This post summarizes the published criminal opinions from the Supreme Court of North Carolina released on December 12, 2025.
Resentencing hearings are de novo unless otherwise limited by the mandate of the reviewing court.
State v. Kelliher, No. 442PA20-2 (N.C. Dec. 12, 2025) (Cumberland County). The defendant in this case was convicted of two counts of first-degree murder for offenses that occurred when he was seventeen years old. In 2013, he initially received consecutive sentences of life without parole, with concurrent sentences for robbery with a dangerous weapon and conspiracy to commit robbery with a dangerous weapon. After mandatory life sentences for juvenile defendants were deemed unconstitutional in Miller v. Alabama, 567 U.S. 460 (2012), the defendant was resentenced to consecutive sentences of life with the possibility of parole. He appealed the new sentence, arguing that an aggregate 50-year parole eligibility date constituted a de facto sentence of life without parole. The supreme court agreed, establishing a rule that any sentence that requires a juvenile offender to serve more than 40 years before becoming eligible for parole is a de facto sentence of life without parole under the North Carolina Constitution. State v. Kelliher (Kelliher I), 381 N.C. 558 (2022). The court in Kelliher I remanded the case to the trial court with instructions to enter concurrent sentences of life with the possibility of parole. It gave no instructions as to the robbery sentences.
On remand, the trial court judge sentenced the defendant to two concurrent terms of life with the possibility of parole to run at the expiration of two consecutive terms of 64–86 months for the robberies—a total sentence that would leave the defendant eligible for parole after 36 to 39 years. The defendant again appealed, arguing that the trial court went beyond the Kelliher I mandate from the Supreme Court, which mentioned only the murder sentences and was silent as to the robberies. The Court of Appeals agreed with the defendant.
The Supreme Court reversed the Court of Appeals and reinstated the trial court’s sentence. The court reasoned that when a case is remanded for resentencing, that hearing should be conducted de novo unless otherwise limited by the reviewing court. Here, in the absence of limiting language in the Supreme Court’s mandate in Kelliher I, the trial court had authority at the de novo sentencing hearing to order the murder sentences to run consecutively to the robbery sentences, even though the robberies had been concurrent in the original judgment.
(1) Trial courts should apply the “distinct interruption” test for determining the number of counts of indecent liberties resulting from multiple acts, regardless of the type of acts in question; (2) six to seven minutes was a sufficiently distinct interruption between two kisses to support multiple charges.
State v. Calderon, No. 238A23 (N.C. Dec. 12, 2025) (Wake County). The defendant was found guilty after a jury trial of three counts of taking indecent liberties with a child based on three acts occurring on the same day: kissing the victim on the neck outside a van, kissing the victim on the mouth inside the van, and kissing the victim on the mouth again inside the van approximately six to seven minutes later. On appeal, the Court of Appeals reversed the judgment in part, concluding over a dissent that the kisses inside the van were “touchings” and not “sexual acts,” and that they were not sufficiently distinct under a test for such acts established in State v. Sellers, 253 P.3d 20 (Kan. 2011), a Kansas case. The dissent would have found that the defendant committed three separate and distinct acts, and that he was thus properly convicted and sentenced for all three.
The Supreme Court reversed the Court of Appeals. First, the court concluded that the Court of Appeals erred in its threshold inquiry of whether the defendant committed a touching or a sexual act. The distinction is not supported by G.S. 14-202.1, and in fact neither type of act is required to convict a defendant of indecent liberties with a child. Second, the court concluded that the Court of Appeals erred by applying its four-factor Sellers test for determining the number of counts of indecent liberties applicable to a series of non-sexual acts. The court explained that the proper test—regardless of the particular acts in question—is the “distinct interruptions” test set out in State v. Dew, 379 N.C. 64 (2021). Applying that test, the court held that the trial court did not err by imposing sentences for three convictions. The six-to-seven-minute gap between the two kisses inside the van was a sufficiently distinct interruption to give the defendant an opportunity to reconsider and choose not to offend, and thus supported one conviction for each act.
