A couple of weeks ago, the Supreme Court decided Bondi v. VanDerStok, 604 U.S. __ (2025). It is an administrative law case, not a Second Amendment case, but folks interested in firearms law will still want to know about it. The media has generally described this case as allowing the ATF to ban “ghost guns,” which is not exactly wrong but also is not precise. Read on for more details.
A woman was babysitting a child near Great Bend, Kansas, when the child she was watching complained of a monster under the bed. Seeking to assuage the child’s fear, the babysitter checked under the bed only to find a man hiding there. After a tussle with the babysitter, the man left the home and evaded capture until the next day, when local deputies located and arrested him. The man had recently posted bond on charges of threat crimes, domestic violence, and violating a protective order. He is now being held on no bond and is facing burglary, aggravated assault, and child endangerment charges. The AP has the story, here. Read on for more criminal law news.
On Wednesday, the Michigan Supreme Court held in a 5-1 opinion that the odor of marijuana alone isn't a sufficient reason for police to conduct a warrantless search of a car. In 2018, the possession and use of small amounts of marijuana by people who are at least 21 years old became legal. However, the law specifies that marijuana cannot be used while operating a vehicle. In the opinion, Justice Megan Cavanagh notes that “the smell of marijuana might just as likely indicate that the person is in possession of a legal amount of marijuana, recently used marijuana legally, or was simply in the presence of someone else who used marijuana” and that the smell “no longer constitutes probable cause sufficient to support a search for contraband.”
The National Center for State Courts (NCSC) recently published a report addressing “unprecedented challenges” facing juries and jury trials. The report opined that these challenges include both affirmative attacks on juries and jury trials due to unpopular verdicts as well as enervation on the part of the public regarding civil engagement generally and jury service specifically. Follow-on effects are an erosion of public trust in the jury system and jury pools that are less representative of the communities from which they are selected, according to the report’s authors. The report also highlighted the decline in the number of jury trials in criminal and civil cases, which it said meant that younger lawyers gain less trial experience. The authors posited that when those lawyers become trial judges, they are less prepared to oversee jury trials, creating a “feedback loop . . . leading to even fewer trials and greater pressure to settle or plea bargain cases.” The overarching identified concern was that the jury system might become a “marginalized part of the justice system, with fewer people participating and less public trust in the outcomes.” The report went on to identify four critical vulnerabilities related to the future of juries and jury trials and recommended strategies to address them.
On Wednesday, the U.S. Supreme Court upheld a federal regulation requiring, among other things, that those who make or sell “ghost guns” or “gun kits” must mark their products with serial numbers, keep records of their sales, and conduct background checks on buyers. The regulation, first enacted in 2022 by the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms, and Explosives came in response to a sharp increase in the number of unmarked guns being found at crime scenes around the country, from about 1,600 in 2017 to 19,000 in 2021. Gun manufacturers opposed the Biden-era regulation, arguing that multiple gun parts is not a gun. Writing for the majority in Bondi v. VanDerStok, Justice Neil Gorsuch said the ATF was within its authority under the broad language of the 1968 Gun Control Act to enact the regulation, noting that many gun kits are easy to assemble in less than an hour. Justices Clarence Thomas and Samuel Alito dissented, and wrote separately. Read on for more criminal law news.
The Interstate Compact for Juveniles (ICJ) is a binding compact that establishes the law that governs the interstate movement of juveniles who are involved in the juvenile justice system. One of the purposes of the ICJ is to “[r]eturn juveniles who have… been accused of an offense to the state requesting their return.” G.S. 7B-4001(b)(3). This is akin to the extradition process used in criminal matters. The proper procedure to return a juvenile who is accused of an act of delinquency in another state to that other state is found in the ICJ rules. This post walks through the procedure.
Today is GiveUNC day, the university’s annual one-day fundraising event for alumni, faculty, staff, supporters, and fans of Carolina to contribute to UNC programs and causes that they find most […]
Hundreds of Venezuelan immigrants were summarily deported from the United States to a prison in El Salvador last weekend. Federal authorities relied on President Trump’s executive order invoking the Alien Enemies Act of 1798 in removing the immigrants without due process protections. The administration stated that the immigrants were members of a violent gang, Tren de Aragua, and that their alignment with the Venezuelan government and entry into the U.S. constituted an invasion by a hostile nation. Advocates for the deported Venezuelans deny their involvement with the gang and stress that the three previous times that the AEA was invoked, it was during clear times of war (the War of 1812, WWI, and WWII). Judge James Boasberg, a federal judge in Washington, had ordered that the flights carrying the immigrants be turned around, but this did not occur, and the court is now engaged in an inquiry to determine whether the Trump administration should be held in contempt. After Trump called for the impeachment of the judge, Chief Justice John Roberts of the United States Supreme Court made a public statement that the appellate process, rather than impeachment, is the proper way to address adverse court rulings. Read on for more criminal law news.
A trial judge has broad discretion regarding whether to accept a defendant’s guilty plea entered pursuant to a plea agreement in which the prosecutor has agreed to recommend a particular sentence. G.S. 15A-1023(b). In that circumstance, the judge must advise the parties whether he or she approves of the arrangement and will dispose of the case accordingly. If the judge rejects the arrangement, the judge must so inform the parties, refuse to accept the plea, and advise the State and the defendant that neither is bound by the rejected arrangement. The judge must tell the parties why he or she rejected the arrangement and give them an opportunity to modify it to meet the judge’s approval. The parties are not required to modify the arrangement, and, upon rejection of the arrangement, the defendant is entitled to have the case continued to the next session of court. The judge’s rejection of the arrangement must be noted in the record, but such a rejection does not appear to preclude another judge from later accepting the arrangement. (The notation of the trial court’s discretionary decision arguably is not a discretionary order of the sort that would require changed circumstances to justify modification by another judge. See generally Michael Crowell, One Trial Judge Overruling Another, Administration of Justice Bulletin No. 2015/06 (UNC School of Government December 2015) (discussing the general rule that one trial judge may modify an order entered by another trial judge on a matter of discretion only if there has been a substantial change in circumstances)). Those rules apply to a plea agreement in which the State has agreed to recommend a sentence. But what about arrangement where the State makes no such recommendation? Does the trial court retain discretion to reject those?
The news story that captured my attention this week is not exactly, or not entirely, a criminal law story. Mahmoud Khalil, who helped lead pro-Palestinian protests at Columbia University, was arrested this week by ICE agents at the university-owned apartment where he lived. (Khalil apparently was a graduate student at the university until December.) Khalil is a lawful permanent resident of the United States – that is, a green card holder – but the agents indicated that his status would be revoked as a result of what the Trump administration views as his anti-Semitic advocacy. He remains in custody but has lawyered up, raising interesting questions about the government’s ability to revoke legal permanent residency based on speech. A federal judge has ordered that he not be deported pending further proceedings. The AP has more here and here. Keep reading for more news.