In a case involving charges of flee to elude, the trial court did not err in admitting for impeachment purposes evidence concerning another incident in which the defendant may have appeared to flee from law enforcement
State v. Moore, No. COA25-1049 (N.C. Ct. App. June 17, 2026) (Wilson County) (Flood).
The defendant appealed from his convictions for fleeing to elude arrest and related motor vehicle offenses arising from an incident in 2023 in which an officer attempted to stop him for speeding. The defendant at first sped up to over 100 miles per hour when an officer began to follow him before eventually slowing and stopping in front of a magistrate’s office. The defendant argued that the trial court erred in overruling his objection to the introduction of evidence regarding a 2024 incident in which he may have appeared to flee from a law enforcement officer.
At the trial on the charges arising from the 2023 incident, the defendant testified that he drove away from the officers to ensure that any interaction he had with them would be in a publicly visible area. He testified that he had been in a situation before where he had been “beat[en] on a back road,” and that he “fe[lt] like now today . . . you have to have somebody around, body cam, something for your safety.” Slip op. at 3. On cross-examination, the State asked the defendant what he would have done if he had encountered the officer “in the city with more lights and people around.” Id. The defendant testified: “I would have pulled over.” Id.
The trial court then permitted the prosecutor to ask the defendant about the 2024 incident, which the State said “‘would go to his credibility,’” though it prohibited the State from asking about any resulting criminal charges. Id. The defendant then testified about how, during that incident, an officer attempted to stop him in the city limits. The defendant testified that after the officer turned on his lights, the brakes in the defendant’s car failed, he hit a tree, and he then got out of his car and “‘ran through [a] yard asking somebody to come out, help, help, the police is out here.’” Slip op. at 4.
On appeal, the defendant argued that questioning concerning the 2024 incident was improper under Rule 404(b) and Rule 403 of the North Carolina Rules of Evidence.
The court of appeals stated that though defendant’s testimony as to whether he would have stopped his vehicle if he were in a city could have been interpreted to mean that he would have stopped in a city in which other people were present, it could also have been interpreted to mean that the defendant would have pulled over in a city because of the general expectation that it would be more populated. Under that latter interpretation, which the court found plausible, evidence of the 2024 incident in which the defendant behaved in a way that could be viewed as evading an officer who tried to stop him in a city was relevant to impeach the defendant’s statements bearing on his intent. Thus, the court of appeals concluded that the trial court did not err in admitting the evidence under Rule 404(b).
The appellate court then considered whether the trial court abused its discretion under Rule 403. The court of appeals considered the evidence to be of limited probative value, given that its impeachment value was contingent on one interpretation of the defendant’s testimony when other interpretations were possible. It also deemed the evidence to have a high potential to prejudice the defendant “by painting the image in the jury’s mind that he was acting in conformity with a tendency to flee from police.” Slip op. at 8. Nevertheless, the court of appeals held that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in admitting the evidence in light of potential factors that may have animated the trial court’s ruling. The appellate court stated that, for example, the intonation surrounding the phrase “city with more lights and people around” may have informed the trial court about its meaning. It also stated that the trial court may have reasonably determined that the jury hearing about the 2024 incident from the defendant created a relatively minimal risk of unfair prejudice -- or that the risk did not substantially outweigh the value of the evidence.
Evidence was sufficient to support convictions for secret peeping and second- and third-degree exploitation of a minor.
State v. Havens, COA25-592 (N.C. Ct. App. June 17, 2026) (Lincoln County) (Zachary). The defendant was convicted of secret peeping, second-degree exploitation of a minor, and third-degree exploitation of a minor based on his use of cameras disguised as charging blocks to secretly film his 13-year-old granddaughter in various states of nudity. The defendant appealed arguing that as to each charge, the State’s evidence was insufficient.
As to the secret peeping charge, the defendant argued that the State was required – and failed – to prove that the defendant used secret cameras with the intent to invade the victim’s reasonable expectation of privacy. The court of appeals disagreed, holding that G.S. 14-202(f) does not require the State to prove that the defendant intended to invade the victim’s reasonable expectation of privacy. The court explained that a person violates G.S. 14-202(f) when he (1) for the purpose of arousing or gratifying the sexual desire of any person, (2) secretly or surreptitiously, (3) uses or installs in any room a device that can be used to create a photographic image, (4) with the intent to capture the image of another, (5) without the person’s consent. The court determined that the State presented sufficient evidence that the defendant secretly or surreptitiously used or installed the charging block cameras in the bathrooms of his home with the intent to capture the images of the victim without her consent.
The defendant also argued that the State failed to present substantial evidence that he acted for the purpose of arousing or gratifying his sexual desire and, thus, the trial court erred in denying his motion to dismiss the charge. The court of appeals disagreed, citing the State’s evidence of the numerous photographs and videos obtained from the charging block cameras and the defendant’s cell phone that showed the victim unclothed and revealed her genitalia and breasts.
As to second- and third-degree sexual exploitation of a minor, the defendant argued that the State was required – and failed – to present substantial evidence that he took photographs and videos to stimulate a sexual desire he had for the victim. Thus, he contended that the trial court erred in denying his motion to dismiss.
The court of appeals rejected the defendant’s argument. As to second-degree exploitation of a minor, the court noted that G.S. 14-190.17(a) criminalizes photographing or duplicating material that contains a visual representation of a minor engaged in sexual activity. Sexual activity includes the lascivious exhibition of the genitals or pubic area. The photographs and videos obtained from the defendant’s devices showing the victim undressed and showing her genitalia and breasts provided sufficient evidence of this offense.
As to third-degree exploitation of a minor, the court of appeals explained that a defendant commits this offense if, knowing the character or content of the material, he possesses material that contains a visual representation of a minor engaging in sexual activity. The State introduced evidence at trial that the charging block cameras contained thumbnails and screenshots taken of videos of the victim showing her genitalia and breasts. The State also introduced evidence that defendant had taken videos with his cell phone of the charging block camera footage. The court of appeals held that the defendant’s actions in taking screenshots of images in the videos and purposefully recording additional videos of the victim on his cell phone were sufficient evidence of his awareness of the content of the material and his possession of it. Thus, the appellate court determined that the trial court did not err in denying the defendant’s motion to dismiss.
