In self-defense cases, the defendant typically claims that the “victim” was actually the assailant and that the defendant needed to use force to defend himself, family, home, or other interests. Because of this role reversal, the rules of evidence allow the defendant to offer evidence to show that the victim was the assailant or at least that the defendant reasonably believed that the victim intended to do harm. In State v. Bass, ___ N.C. ___, 819 S.E.2d 322 (2018), the North Carolina Supreme Court clarified one form of evidence that a defendant may not offer about the victim in a self-defense case. This post reviews the evidence found impermissible in Bass as well as several types of evidence that remain permissible.
Background
To make a long story short, the defendant, Bass, shot Fogg while the two were in the breezeway of Bass’s apartment complex. He relied on self-defense against the charges of attempted murder and assault with a deadly weapon with intent to kill inflicting serious injury. The jury convicted him of assault with a deadly weapon inflicting serious injury.
One issue concerned the jury instructions given by the trial judge. Although the judge instructed the jury on self-defense, he denied Bass’s request for an instruction that he did not have a duty to retreat in a place where he had a “lawful right to be,” as provided in G.S. 14-51.3 on defense of person. The judge reasoned that Bass was not entitled to the instruction because the breezeway was not within the curtilage of Bass’s home. The Court of Appeals reversed and granted a new trial, essentially finding that the statutory language means what it says—a person does not have a duty to retreat in a place where he has a lawful right to be, including a public place. I wrote a previous post about this aspect of the Court of Appeals’ decision. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that when a defendant is entitled to a self-defense instruction, he “is entitled to a complete self-defense instruction, which includes the relevant stand-your-ground provision.” Slip Op. at 10, 819 S.E.2d at 326 (emphasis in original).
A second issue concerned the admissibility of testimony about previous violent acts by Fogg.
Williford, Fogg’s ex-girlfriend, would have testified that Fogg had, without provocation and in front of Williford’s three-year-old daughter, pulled a gun on Williford and choked her until she passed out. She also would have testified that Fogg beat her so badly that her eyes were swollen shut and she was left with a bruise reflecting an imprint of Fogg’s shoe on her back. Michael Bauman would have testified that, on one occasion, he witnessed Fogg punch his own dog in the face because it approached another individual for attention. On another occasion, Bauman encountered Fogg at a restaurant, where Fogg initiated a fight with Bauman and also “grabbed” and “threw” Bauman’s mother-in-law when she attempted to defuse the situation. Terry Harris would have testified that Fogg, a complete stranger to him, initiated a verbal altercation with him in a convenience store. Two or three weeks later, Fogg pulled over when he saw Harris walking on the side of the road and hit him until Harris was knocked unconscious. According to Harris, Fogg “[s]plit the side of [his] face” such that he required stitches. Slip Op. at 14–15, 819 S.E.2d at 328.
The trial judge excluded this testimony. The Court of Appeals held that the evidence was admissible in support of Bass’s defense that Fogg was the aggressor on the night Bass shot him. The Court of Appeals also held the trial judge erred in denying the defendant’s motion to continue after the prosecutor learned the night before trial of five additional instances of assaultive behavior by Fogg, which the prosecutor disclosed to defense counsel. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that the testimony offered by the defendant was inadmissible character evidence and that evidence of the additional acts would have been inadmissible for the same reason.
Evidence about the Victim
Character to show conduct. The rules on character evidence, the subject of the Supreme Court’s opinion, have several precise steps. Please bear with me.
Generally, evidence of a person’s character is not admissible to prove he “acted in conformity therewith on a particular occasion.” N.C. R. Ev. 404(a). In other words, a party may not offer evidence of a person’s past character to show that he committed the current deed. An exception to this general rule allows a defendant in a criminal case to offer evidence of “a pertinent trait of character of the victim.” N.C. R. Ev. 404(a)(2). The Supreme Court in Bass recognized that evidence of a victim’s violent character is pertinent and thus admissible in determining whether the victim was the aggressor in a case in which the defendant claims self-defense. Slip Op. at 13, 819 S.E.2d at 327.
The inquiry does not end there. North Carolina Rule of Evidence 405 specifies the forms of evidence that are permissible to show character, including violent character. Rule 405(a) allows reputation and opinion testimony in “all cases in which evidence of character or a trait of character of a person is admissible.” Thus, a witness who knows the victim can give an opinion that the victim is a violent person. However, Rule 405(b) only allows evidence of specific instances of conduct to show character when “character or a trait of character of a person is an essential element of a charge, claim, or defense.” Thus, a witness can testify that the victim engaged in specific acts of violence only if the victim’s character for violence is an essential element.
