A legislative session wouldn’t be complete without a new jail credit rule for confinement in response to violation (CRV).
Jamie Markham
New Probation Condition for Felons: Mandatory Waiver of Extradition
In Session Law 2016-77, the General Assembly made some changes the law of probation, post-release supervision, and parole. Though styled as “an act to amend provisions of the Justice Reinvestment Act,” the latest legislation makes some changes that go beyond the 2011 JRA. Today’s post summarizes one of the changes: a new requirement for supervised felony probationers to make a prospective waiver of extradition.
Running a Sentence Consecutively to an Anticipated Sentence
May the judge sentencing a conviction now order that it run consecutively to sentences the defendant might get in the future?
Keeping a Person Under Supervision When There’s No Sentence Left to Suspend
When a person has so much jail credit that he has served his entire sentence of imprisonment, may he nonetheless be sentenced to probation? In other words, may a court sentence someone to probation when there is no sentence left to suspend?
Some FAQ about Probation Violation Appeals
Today’s post gives my best answers to a few frequently asked questions about appeals of probation violation hearings.
What Level of Suspicion Is Required to Arrest for a Probation Violation?
There aren’t very many federal cases about North Carolina probation. When we get one, I’m inclined to write about it. In Jones v. Chandrasuwan, __ F.3d __ (4th Cir. 2016), the Fourth Circuit announced a new rule about the level of suspicion required to arrest a probationer for a suspected probation violation.
Deferred Prosecution: Who Steers the Ship?
The district attorney decides when to defer prosecution. But if that deferral includes probation under G.S. 15A-1341(a1), the court has a role in the process—including what to do in response to a violation of the deferred prosecution agreement. Sometimes the State and the judge are on the same page. Sometimes they aren’t.
Twenty-Five Year Review of Sentences to Life Without Parole
I have started to get questions about G.S. 15A-1380.5, a repealed statute that used to provide for judicial review of sentences to life without parole after 25 years of imprisonment. It’s too early for a court to be applying the law just yet—the first reviews shouldn’t happen until 2019—but we’re getting close, and people are talking about it. Today’s post describes the law.
Egregious Aggravation Is Unconstitutional
In 2008 the General Assembly created the new crimes of rape and sexual offense with a child by an adult offender (G.S. 14-27.2A and -27.4A, respectively). S.L. 2008-117. They have special sentencing rules, described here, including the possibility of a higher maximum sentence if the judge finds “egregious aggravation” in the case. Discussing the law immediately after it passed in 2008, John Rubin wrote (here, on page 3) that placing the responsibility for determining egregious aggravation on the judge—not the jury—was “likely unconstitutional” under Blakely v. Washington. As my kids like to say, “Nailed it.” State v. Singletary, decided by the court of appeals last week (and mentioned briefly in last week’s News Roundup), ratified John’s view.