This post summarizes the published criminal opinions from the North Carolina Court of Appeals released on December 17, 2025.
Evidence was sufficient to establish essential elements of felony possession of stolen goods and attempted misdemeanor larceny.
State v. Brown, COA24-949 (N.C. Ct. App. Dec. 17, 2025) (Caldwell County) (Collins). At trial, the defendant was convicted of felony possession of stolen goods and attempted misdemeanor larceny, but acquitted of felony breaking or entering. The charges arose from an incident in which the victims had multiple items stolen from a house primarily used for storage. After hearing a vehicle go over a wooden bridge to their property, one of the victims saw a tan pickup truck driving away as a person jumped onto the back and adjusted a tarp covering. The victim went to the storage house and saw that safes had been broken, lampshades and household items were strewn outside, and rugs, tools, and a Hitachi air compressor were missing. The victim anticipated that those responsible would return to the property, so he placed a motion detector on the bridge. The detector activated later that night and the victim saw a vehicle on his property moving without headlights. He called the police, who stopped a Mazda sedan before it left the property. The driver of the car, Ms. Plonk, was a woman who had been living with the victim’s neighbors; the defendant was in the passenger seat. Officers subsequently investigated and determined that the tan truck belonged to the victim’s neighbors, and Ms. Plonk occasionally drove it. Officers searched the neighbors’ home and found property stolen from the victim there. Ms. Plonk had given the Hitachi air compressor to one of the neighbors as a gift. According to a neighbor, the defendant regularly visited Ms. Plonk at the neighbors’ house, leaving at 3:00 AM on one occasion.
On appeal, the defendant challenged the sufficiency of the evidence. As to the charge of felony possession of stolen goods, the Court of Appeals found sufficient evidence of possession of the goods where the defendant was in the car with Ms. Plonk as she drove without headlights on the property hours after the break-in occurred. The court also emphasized that the defendant regularly visited Ms. Plonk at the neighbors’ home where the stolen property was ultimately found. As to whether the defendant knew or had reasonable grounds to know that the property was taken pursuant to a breaking or entering and whether the defendant acted with a dishonest purpose, the court relied on similar facts to find that substantial evidence existed to support those elements. The court pointed to the same facts in determining that sufficient evidence existed to support the “intent to take away the property of another” element of attempted misdemeanor larceny. Thus, the court concluded that the motion to dismiss for insufficiency of the evidence was properly denied as to both charges.
The defendant lacked standing to challenge the court order authorizing law enforcement to obtain real-time cell-site location information where he showed only “mere possession” of the tracked cell phone rather than ownership or a possessory interest and law enforcement gathered less than one hour’s worth of data.
State v. Escalante, COA25-64 (N.C. Ct. App. Dec. 17, 2025) (Mecklenburg County) (Griffin). The defendant was convicted of first degree murder at trial. On appeal, he challenged the denial of his motion to suppress. At issue was whether law enforcement violated the defendant’s Fourth Amendment rights in obtaining one hour’s worth of real-time cell-site location information (“CSLI”) in order to find the defendant and arrest him. Authorities determined that the defendant was using a particular cell phone to contact family and friends in the aftermath of the murder. They applied for a court order to obtain the CSLI. Upon locating and arresting the defendant at a residence, authorities found five other cell phones in the home. As to the phone that was the subject of the order, the court concluded that the defendant had not carried his burden of establishing standing to challenge the search. Relying on State v. Stitt, 201 N.C. App. 233, 241 (2009), the court declined to “assume ownership or a possessory interest” based on the defendant’s “mere possession” of the cell phone. The court noted that the defendant only stated he had used the phone and did not offer evidence that he had a possessory interest in it. The court also emphasized the difference between obtaining one hour’s worth of real-time CSLI and obtaining four months of historical CSLI, which was found to be an unreasonable search in Carpenter v. United States, 585 U.S. 296 (2018). The Court of Appeals thus affirmed the trial court’s order denying the defendant’s motion to suppress.
(1) The trial court properly concluded that the defendant forfeited his right to counsel; (2) the trial court erred in holding the defendant in direct criminal contempt where the defendant was not given a summary opportunity to respond the day he was held in contempt; though he was given an opportunity to respond the following day, summary proceedings were no longer appropriate and plenary proceedings should have been initiated.
State v. Jacobs, COA24-1081 (N.C. Ct. App. Dec. 17, 2025) (Cabarrus County) (Hampson). The defendant was charged with resisting a public officer, failure to heed light or siren, reckless driving, and speeding based on an incident in which the defendant did not pull over for several minutes after being blue-lighted by law enforcement. In district court, two attorneys withdrew from the representation and the court found that the defendant had forfeited his right to counsel. The defendant was convicted of all charges and appealed. In superior court, the defendant’s third attorney moved to withdraw, citing disagreement with the defendant as to whether certain motions should be filed. At a hearing on forfeiture of the right to counsel, the defendant questioned the jurisdiction of the court and the court found that the defendant was “insisting” that his lawyer file frivolous motions unsupported by facts or law. The court concluded that the defendant had forfeited his right to counsel. Defendant was subsequently convicted of all charged at trial.