Here, the Court of Appeals and Supreme Court disagreed. The Court of Appeals held that whether the defendant or victim was the aggressor is an essential inquiry, or element, of self-defense. Rule 405(b) therefore allowed Bass to present evidence of specific acts of violence by Fogg to show that he had a violent character and therefore was the aggressor. The Supreme Court agreed that whether the defendant or victim was the aggressor is a central inquiry. However, to the Supreme Court, the determinative question under Rule 405(b) is whether the victim’s violent or aggressive character is an essential element, which is a different question than whether the victim was the aggressor in the current incident. The Supreme Court answered no. Accordingly, Fogg’s past acts were not admissible under Rule 405(b) to show that he was the aggressor. Contrary language in another recent Court of Appeals decision, State v. Greenfield, ___ N.C. App. ___, Slip Op. at 6–8 (Dec. 4, 2018), probably does not survive the ruling in Bass.
But wait, there’s more. Bass does not address or rule out other theories of admissibility of prior violent acts by the victim. These are discussed at greater length in Chapter 7 of my book The Law of Self-Defense in North Carolina (1996), which obviously has aged but still reflects the applicable evidence principles and includes cites to pertinent court decisions.
Known acts to show reasonable fear. If the defendant knows of prior violent acts by the victim, longstanding law in North Carolina recognizes that the defendant may offer evidence about the acts to show why he feared the victim and why his fear was reasonable. See, e.g., State v. Johnson, 270 N.C. 215, 218–20 (1970). The evidence is not subject to the limitations on character evidence because its relevance is to show the defendant’s state of mind and the reasonableness of his apprehension of the victim. The Bass decision, which dealt with prior acts by the victim that were not known by the defendant, does not affect this theory of admissibility. Another recent decision, in which the Court of Appeals relied on this type of evidence to show that the defendant reasonably believed it was necessary to use deadly force, should remain good law. See State v. Irabor, ___ N.C. App. ___, Slip Op. at 7–9 (Nov. 20, 2018).
Threats by the victim. Evidence of threats by the victim against the defendant are admissible under North Carolina law for various reasons. Whether known or unknown by the defendant, such threats show the victim’s intent. The cases treat threatening statements by the victim against the defendant like threats by the defendant against the victim: they are statements of intent tending to show how the person making the threat later acted. Thus, in a self-defense case, threats by the victim against the defendant are relevant to show that the victim was the aggressor. See, e.g., State v. Ransome, 342 N.C. 847 (1996). If the defendant knows of the threats, they are relevant and admissible for the additional reason that they show the defendant’s reasonable apprehension of the victim. See, e.g., State v. Macon, 346 N.C. 109, 114–15 (1997). Again, this evidence is not subject to the limitations on character evidence.
Impeachment. When the rules on character evidence apply, other exceptions allow the defendant to offer evidence of specific acts by the victim. If a witness testifies about the victim’s peaceful character or otherwise opens the door, North Carolina Rule of Evidence 405(a) allows cross-examination into “relevant specific instances of conduct.” For example, if a witness testifies about the victim’s peaceful character (permitted under Evidence Rule 404(a)(2) in some instances), the defendant may impeach the witness through cross-examination about prior violent acts of the victim. See generally State v. Gappins, 320 N.C. 64, 68–70 (1987) (applying this rule to allow State’s cross-examination of defendant’s character witnesses).
Rule 404(b). North Carolina Rule of Evidence 404(b) creates another exception to the limits on character evidence. It allows evidence of specific crimes, wrongs, or acts “for other purposes,” such as motive, intent, preparation, plan, and absence of mistake. The North Carolina courts have held that Rule 404(b) is a rule of inclusion. See State v. Coffey, 326 N.C. 268, 278–79 (1990). Prior acts, including acts of the victim, are admissible if they are relevant for some purpose other than to show that the person has the propensity, or character, to commit the current act under consideration. See, e.g., State v. Smith, 337 N.C. 658, 664–67 (1994) (holding that prior acts of victim were not admissible under Rule 404(b) in this case). Whether Fogg’s prior acts might have been admissible under Rule 404(b) for a non-character purpose was not considered in Bass.
Potential impact of defensive-force statutes. Another question concerns the impact of the defensive-force statutes enacted by the General Assembly in 2011, which recent cases have recognized depart from prior law in some important respects. Provisions potentially relevant to this discussion include G.S. 14-51.2(d), which establishes a presumption that a person who unlawfully and forcibly enters a person’s home, motor vehicle, or workplace is presumed to be doing so with the intent to commit an unlawful act involving force or violence. Suppose the State tries to rebut this presumption by offering evidence that the person did not enter with this intent. Would such evidence open the door to further rebuttal by the defendant through evidence of prior acts by the victim?
On their face, this provision and others in the defensive-force statutes do not address evidence law. I wonder, however, whether the expanded rights enacted by the General Assembly could be read as affecting, or at least simplifying, the overall approach to evidence issues in self-defense cases. Although many avenues remain after Bass for the defendant to introduce evidence about the victim’s prior conduct, the road map is complicated and has some unexpected potholes.