Judicial branch officials may be removed from office through a variety of proceedings. Judges of the trial courts and appellate court judges and justices may be removed from office by the North Carolina Supreme Court following an investigation by and the recommendation of the Judicial Standards Commission. G.S. 7A-376. Clerks of superior court and district attorneys may be removed by the senior resident superior court judge (or another superior court judge assigned to preside over the matter) following the filing of a sworn affidavit and a hearing. G.S. 7A-66 (district attorneys); 7A-105 (clerks). Magistrates may be removed by the senior resident superior court judge (or another superior court judge assigned to preside over the matter) following the filing of sworn written charges or an order by the Chief Justice and a hearing. G.S. 7A-173.
Questions sometimes arise regarding the impact of a judicial branch official’s retirement or the conclusion of his or her term of office while removal proceedings are pending. Does a judicial branch official’s departure from office render removal and other disciplinary proceedings moot?
Mootness, generally. A case is moot when a determination is sought on a matter that “cannot have any practical effect on the existing controversy.” Chavez v. McFadden, 374 N.C. 458, 467 (2020) (internal citations omitted). The doctrine of mootness rests upon a “core concept of justiciability,” namely whether a legal controversy is appropriate or suitable for a court to decide. Anderson v. North Carolina State Bd. of Elections, 248 N.C. App. 1, 5 (2016). As a matter of judicial restraint, North Carolina’s trial and appellate courts do not proceed with cases “merely to determine abstract propositions of law.” In re Peoples, 296 N.C. 109, 147 (1976). Thus, as a general matter, if the issues before a court become moot, the court should dismiss the action. Roberts v. Madison Cnty. Realtors Ass’n, Inc., 344 N.C. 394, 399 (1996).
The public interest exception. There are several exceptions to the mootness doctrine pursuant to which a court may appropriately address the merits of an otherwise moot action. See Anderson, 248 N.C. App. at 7-8. Among those is the public interest exception, which applies when an otherwise moot case “implicates a question that involves a matter of public interest, is of general importance, and deserves prompt resolution.” State v. Daw, 368 N.C. 468, 471 (2024) (internal citations omitted).
When judges or justices leave office. Within a few years of the creation of the Judicial Standards Commission and the modern method for disciplining and removing judges, the North Carolina Supreme Court in In re Peoples, 296 N.C. 109, 150–51 (1978), determined that a judge’s resignation did not render the question of his removal moot.
The court first noted that the Judicial Standards Commission had jurisdiction over the respondent judge when it notified him, two days before his resignation, that formal proceedings had been instituted against him. That jurisdiction was not ousted by the judge’s resignation; thus, the commission retained authority to recommend, and the supreme court retained authority to impose, discipline.
The court then noted that unlike jurisdiction, which is determined by examining the facts in existence when the action is commenced, mootness may occur because of circumstances that develop during the course of the proceedings. The court looked to authority from other jurisdictions that had considered the effect of a public official’s resignation on removal proceedings. Those courts held that if the only purpose of the proceeding is to vacate the office, the proceeding becomes moot when the office-holder resigns. But where removal involves sanctions in addition to ouster, the proceeding may be prosecuted to its conclusion despite the official’s resignation. Id. at 148.
The court applied that distinction to North Carolina’s statutory scheme for removal of judges. It reasoned:
If G.S. 7A-376 limited the sanctions for wilful misconduct in office to censure or removal, Respondent’s resignation would have rendered the proceedings moot. The statute, however, envisions not one but three remedies against a judge who engages in serious misconduct justifying his removal: loss of present office, disqualification from future judicial office, and loss of retirement benefits. Only the first of these was rendered moot by Respondent’s resignation.
The court added:
[I]t would indeed be a travesty if a judge could avoid the full consequences of his misconduct by resigning from office after removal proceedings had been brought against him. According to this argument, it would be possible for an involved judge, at any time before the Commission files its findings and recommendations with the Supreme Court, to bring the proceedings against him to a premature close by submitting his resignation to the Governor, who would accept it without knowledge that charges were pending against the judge. We are entirely convinced that the legislature never intended any such result, and that to interpret G.S. 7A-376 according to Respondent’s contentions would emasculate the statute and thwart the legislative intent entirely.
Following In re Peoples, the supreme court has continued to apply the rule that a judge’s resignation neither deprives the court of jurisdiction over a removal proceeding nor limits the available sanctions. The court in In re Renfer, 347 N.C. 382 (1997), so stated and recommended censure rather than removal for the judge’s willful misconduct in office, which warranted removal, due to the former judge’s “acknowledgment of wrongdoing, her resignation from office, and her agreement not to hold future judicial office in North Carolina.” Id. at 384-85. See also In re Belk, 364 N.C. 114, 126 (2010) (removing judge for willful misconduct following his resignation).
In re Peoples, In re Renfer, and In re Belk involved disciplinary proceedings against judges who resigned from office. Yet, given that disqualification and the loss of retirement benefits accompany a judge’s removal from office, there is little reason to doubt that disciplinary proceedings against judges who leave office because their terms have ended or because they retire also could proceed to their conclusion since those additional sanctions could similarly impact retired or out-of-office jurists.
What about clerks, district attorneys, and magistrates? The removal statutes for clerks, district attorneys and magistrates each provide that if the presiding court finds that the grounds for removal exist, the court must “permanently” remove the official and terminate the official’s salary. See G.S. 7A-66 (so providing for district attorneys); 7A-105 (so providing for clerks); 7A-173 (so providing for magistrates).
What does it mean to permanently remove an official? In construing a statute, a court generally presumes that the legislature did not use superfluous words; thus, where possible, it accords meaning to every word in a statute. See, e.g., C Investments 2, LLC v. Auger, 383 N.C. 1, 12 (2022). Each of the aforementioned statutes could have provided for the removal of the affected official from their current term of office by using the term “removal” without the “permanently” modifier. Indeed, there is no temporary removal provided for by statute; instead, the interim alleviation of duties is referred to as “suspension.” See G.S. 7A-66 (so providing for district attorneys); 7A-105 (so providing for clerks); 7A-173 (so providing for magistrates). To accord meaning to the word permanently, one must construe it as being something more than removal; that something more would be a permanent bar from holding the office.
Under that interpretation, the reasoning in In re Peoples that removal proceedings are not mooted by the office holder leaving office would appear to apply with equal force to removal proceedings against clerks, district attorneys, and magistrates. To determine that such a proceeding was moot would be to deprive the tribunal of its authority to permanently bar the official from holding the former post.
And even if removal under G.S. 7A-66, 7A-105, and 7A-173 did not disqualify the official from ever again holding the office, the public interest exception to the mootness doctrine might apply. Arguably, a determination of whether the involved official engaged in misconduct warranting removal is a matter of public interest and has significance for both the electorate’s (and, in the case of magistrates, the judiciary’s) selection of the appropriate office-holder and the integrity of the judicial branch. Cf. In re Nowell, 293 N.C. 235, 241 (1977) (noting that the aim of a judicial standards inquiry “is not to punish the individual but to maintain the honor and dignity of the judiciary and the proper administration of justice.”)
