert testimony is based on sufficient facts or data (Rule 702(a)(1)), the product of reliable principles and methods (Rule 702(a)(2)), and the result of the witness reliably applying the principles and methods to the facts of the case (Rule 702(a)(3)). That said, there are circumstances where the proponent is not required to make these showings. Rule 702(a1)(2) permits a witness to give expert testimony about whether a person was impaired, and by what category of impairing substance, “notwithstanding any other provision of law” when the witness holds a current certification as a Drug Recognition Expert (DRE). In a case of first impression, the Court of Appeals held that the proponent of expert testimony by a witness properly certified as a DRE must nonetheless meet the showing required by Rule 702(a)(3) that the testimony is the result of the witness reliably applying the principles and methods to the facts of the case. Read on for more detail.

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There are six sentencing levels for Driving While Impaired (DWI) convictions. A defendant is only exposed to the three most severe levels (A1, 1, and 2) if a judge or jury finds the existence of one or more “grossly aggravating factors” beyond a reasonable doubt. These factors are listed in G.S. 20-179(c). One of them is “[d]riving by the defendant at the time of the offense while the defendant's driver's license was revoked pursuant to G.S. 20‑28(a1).” Rather than applying to all revocations, G.S. 20-28(a1) applies when person’s license is revoked for an “impaired driving revocation.”  At first glance, it appears any time a person is convicted of DWI, if their license was revoked for an impaired driving revocation, this grossly aggravating factor would apply and elevate their sentencing exposure—but that may not be the case. Read on for more.

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In previous posts, I’ve addressed the expedited scheduling requirements and opportunities for permanent release of motor vehicles seized pursuant to G.S. 20-28.3. Today, I’ll address the ways a motor vehicle may be released temporarily pending trial or final disposition of the underlying offense. Generally speaking, this temporary release permits a motor vehicle owner to obtain temporary possession of the vehicle conditioned on meeting certain prerequisites and agreeing to return the motor vehicle on the day of the forfeiture hearing. Read on for more. 

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In every case where a person is charged with felony speeding to elude arrest pursuant to G.S. 20-141.5(b) or (b1), the motor vehicle driven is subject to seizure and forfeiture. This is also true in DWI cases where, at the date of offense, the defendant’s driver’s license was revoked for an impaired driving revocation or the defendant did not have a valid license nor insurance. When in district court, these cases have expedited calendaring requirements (discussed here). This is in part to preserve the vehicle’s value while the case is pending. Upon seizure, the vehicle is usually first towed to a local storage facility, then transferred to the facilities of a state contractor within a few days. There are fees for towing, as well as accruing fees for storage. Whether the motor vehicle is released to its owner, a lienholder, or forfeited to the county board of education, these towing and storage fees must be paid. Often, these fees are paid out of the proceeds of the sale of the vehicle. While expediting the underlying case towards resolution is one way to minimize these fees, another is release of the vehicle before case disposition. This post addresses the circumstances under which a vehicle may be fully released pretrial and does not have to be brought back for a later forfeiture hearing.

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Law enforcement has authority to seize a person’s motor vehicle in several circumstances. Motor vehicles may be seized as evidence of a crime or for containing evidence of a crime, or as a consequence of being charged with certain offenses, including specified drug offenses, larcenies, and motor vehicle offenses. For some individuals charged with impaired driving or felony speeding to elude arrest, their vehicles may be seized and are subject to forfeiture pursuant to G.S. 20-28.3. In these cases, subsection (m) requires expedited scheduling and imposes additional requirements before the case can be continued. This post examines when subsection (m) applies, what it requires, and what may happen if it’s not followed.

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The U.S. Supreme Court held in Blakely v. Washington, 542 U.S. 296 (2004) that any contested fact that increases the defendant’s sentence beyond the statutory maximum must be submitted to the jury and found beyond a reasonable doubt. Shortly thereafter,  the General Assembly amended G.S. 20-179 to require judges in superior court cases to submit contested aggravating factors during impaired driving sentencing to the jury. Practically, this means that after a person is found guilty of impaired driving, if they are contesting properly alleged aggravating factors, there must be a sentencing hearing before the jury to determine any aggravating factors beyond a reasonable doubt. The North Carolina Supreme Court considered in State v. King, ___ N.C. ___, 906 S.E.2d 808 (2024) what happens if a judge finds contested aggravating factors without submitting them to the jury.

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I have written before about the cache associated with a handful of unpublished opinions from the North Carolina Court of Appeals. Sure, they aren’t binding, but they can be persuasive. My guess is that the Court’s December 2023 opinion in State v. C.K.D.. No. COA23-204, 2023 WL 8748032, ___ N.C. App. ___, 895 S.E.2d 923 (2023) (unpublished), has been used as a persuasive tool in more than a few impaired driving cases since it was decided. The C.K.D. Court upheld the dismissal of impaired driving charges based on the detention of the defendant for 11 hours following his initial appearance pursuant to an impaired driving hold. The Court determined that (1) there was no clear and convincing evidence that the defendant who had registered a 0.17 alcohol concentration posed a danger, and (2) holding the defendant for 11 hours irreparably prejudiced the defendant’s case by depriving him of the opportunity to have others observe his condition, even though the defendant indicated he did not wish to call anyone to witness his condition in the jail or to assume responsibility for him as a sober, responsible adult. I was a bit surprised by the outcome. I would have thought that the alcohol concentration standing alone would have been sufficient to support the hold. I also would have thought that the defendant’s failure to attempt to contact anyone from jail would have defeated his claim of irreparable prejudice. As noted, I would have been wrong on both counts. This post will discuss C.K.D., explore how it differs from other court of appeals decisions following Knoll, and consider what the takeaways may be for magistrates imposing such holds.

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What law applies when a juvenile is suspected of impaired driving? If the juvenile is 16- or 17-years-old, the criminal law applies in the same way that it applies to someone aged 18 or older. These offenses are carved out of juvenile jurisdiction (G.S. 7B-1501(7)b.) They are therefore criminal matters from their inception. However, if the juvenile is under age 16 at the time of the offense, the case is a juvenile matter from its inception. This blog explains how cases alleging impaired driving under the age of 16 should proceed pursuant to the Juvenile Code.

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I wrote last week about changes to North Carolina’s ignition interlock statutes that were effective June 1, 2022.  As I noted in that post, one of those changes was to eliminate the time and purpose restrictions that otherwise apply to limited driving privileges if ignition interlock is required as a condition and the person is driving a designated vehicle equipped with ignition interlock. Another was to require vendors to waive a portion of ignition interlock costs for a person ordered by a court or required by statute to install ignition interlock but who is unable to afford the system. These changes and others enacted by S.L. 2021-82 were recommended by the Ignition Interlock Subcommittee of the Statewide Impaired Driving Task Force as part of a package of reforms designed to expand the use of ignition interlock and, in turn, to improve traffic safety. It remains to be seen whether the legislation will have that effect. One determinant may be whether drivers see the benefit of broader driving privileges as being worth the cost of ignition interlock. A judge may be more likely to impose the condition when it is sought by an applicant. Another factor may be whether judges believe that ignition interlock is an effective countermeasure to impaired driving (researchers in fact identify interlock as among the leading countermeasures) and whether ignition interlock requirements in limited driving privileges are enforced in practice. This post addresses this last issue by reviewing the mechanisms for enforcing ignition interlock requirements and the sanctions for violation of ignition interlock conditions imposed by a court as part of a limited driving privilege.

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