There are two different types of probation extensions. They are set out in different statutes. And they can be confusing.
Ordinary extensions. Under G.S. 15A-1344(d), probation may be extended at any time “after notice and hearing and for good cause shown.” This type of extension allows probation to be extended up to the maximum allowed under G.S. 15A-1342(a), which is five years (or two years in the case of a deferred prosecution or conditional discharge). No violation is required to give the court authority to extend probation under this provision; other “good cause” could suffice, such as simply needing more time to complete a program or make payments. And the court could use this type of extension more than once in an individual case, perhaps first extending it by 12 months, and later by another 12 months, provided the total time on probation does not exceed five years.
Special purpose extensions. The other type of probation extension is more complicated. Under G.S. 15A-1342(a) or, for Structured Sentencing cases, G.S. 15A-1343.2(d) (both provisions say the same thing), probation may be extended by up to three years beyond the original period of probation if three things are true: (1) the probationer consents; (2) the extension happens in the last six months of the original period of probation; and (3) the extension is to complete a program of restitution or to complete medical or psychiatric treatment.
Two recent cases from the Court of Appeals illustrate potential pitfalls with both types of extensions.
In State v. Smith, No. COA25-713, 2026 WL 1407895 (N.C. Ct. App. May 20, 2026), a probation revocation was vacated due to an erroneous ordinary extension. The defendant was placed on probation for 36 months in November 2020—meaning probation would have naturally expired in November 2023. In April 2022, that probation was extended by 24 months because the defendant was behind on his payment plan. The order extending the probation looked like this:
With that purported extension in place, probation would have expired in November 2025. However, in 2024 the trial court found that the defendant absconded and revoked his probation. On appeal, the defendant argued that the court lacked jurisdiction to revoke his probation in 2024 because the 2022 extension was invalid.
The Court of Appeals agreed. The court noted that this couldn’t have been a special purpose extension, because it happened in April 2022, well over six months before the end of the original period of probation. And it wasn’t a proper ordinary extension because the trial court didn’t make a finding of good cause—Box 1.a in the extension section of the modification order was not checked. In the absence of a good cause finding, the 2022 extension was erroneous, and thus probation expired in November 2023, leaving the court without jurisdiction to revoke in 2024.
As a quick side note, when discussing the requirement for a finding of good cause, the Court of Appeals at a few points cited to State v. Morgan, 372 N.C. 609 (2019). Morgan is the leading case on the requirement to make a finding of “good cause shown and stated” to preserve a court’s jurisdiction to act on a timely-filed violation after a period of probation has expired. That rule stems from the reference to “good cause shown and stated” in G.S. 15A-1344(f), not the requirement for “good cause” for a probation extension under G.S. 15A-1344(d). The Morgan rule for so-called “discontinued cases” wasn't applicable in Smith, because Mr. Smith’s case was not expired in 2022 when the trial court tried to extend him. I don’t think any conflation of the two statutory mentions of “good cause” in G.S. 15A-1344 impacts the outcome in Smith, although the court did cite language from G.S. 15A-1344(f) and Morgan to suggest that an ordinary extension requires both good cause and a finding of violation. There is no requirement for a finding of violation under G.S. 15A-1344(d)—just good cause.
The second recent case, State v. Jessup, No. COA25-984, 2026 WL 1579463 (N.C. Ct. App. June 3, 2026), involved another extension gone wrong. In Jessup, the defendant was placed on probation for 36 months in January 2021. So that original probation period would have expired in January 2024. At a violation hearing held in August 2023, with the defendant’s consent, the court extended probation by 36 months to allow him to pay restitution. That extended period would have expired in January 2027. The modification order looked like this:
In 2025, the trial court revoked the defendant for absconding. On appeal, the defendant argued that the extension was invalid because it was styled as an ordinary extension—Box 1.a was checked—but went beyond the five-year maximum (36 months original plus 36 months extension is six years). The Court of Appeals agreed, concluding that checking Box 1.a instead of 1.b was a substantive error, not a mere clerical error. As a result, the purported ordinary extension was invalid, the period of probation expired in January 2024, and the trial court was thus without jurisdiction to revoke in 2025.
A couple of things stand out to me in Jessup. First, this actually could have been a valid special purpose extension if the right box was checked. August 2023 was in fact within the last six months of the original period of probation, the defendant consented, and it was for restitution. Rarely do all of those things actually line up.
Second, the Court of Appeals said the erroneous extension was invalid from the get-go. Slip op. at 5 (“Thus, because the Extension Orders exceeded the trial court’s statutory authority, they are void.”). I might have thought it would be deemed valid to the extent possible under the ordinary extension law (that is, up to the five-year point—which would have saved the revocation here), but the court concluded that the improper extension had no effect at all.
Smith and Jessup highlight the need for caution when it comes to probation extensions. I have a few practical takeaways based on the cases.
First, it’s never enough just to check Box 1. The court must go on to decide whether the extension is Box 1.a (ordinary) or Box 1.b (special purpose). Also, don’t check both 1.a and 1.b, because that will be ambiguous and subject to challenge.
Second, I would suggest using 1.a whenever possible—particularly in any case where there is no need to go beyond five years of supervision. There are fewer procedural and chronological wrinkles with ordinary extensions, and they, unlike special purpose extensions, can be done multiple times. Once probation has been extended once, a special purpose extension is almost certainly off the table, because the defendant is no longer in the last six months of the original period of probation.
Third, the requirement for “good cause” to impose an ordinary extension apparently must be memorialized, even if there has been a finding of violation elsewhere on the modification order. That good cause finding is incorporated into Box 1.a, so checking that should generally do the trick. But don’t confuse that finding of “good cause” with the additional finding of “good cause shown and stated” that is required under G.S. 15A-1344(f) in cases where the period of probation has already expired by the time the violation hearing rolls around. They are two different things.
Finally, an invalid extension is void. Not voidable—void.