(1) Obstruction of justice does not require as an element that the defendant actually succeed in preventing officers from finding evidence; (2) felony cruelty to animals requires actual knowledge of an animal’s presence to satisfy the crime’s malice element.
State v. Ford, No. 31A24 (N.C. Dec. 12, 2025) (Buncombe County). The facts of this case arose from an encounter between the defendant, owner of an event rental business, and a person named Alex McPherson. Mr. McPherson was known around Asheville as the “Cat Man” because he was often seen with his cat, Thomas, who sometimes rode in a stroller. Witnesses saw the defendant drive his work truck into the stroller, scaring the cat. When officers investigated the incident, the defendant told them he “had no clue” who was driving the truck and did not share documentation showing truck assignments for the day in question, even though documentation for every other day from that timeframe was still in the office recycling bin. Officers eventually found the day’s schedule through a search of the defendant’s phone. The defendant was tried for felony obstruction of justice and felony cruelty to animals. The trial court trial court denied the defendant’s motions to dismiss the charges and the jury found him guilty of both crimes.
On appeal, the Court of Appeals affirmed the convictions over a dissent. As to the animal cruelty charge, the court deemed the evidence adequate to support the conclusion that the defendant “knew or should have known” that the McPherson had a cat with him in the stroller.
The Supreme Court affirmed the Court of Appeals, concluding that the trial court did not err in denying the defendant’s motions to dismiss. As to the obstruction of justice charge, the court noted that disposal or destruction of a document sought by law enforcement can constitute obstruction of justice even when officers succeed in obtaining it by other means. In other words, the defendant’s “success” in actually obstructing justice is not an element of the offense. Additionally, the existence of a standard business practice of discarding documents did not foreclose the possibility that the defendant intentionally obstructed justice in this case. That documentation from other days was still in the recycling bin supported the inference that the spreadsheet from the particular day in question was disposed of irregularly and outside of standard practices.
As to the felony cruelty to animals charge, the Supreme Court noted that the Court of Appeals misstated the intent element of the offense to the extent that it said it could be satisfied if the defendant “should have known” that the cat was in the stroller. The crime requires malice as an element, malice requires intentionality, and intentionality in turn requires actual knowledge. Notwithstanding the Court of Appeals’ misstatement, the Supreme Court affirmed, concluding that the State presented sufficient circumstantial evidence that the defendant actually knew Thomas the cat was in the stroller.
Justice Berger concurred, writing separately to clarify that the burden required for the State to survive a motion to dismiss for insufficient evidence is “more than a scintilla of competent evidence,” which, he said, is “not a high bar.”
The trial court committed plain error by instructing the jury that the castle doctrine’s presumption of reasonable fear of imminent death or bodily harm could be overcome by substantial evidence beyond the five grounds set in G.S. 14-51.2(c), and by failing to instruct that the curtilage is part of the home for defense of habitation purposes.
State v. Allison, No. 103PA24 (N.C. Dec. 12, 2025) (Burke County). The defendant was convicted of second-degree murder based on the killing of Brandon Adams. After an argument related to Adams’s girlfriend, Adams followed the defendant to the defendant’s house. After they parked their cars, the defendant quickly entered his house but Adams stuck his hand and foot inside the door, preventing the defendant from closing it. The defendant retrieved a shotgun and returned to the front door to show it to Adams, who remained on the front porch. The defendant warned Adams not to cross the threshold and asked him to leave so the defendant could take care of his mother, who suffered from Alzheimer’s and lived with him. Adams did not leave. The defendant turned to look back at his mother, and when he turned back toward the front porch, he saw Adams make a forward move toward the house. The defendant shot him. Adams later died from the wound.
