This post summarizes the published criminal opinions from the North Carolina Court of Appeals released on October 7, 2026.
Appeal as to purported errors in the jury instructions on self-defense dismissed without prejudice due to gaps in the appellate record; no error to admit security video despite gaps; no error to admit rap lyrics written by the defendant while in jail awaiting trial.
State v. Barrino, COA25-886 (N.C. Ct. App. Oct. 7, 2026) (Union County) (Tyson). The defendant shot the victim, Nivens, after Nivens interrupted the filming of a music video and, according to witness testimony, shot at the defendant. A jury convicted the defendant of first-degree murder. On appeal, the defendant argued that the trial court erred by (1) omitting the stand-your-ground and no-duty-to-retreat language from its jury instructions, (2) admitting security video, and (3) admitting rap lyrics he wrote.
As to the jury instructions, the trial court and the parties had agreed that the jury would be instructed under N.C.P.I.—Crim. 206.10, which states that the “defendant has no duty to retreat in a place where the defendant has a lawful right to be.” The trial court later told the parties that it had “made some edits,” and the final version given to the jury—to which defense counsel did not object—omitted that language as well as the related stand-your-ground language of N.C.P.I.—Crim. 308.10. Because of gaps in the appellate record, the Court of Appeals majority said it could not determine whether the defendant had notice of the amended instruction before it was given, and therefore could not determine the proper standard of review. The court dismissed this portion of the appeal without prejudice to the defendant’s ability to file a motion for appropriate relief in the trial court.
As to the security video, the defendant argued that it was not properly authenticated and was irrelevant and misleading. The video, obtained from the Monroe Housing Authority, skipped and froze repeatedly, including during the portion that may have shown who drew a weapon first. The court relied on precedent holding that gaps in a video’s coverage do not render it unreliable for purposes of authentication under Rule 901(a); they go to the weight of the evidence, not its admissibility. The court overruled the argument.
Finally, the court rejected the defendant’s challenge to the admission of rap lyrics he wrote in jail while awaiting trial. The lyrics referred to names relevant to the State’s theory of motive and intent: that the defendant killed the victim in retribution for the murder of the defendant’s brother. The trial court therefore did not abuse its discretion in admitting them.
Judge Wood dissented. She would have held that the record was sufficient to show that the trial court erred by omitting portions of the agreed-upon self-defense instructions, and she would have reversed and remanded for a new trial.
The defendant was not prejudiced by any error in amending the victim’s first name on the indictment; a SANE nurse’s testimony did not impermissibly vouch for the victim’s credibility; the defendant did not receive ineffective assistance of counsel based on a failure to review the transcript of a prior mistrial.
State v. Strange, COA26-17 (N.C. Ct. App. Oct. 7, 2026) (McDowell County) (Collins). The defendant was charged with multiple statutory sex offenses and indecent liberties with a child based on offenses against the child of his former romantic partner. The first trial ended in a mistrial. At the second trial, the jury found the defendant guilty on all counts. He raised three arguments on appeal.
First, the defendant argued that the trial court erred by allowing the State to amend the indictments to correct the victim’s first name. The defendant had expressly acknowledged to the trial court that the error did not prejudice him. The Court of Appeals concluded that even if allowing the amendment was error, it was not prejudicial, and overruled the argument.
Second, the defendant argued that the trial court erred by overruling his objection to the sexual assault nurse examiner’s testimony that she referred the victim to therapy “to work through the trauma that she reported.” He contended that the statement conveyed the nurse’s belief that the victim had in fact been sexually abused. Viewing the testimony in context, the court concluded that it described the nurse’s routine referral practice rather than offering an opinion on the victim’s credibility or on whether abuse occurred. Admitting it was not an abuse of discretion.
Finally, the defendant argued that he received ineffective assistance of counsel because his lawyer did not obtain a transcript of the mistrial proceedings to use in impeaching the State’s witnesses. Applying the two-prong test of Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984), the court assumed that reasonably competent counsel would have requested the transcript, but concluded that the defendant could not show prejudice in light of the victim’s core testimony. The court overruled the argument and affirmed the convictions.
The trial court did not abuse its discretion or misapply the First Amendment in limiting the release of law enforcement dash cam video under G.S. 132-1.4A.
Nikac v. Pitt County Office of the Sheriff, COA25-830 (N.C. Ct. App. Oct. 7, 2026) (Pitt County) (Hampson). This is not a criminal case, but it concerns the release of custodial law enforcement agency recordings under G.S. 132-1.4A (the CLEAR statute) and may therefore be of interest to readers of these summaries. The petitioner, Lydia Nikac, is a professional trainer of K-9 police dogs. In October 2024, she discovered a man, Toler, breaking into her car and, with the help of her two trained police dogs, attempted to detain him until law enforcement arrived. A trooper from the N.C. State Highway Patrol (NCSHP) arrived and observed the suspect on the ground and the dogs barking. After telling Nikac to control her dogs, he drew his firearm and fired multiple shots, killing both dogs. Deputies from the Pitt County Office of the Sheriff (PCOS) then arrived, arrested Toler, and collected evidence. The trooper’s dash cam recorded the incident. The petitioner filed a petition for release of the recording under G.S. 132-1.4A, stating that she needed it to evaluate potential civil claims arising from the shooting.
At a December 2024 hearing, PCOS and NCSHP objected to any public dissemination of the recording, and the Pitt County District Attorney’s Office raised the concern that release could affect Toler’s right to a fair trial. The trial court ordered the respondents to provide all applicable recordings for in camera review before a return hearing in January 2025.
At the return hearing, the petitioner sought public release of the recording and invoked her First Amendment right to publish and discuss them. The trial court ordered the recording released to the petitioner and her counsel for the exclusive purpose of potential legal proceedings, but did not order general public release. To the contrary, the court’s written order prohibited further disclosure or dissemination without prior court authorization, finding that release might create a serious threat to ongoing criminal investigations. The petitioner appealed.
The Court of Appeals concluded that the trial court did not abuse its discretion. The order showed that the court considered the eight standards set out in G.S. 132-1.4A(g) and tailored its order accordingly.
As to the First Amendment argument, the Court of Appeals held that the test from Seattle Times Co. v. Rhinehart, 467 U.S. 20 (1984), applies to orders under the CLEAR statute. In Seattle Times, the Supreme Court held that the First Amendment does not categorically protect a litigant’s right to disseminate information obtained under a court order that restricts how the information may be used. Instead, a court asks (1) whether the limitation furthers an important or substantial governmental interest unrelated to the suppression of expression, and (2) whether the limitation is no greater than necessary or essential to protect that interest. The order here satisfied both prongs: it furthered the important governmental interest in the fairness and integrity of related criminal investigations, and it was no broader than necessary because, for example, it allowed the petitioner to seek further disclosure and to speak to the news media about the recording.