At sentencing, the defendant expressed his desire to appeal and requested transcripts of the proceedings. He then stated to the court, “I’ll see you in federal court, bucko.” The court deemed the statement a threat and imposed a 30-day sentence for contempt of court. A back-and-forth ensued with the defendant responding, “add it up, bro,” and asking for “more,” and the court imposing five additional consecutive 30-day sentences for direct contempt. The court revisited the matter the following day while correcting a sentencing error arising from the trial convictions. The court stated that it had not “decided in final” how to handle the contempt matter and was giving the defendant an opportunity to be heard. The defendant stated he did not intend to threaten the court and was just trying to exercise his right to appeal. However, the trial court concluded that the six consecutive sentences for contempt were justified based on the defendant’s willfully interrupting court proceedings and disrespecting the authority of the court. Approximately one month later, the court sua sponte modified the contempt sentences, consolidating the six sentences into one 30-day sentence.
On appeal, the defendant challenged two aspects of the proceedings: (1) the trial court’s conclusion that the defendant forfeited his right to counsel, and (2) the trial court’s holding the defendant in direct criminal contempt. As to the forfeiture, the court concluded that the defendant willfully delayed and obstructed court proceedings, causing three different attorneys to withdraw from representation. The court stressed the defendant’s demands that counsel file “baseless motions” and “causes of action improper under the law.” The defendant also interrupted and disrupted proceedings during the forfeiture hearing. The Court of Appeals held that the trial court properly concluded that the defendant had forfeited his right to counsel.
However, as to the contempt, the appellate court agreed with the defendant that the trial court did not give him an adequate opportunity to be heard in response to the finding of direct criminal contempt as required by G.S. 5A-14(b). Though only a “summary” opportunity to respond is required by statute, the appellate court found that the brief protestations in the back-and-forth between the court and the defendant did not amount to an adequate opportunity. This was error even though the defendant was given a “full opportunity” to respond the following day, since summary proceedings were no longer appropriate after the unnecessary delay. Rather, plenary proceedings under G.S. 5A-15 should have been initiated after the trial court deferred adjudication and sentencing for one day (plenary proceedings would require the drafting and service of an order to show cause). As the appellate court found error in the lack of opportunity to respond, the court did not reach the question of whether the defendant’s behavior warranted a finding of direct criminal contempt.
Where defense counsel stated his intention to enter notice of appeal at the appropriate time, but the defendant then physically attacked his lawyer during entry of judgment, oral notice of appeal was in violation of Rule 4; appeal dismissed and petition for writ of certiorari denied.
State v. Jordan, COA25-107 (N.C. Ct. App. Dec. 17, 2025) (Nash County) (Zachary). The defendant was convicted at trial of assault with a deadly weapon with intent to kill and possession of a firearm by a felon. After the defendant was sentenced for the first conviction, defense counsel stated, “At the appropriate time, we would be entering notice of… appeal.” However, as the court pronounced the second judgment, the defendant attacked his attorney and knocked him to the ground. The bailiffs intervened in the “melee” and removed the defendant from the courtroom. While defense counsel received medical attention in the judge’s chambers, the judge resumed court, noted the circumstances, and stated: defense counsel “does give[ ] notice of appeal on behalf of his client.” No written notice of appeal was filed.
The Court of Appeals pointed to cases where defense counsel’s statement of an intention to give oral notice of appeal was found to be premature and in violation of Rule 4. The court concluded that it lacked jurisdiction to hear the appeal and dismissed it. The court also declined to exercise its discretion to consider the matter and denied the defendant’s petition for writ of certiorari.
Where alternate juror initially joined the panel of twelve to select a foreperson and begin deliberations, no violation of the defendant’s constitutional right to a jury of twelve occurred because alternate was promptly ordered to return and the record did not suggest that alternate participated in deliberations; dissent would order new trial because the record did not clearly show that deliberations had not begun.
State v. Smith, COA25-15 (N.C. Ct. App. Dec. 17, 2025) (Pitt County) (Murry). The defendant was convicted at trial of two counts of taking indecent liberties with a child. On appeal, the defendant raised one issue: whether his constitutional right to a jury of twelve was violated when the alternate juror initially joined the panel of twelve upon exiting from the courtroom to select a foreperson and then begin deliberations. The majority opinion concluded that there was no structural error in the composition of the jury, as defense counsel objected shortly after the jury left the courtroom, and the trial judge “promptly ordered that the alternate ‘come back’ and directed the bailiff to retrieve her.” Furthermore, the trial judge instructed the jury to select a foreperson prior to beginning deliberations, and the record did “not suggest that the alternate entered the jury room, communicated with jurors, or participated in any discussion regarding the verdict.”
Judge Dillon dissented and voted for a new trial, even though he “highly doubted” that deliberations had begun. The dissent emphasized that the trial judge did not make an inquiry to determine if deliberations had begun, and the transcript contained no timestamps. Thus, it was unclear exactly how long the alternate remained with the 12 other jurors outside the courtroom. In the dissent’s analysis, precedent from the North Carolina Supreme Court required that the trial be voided unless the record clearly showed that deliberations had not begun.