At trial, the defendant presented a castle doctrine argument. The State argued that the defendant was not entitled to the castle doctrine defense because Adams did not physically enter his home. The trial court gave the instruction, but included language indicating the possibility that the State could present evidence to overcome the presumption that the defendant reasonably feared imminent death or serious bodily injury. The court also did not instruct the jury that the curtilage of the home constitutes part of the home for defense of habitation purposes. The defendant appealed, arguing that the instruction was deficient.
The Court of Appeals rejected the defendant’s jury instruction argument, concluding that the State presented substantial evidence that the defendant “did not have a reasonable fear of imminent death or bodily harm, thus overcoming the reasonableness presumption and creating a question of fact for the jury to decide.”
The Supreme Court granted discretionary review to review the single issue of whether the statutory presumption of reasonableness in G.S. 14-51.2(c) can, in addition to the five statutorily-enumerated rebuttal circumstances, also be rebutted when the State presents substantial evidence from which a reasonable juror could conclude that the defendant did not have a reasonable fear of imminent death or serious bodily harm.
The Supreme Court concluded that under State v. Phillips, 386 N.C. 513 (2024), the castle doctrine’s statutory presumption of reasonable fear may only be rebutted by the five circumstances contained in G.S. 14-51.2(c). Thus, the Court of Appeals erred by allowing the presumption to be rebutted based on a non-statutory grounds. Additionally, the trial court erred by not instructing the jury that a home’s curtilage is protected under the language of G.S. 14-51.2.
After determining that the instructions were erroneous, the Supreme Court concluded that the defendant established all three prongs needed to demonstrate plain error. First, the instructional errors were fundamental in that they deprived him of his entitlement to a complete self-defense instruction. Second, he showed that those fundamental errors had a probable impact on the trial’s outcome, because, the court said, the jury “would almost certainly return a different verdict” if properly instructed. Finally, the defendant established that the error is an exceptional case warranting plain error review in that the erroneous instructions likely led to a conviction based on conduct the General Assembly deemed justifiable and legal. The court thus reversed the Court of Appeals and remanded the matter for a new trial.
Justice Riggs, joined by Justice Earls, dissented, writing that, properly understood, State v. Phillips allows the State to rebut the castle doctrine’s presumption of reasonableness through evidence beyond the five circumstances set out in G.S. 14-52.1(c), and that the State did so here.
There was substantial evidence that the defendant knew or had reasonable grounds to believe the gun in his possession was stolen.
State v. Bracey, No. 32A25 (N.C. Dec. 12, 2025) (Brunswick County). The defendant, a previously-convicted felon with outstanding warrants, led officers on a high-speed chase after they asked him to get out of his car in a hotel parking lot. Upon the defendant’s eventual arrest, officers saw an empty holster in his car, leading them to suspect the defendant had a firearm. They eventually found it behind a panel next to the car’s steering wheel during a search of the car at the impound lot. A run of the gun’s serial number indicated it was stolen. The defendant was charged with possession of a stolen firearm and other crimes. At trial, the court denied the defendant’s motion to dismiss the stolen firearm charge for insufficient evidence and he was convicted.
On appeal, the defendant argued that the State’s evidence was insufficient to establish that he knew or had reasonable grounds to believe the firearm was stolen. Over a dissent, the Court of Appeals affirmed the conviction.
The Supreme Court likewise affirmed, concluding that the defendant’s flight, his attempt to conceal the gun, and his decision to hide the gun but not the holster provided evidence upon which would allow a rational juror to infer that the defendant knew or had reasonable grounds to believe the gun was stolen.
Justice Earls, joined by Justice Riggs, dissented, distinguishing the facts of this case from prior cases where evidence of the defendant’s knowledge that a firearm or other property was stolen was deemed sufficient.
Knock and talk exception permitted officers to approach defendant’s door where they suspected he was selling drugs, the plain smell of marijuana constituted probable cause, and exigent circumstances supported warrantless search.
State v. Reel, No. 34A35 (N.C. Dec. 12, 2025) (Guilford County). The Supreme Court affirmed the Court of Appeals, per curiam. A summary of the decision of the Court of Appeals is available here.
