This post summarizes the published criminal opinions from the North Carolina Supreme Court released on March 20, 2026.
Circumstantial evidence was sufficient to submit robbery with a dangerous weapon to the jury where the evidence tended to show the defendant had opportunity, intent, and a plan or scheme to commit the offense.
State v. Perry, No. 64PA24 (N.C. Mar. 20, 2026) (Berger). On May 18, 2021, the victim arrived at an apartment carrying cash, a phone, and a key. When he arrived, he was pistol‑whipped and attacked. During the attack, he recognized the defendant among other assailants. He lost consciousness and later awoke in the road without his property. He flagged down assistance and was able to receive medical care. The State offered Rule 404(b) evidence of a prior pistol‑whip robbery committed by the defendant for the purposes of showing intent and a scheme or plan. At the close of the State’s evidence, the defendant made a motion to dismiss the robbery with a dangerous weapon charge on the basis that there was insufficient evidence of a taking. The defense argued that that the State merely provided evidence of an opportunity for the defendant to take the victim’s property. Considering the evidence in the light most favorable to the State, the trial court denied the motion to dismiss. On appeal, the Court of Appeals disagreed and held the motion should have been granted.
The Supreme Court reversed, emphasizing that at the dismissal stage courts view the evidence in the light most favorable to the State, consider it “as a whole,” and ask only whether there is more than a scintilla of evidence permitting a reasonable inference of guilt. Applying that framework, the Court held the evidence of the assault, the missing items immediately upon the victim’s regaining consciousness, the defendant’s role as the primary assailant, and the admitted 404(b) evidence together allowed the jury to infer a continuous chain of events linking the assault and the taking (or attempted taking). The Court distinguished cases where opportunity alone in a public space was equally available to unknown third parties and reiterated that the statute is satisfied by an unlawful taking or an attempt to take property by use of a dangerous weapon. Justice Riggs dissented, joined by Justice Earls.
G.S. 15A‑1335’s bar on harsher resentencing after a successful appeal does not prevent a higher term when structured sentencing requires correcting an improper sentence.
State v. Thomas, No. 262PA24 (N.C. Mar. 20, 2026) (Newby). In 2019, the defendant waived counsel, proceeded pro se, and was tried on charges related to a string of motor vehicle and credit card thefts. He was convicted of thirteen counts, which the court consolidated into two judgments for sentencing. The first was consolidated around a felony larceny conviction. The trial court found the defendant was a habitual felon, assigned the defendant nine prior record level points, and classified him as a prior record level III offender. He was sentenced to 67-93 months in prison. The second judgment was consolidated around a breaking or entering a motor vehicle conviction. The trial court again found the defendant was a habitual felon, assigned the defendant nine prior record level points, and classified him as a level III offender. He was sentenced to 26-44 months in prison. The defendant appealed, and the Court of Appeals remanded for a new trial after finding the trial court should not have accepted the defendant’s waiver of counsel.
At his second trial, the defendant was convicted of eight offenses. The trial court again consolidated the convictions into two judgments. The first was consolidated around a possession of stolen motor vehicle conviction. The trial court found the defendant was a habitual felon, assigned the defendant nine prior record level points, and classified him as a prior record level III offender. He was again sentenced to 67-93 months in prison. The second was again consolidated around a breaking or entering a motor vehicle conviction. This time, the trial court realized that due to a prior conviction “with all of the elements of the present offense,” G.S. 15A-1340.14(b)(6) required assigning an additional prior record level point. As a result, for this judgment, the trial court assigned the defendant ten prior record level points and classified him as a level IV offender (and determined he was a habitual felon). He was sentenced to 30-48 months in prison. The defendant appealed, arguing that the second judgment violated G.S. 15A-1335’s bar on imposing a greater sentence on remand after a defendant’s successful appeal. The Court of Appeals affirmed the second judgment as imposed. The defendant filed a petition for discretionary review.
The Supreme Court narrowly framed the issue as a conflict between two statutes: the general prohibition on harsher sentences after a successful appeal in G.S. 15A‑1335 and the specific, mandatory requirements of structured sentencing. The Court held that when structured sentencing requires a different result, the trial court may not perpetuate an illegal sentence merely to comply with G.S. 15A‑1335. The Court emphasized that the General Assembly has exclusive authority to prescribe punishments and that trial courts are obliged to enter judgments that conform to the structured sentencing framework. Although acknowledging that G.S. 15A‑1335 ordinarily bars harsher resentencing, the Court characterized this as one of the “rare” instances where correcting an illegal sentence is required even if it increases the term. Justice Dietz dissented. Justice Riggs dissented separately, joined by Justice Earls.
