The role of law enforcement officers in involuntary commitments is controversial. Some argue that individuals subject to involuntary commitment are dangerous by definition, so it makes sense to task officers with taking them into custody. Others contend that the presence of officers makes what should be a healthcare event feel like an arrest, creates stigma, and often engenders resistance. A recent federal appellate case illustrates how things can go wrong, illustrates some impermissible uses of force, and raises questions about how officers can differentiate between permissible and impermissible uses of force.
The case is Castro-Reyes v. City of Opa-Locka, 166 F.4th 886 (11th Cir. 2026). The following facts are drawn from the court’s opinion, which relies on evidence submitted to the district court in connection with summary judgment motions, including multiple body-worn camera recordings. Importantly, given the procedural posture of the case, the court took disputed facts in the light most favorable to the plaintiff, Jafet Castro-Reyes.
In 2020, Castro-Reyes was 19 years old and living alone in a Florida apartment. One day, he experienced a desire to begin a “new life,” and suddenly began removing furniture, food, and other items from his residence. Friends and neighbors noticed that he was behaving hyperactively and was hyperventilating. He began to cry, said that he did not feel well, and paced across his living room. Family came to the scene and found Castro-Reyes to be “unrecognizable.” Concerned for his well-being, they called 911. To prevent him from leaving the apartment before authorities could arrive, they bound his “hands and feet with electrical wires and clothing cords.”
Two officers arrived, finding Castro-Reyes partially undressed, tied up, and claiming that he was God. They sought to untie him and handcuff him and succeeded in getting one arm in a cuff. When they had trouble flipping him over to complete the handcuffing – presumably due to his resistance – they called for backup. Three more officers arrived. The officers’ communications with one another suggest that their objective at that time was to take Castro-Reyes into custody for an emergency involuntary commitment. According to the court,
[a] chaotic scene . . . unfolded as multiple officers grabbed Castro-Reyes, pulling his body in various directions and shouting at him to turn over. A few seconds later, [an officer] tased Castro-Reyes. This first tasering lasted for about sixteen seconds. As the taser connected with his skin, Castro-Reyes spasmed and curled into the fetal position.
A lieutenant then came on scene. The other officers were still struggling to handcuff Castro-Reyes, and the lieutenant joined the effort. He ultimately punched Castro-Reyes in the face three times in an apparent attempt to subdue him, even as another officer called out, “Don’t do it. That’s not gonna help,” and referenced Castro-Reyes’s mental illness.
The officers succeeded in handcuffing Castro-Reyes. However, as they moved him outside and towards a waiting vehicle, he continued to struggle. One of the officers tased him several more times, even after being ordered to discontinue use of the taser. The officer’s report indicated that during the entire encounter, the officer used his taser 22 times, fully depleting the unit’s battery.
Castro-Reyes spent several days in the hospital after the incident. He alleges that he suffered “a dislocated right shoulder, back pain, lacerations to his face, and kidney issues associated with his injuries.” The lieutenant who punched him was fired.
Castro-Reyes sued. He claimed that the officers violated the Fourth Amendment by entering his apartment without a legal basis; that they falsely arrested him; and that they used excessive force. A federal district court granted summary judgment in favor of some of the officers on some claims, including the Fourth Amendment claim, based on qualified immunity, and denied it on others. The officers appealed the denials.
The Eleventh Circuit ruled:
- The officers were entitled to qualified immunity on the false arrest claim, because they had a reasonable basis for believing that Castro-Reyes met the criteria for emergency involuntary commitment.
- The lieutenant and the officer who repeatedly used his taser were not entitled to qualified immunity on the excessive force claim, because a reasonable jury could conclude that Castro-Reyes was restrained by multiple officers and was not attempting to strike or injure the officers, which would render the use of a taser and punches to the face grossly disproportionate and excessive.
- The same two officers were not entitled to summary judgment on state law assault and battery claims, largely for the same reasons.
The case reminds me of Armstrong v. Village of Pinehurst, 810 F.3d 892 (4th Cir. 2016), in which the Fourth Circuit ruled that officers used excessive force when they repeatedly tased “a mentally ill man being [subject to a custody order in connection with an involuntary commitment, who] was seated on the ground, was hugging a post to ensure his immobility, was surrounded by three police officers and two . . . security guards.” Both cases underscore that officers should be reluctant to use force to inflict pain in an attempt to compel compliance with a commitment proceeding when the subject’s resistance does not create a real risk of injury to officers.
Assuming that the facts of Castro-Reyes are as described – remember that they are presented in the light most favorable to the plaintiff – the conduct of at least two of the officers appears to be callous and indefensible. But in a less egregious case, it may be more difficult for officers and courts to resolve questions about the use of force. Generally, officers may use reasonable force when taking a person into custody in connection with an involuntary commitment. See G.S. 122C-251(e) (proving that a “law enforcement officer [taking custody of an individual in connection with involuntary commitment proceedings] may use reasonable force to restrain the respondent if it appears necessary to protect the law enforcement officer, the respondent, or others”); N.C. Attorney General Opinion (Feb. 2, 1977) (“The amount of force that an officer may use in taking or retaining custody pursuant to an involuntary commitment custody order is such as he reasonably believes to be necessary to effect the taking into custody, prevent escape therefrom, or to defend himself or others during such custodial undertakings.”).
The idea of reasonable force is obviously elastic and circumstance-dependent. It may be particularly elusive in the context of involuntary commitments, because the reasonableness test that is familiar to most officers is the multi-factor analysis from Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386 (1989). One consideration in that test is “the severity of the crime at issue,” a factor that is irrelevant to involuntary commitments.
My sense is that many officers dread being involved in the involuntary commitment process. It can be extremely time-consuming and the rules seem to be unclear. Several of the officers in Castro-Reyes seem to have handled the situation especially poorly, but even officers who are trying their best to comply with the law may find themselves uncertain about what amount of force is permissible in response to different types of resistance. If any agencies have developed policies or training that have been helpful to officers in making decisions about the use of force in connection with involuntary commitments, I would be interested to hear from them.
