Recent blog posts

An officer who stops a motorist for a traffic infraction may run a computer check on the driver’s license and may check for outstanding warrants. The results of these checks may determine how the officer proceeds. For example, if a check reveals that the driver’s license is revoked, the officer may charge the driver with DWLR and may direct the driver that he or she cannot drive the vehicle away from the location of the stop.

May an officer also check a motorist’s criminal record? Such historical information is less likely to dictate the officer’s course of action. But knowing whether a motorist has a record of violent crimes may help an officer determine how cautious he or she must be while completing the stop. This post discusses whether an officer may take time to run a motorist’s criminal record, and summarizes two recent cases on point.

This post reviews what is commonly known as “hot pursuit” of a suspect to make an arrest outside an officer’s territorial jurisdiction. Note, however, that the actual term in G.S. 15A-402(d) is the “immediate and continuous flight” by a suspect from an officer’s territory. Also, although the statute is specifically confined to an officer’s arrest authority, court cases include other law enforcement actions such as investigative stops and searches.

A shocking murder transfixed the nation this week and led to a multi-state manhunt that ended Tuesday with the perpetrator’s suicide.  In Cleveland on Sunday, Steve W. Stephens posted a video to Facebook where he shoots and kills Robert Godwin Sr., a stranger to Stephens seemingly targeted at random.  The News Hour has an overview of the story here.  After a two-day manhunt, a McDonalds employee in Pennsylvania recognized Stephens and called police.  Following a brief chase ended by a PIT maneuver, Stephens killed himself.  Keep reading for more news.

A few weeks ago, I wrote about a Stanford University study suggesting that granting driver’s licenses to unauthorized immigrants improves overall traffic safety. That approach is not an option in North Carolina, where unauthorized immigrants have been ineligible to obtain a driver’s license, learner’s permit or identification card since 2006. Recognizing that many unauthorized immigrants drive regardless of whether they are licensed, the district attorney in Orange and Chatham Counties announced this week a new policy for disposing of no operator’s license charges against such drivers, provided they meet certain conditions.

When imposing a split sentence, the court has a choice to make about what to do with whatever pretrial jail credit the defendant might have in the case. Apply it to the split? Or apply it to the defendant’s suspended sentence? Today’s post discusses a few issues associated with that choice.

Two weeks ago, the SOG hosted over 50 public defenders, contract attorneys, and private assigned counsel at its annual Felony Defender training. The training provides guidance to lawyers transitioning to superior court about handling a felony case from start to finish. Topics include discovery and investigation, pretrial motions, voir dire, and jury instructions, among others. On a personal note, it was my first training in my role as Defender Educator and my first behind-the-scenes look at the effort required to plan and execute a successful course. Without the hard work of the faculty and support staff from the SOG, as well as volunteers from IDS and the private bar, the program would not have been possible. Thanks to everyone that participated. I truly enjoyed the training, especially speaking with the lawyers that attended, and I hope they found it worthwhile as well.

In Moore v. Texas, which I discussed here, the Supreme Court of the United States held that courts must rely on current clinical standards when determining whether a defendant is intellectually disabled and so exempt from the death penalty. Must courts also defer to clinical standards when determining whether a defendant is insane and so exempt from criminal culpability? I don’t think so, for the reasons below.

The News & Observer reports that the General Assembly has passed a bill that reduces the number of judges on the North Carolina Court of Appeals from fifteen to twelve.  The bill is controversial – supporters say that fewer judges are needed because the workload of the Court of Appeals has declined over the past decade while opponents say that the intent of the bill is to limit Governor Roy Cooper’s ability to replace judges who are approaching mandatory retirement.  The legislation is House Bill 239, which Jeff mentioned a few weeks ago in a post about the court’s caseload.

This is the last post of the week as the SOG is closed tomorrow for a holiday, keep reading for more news.

Many–perhaps even most–parents paddle, spank, or otherwise use physical force to discipline their children. This kind of discipline is generally viewed by law enforcement officers, prosecutors, and the courts as a parental prerogative and not as criminal child abuse. Yet there are limits on the degree of physical force that a parent may lawfully employ and the degree of injury a parent may lawfully inflict. A parent who acts with malice, uses grossly inappropriate force or who causes lasting injury may be prosecuted for child abuse. A recent court of appeals case demarcates the boundaries of permissible parental discipline and sets forth standards for determining when physical discipline by parents constitutes criminal child abuse.

In Rodriguez v. United States, 135 S. Ct. 1609 (2015), the United States Supreme Court significantly limited the scope of a traffic stop. It is almost exactly two years since the ruling, and appellate court opinions throughout the country are still proliferating. And so have our faculty’s blog posts: Jeff Welty has written relevant posts here, here, here, here, and here, Alyson Grine here and here, Shea Denning here, Phil Dixon here, and my posts are here, here, and here. This post summarizes Rodriguez and three North Carolina Court of Appeals rulings that are currently before the North Carolina Supreme Court.