

Jury Argument -- Part III

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In a [prior post](#) on this topic, I began outlining some impermissible types of jury argument. In this post, I'll continue that discussion with the following additional listing of improper argument:

- **Religious Arguments.** The N.C. Supreme Court has repeatedly cautioned against jury arguments based on religion, *see, e.g.*, *State v. Barden*, 356 N.C. 316 (2002), reasoning that they “inevitably pose a danger of distracting the jury from its sole and exclusive duty of applying secular law and unnecessarily risk reversal of otherwise error-free trials.” *Id.* at 358 (quotation omitted).
- **Name Calling.** Name calling should be avoided in jury argument. N.C. R. Super. and Dist. Cts Rule 12; *State v. Augustine*, 359 N.C. 709, 736 (2005); *State v. Jones*, 355 N.C. 117, 133-34 (2002). Specifically, it is improper to refer to the defendant as:
 - a liar, *see, e.g.*, *State v. Gell*, 351 N.C. 192, 211 (2000);
 - a parasite, *State v. Twitty*, ___ N.C. App. ___, 710 S.E.2d 421, 426 (2011);
 - the devil, satan, or a demon, *see, e.g.*, *State v. Matthews*, 358 N.C. 102, 111 (2004);
 - a monster, *Id.* at 111;
 - a S.O.B., *State v. Davis*, 45 N.C. App. 113 (1980); or
 - a criminal, *State v. Miller*, 271 N.C. 646, 660-61 (1967) (“habitual storebreakers”); *State v. Wyatt*, 254 N.C. 220, 222 (1961) (“two of the slickest confidence men”); *State v. Correll*, 229 N.C. 640, 643 (1948) (“racketeering gangster”).

It also is improper to compare the defendant to Hitler or to a Nazi. *State v. Walters*, 357 N.C. 68, 102-05 (2003); *State v. Frink*, 158 N.C. App. 581, 593-94 (2003).

- **Comparing Defendant to an Animal.** Although a prosecutor may use the phrase “he who hunts with the pack is responsible for the kill” to illustrate the legal theory of acting in concert, *see, e.g.*, *State v. Bell*, 359 N.C. 1, 20-21 (2004), caution should be exercised with regard to all comparisons between the defendant and an animal and the “hunts with the pack” argument has been held improper when used in a way that goes beyond “noninflammatory remarks.” *See, e.g.*, *State v. Roache*, 358 N.C. 243, 297-98 (2004); *State v. Jones*, 355 N.C. 117, 134 (2002); *State v. Smith*, 279 N.C. 163, 165-67 (1971); *State v. Ballard*, 191 N.C. 122, 124-25 (1926).
- **Argument Regarding Defendant’s Appearance.** It is improper to argue that a defendant should be convicted simply because of how he or she looks. *See, e.g.*, *State v. Tucker*, 190 N.C. 708 (1925) (“look at the defendants, they look like professed (professional) bootleggers; their looks alone are enough to convict them”).
- **Racial References.** Racial references should be avoided unless relevant to the case. *State v. Diehl*, 353 N.C. 433, 436 (2001).
- **Referring to Tragic National Events.** It is improper for the prosecutor refer to national tragedies such as the Columbine school killings, *Jones*, 355 N.C. at 132-33, the 9/11 terrorist attacks, *State v. Millsaps*, 169 N.C. App. 340, 348-49 (2005), or the Oklahoma City federal building bombing, *Jones*, 355 N.C. at 132-33. Such remarks refer to matters outside the record, urge the jurors to compare the defendant’s acts to others’ infamous acts, and attempt appeal to the jurors’ passion and prejudice. *Jones*, 355 N.C. at 132.
- **Personal Experiences.** During a closing argument a lawyer may not inject his or her personal experiences. G.S. 15A-1230(a); *Jones*, 355 N.C. at 127.

- **Personal Beliefs.** During a closing argument a lawyer may not express his or her personal belief as to the truth or falsity of the evidence or as to the guilt or innocence of the defendant. G.S. 15A-1230(a); *see, e.g., Jones*, 355 N.C. at 127. Thus, a lawyer should not state a personal belief that a witness is lying or being truthful. *See, e.g., State v. Phillips*, 365 N.C. 103, 139 (2011); *State v. Wilkerson*, 363 N.C. 382, 424-25 (2009). Also improper is an expression of personal belief as to the strength of the State's case or of a defense. *See, e.g., State v. Matthews*, 358 N.C. 102, 110-12 (2004).
- **Personal Attacks on Opposing Counsel.** In argument to the jury, lawyers should not engage in personal attacks on opposing counsel. N.C. R. Super and Dist. Cts. Rule 12; *see, e.g., State v. Grooms*, 353 N.C. 50 (2000); *State v. Rivera*, 350 N.C. 285, 290-91 (1999).
- **Personal Attacks on Witnesses.** "Adverse witnesses and suitors should be treated with fairness and due consideration. Abusive language or offensive personal references are prohibited." N.C. R. Super. and Dist. Cts. Rule 12; *see also State v. Phillips*, 365 N.C. 103, 138-39 (2011). Thus, scatological references to a witness' testimony are improper. *State v. Smith*, 352 N.C. 531, 560-61 (2000) ("manure").

Although the prosecutor may to impeach the credibility of an expert during closing argument, a prosecutor should not insinuate that a witness would perjure himself or herself for pay. *State v. Vines*, 105 N.C. App. 147, 156 (1992). It is also improper to malign the expert's profession. *State v. Smith*, 352 N.C. 531, 561 (2000).

- **Asking Jurors to Put Themselves in the Victim's Position.** It is improper for the prosecutor to ask the jurors to put themselves in the victim's place. *State v. Roache*, 358 N.C. 243, 298 (2004); *State v. Prevatte*, 356 N.C. 178, 244 (2002).
- **Role of the Jury.** It is improper for the prosecution to argue that the jury should lend an ear to the community, *see, e.g., State v. Golphin*, 352 N.C. 364, 471 (2000), or decide a case based on public sentiment, *State v. Conaway*, 339 N.C. 487, 529 (1995); *State v. Scott*, 314 N.C. 309, 311-14 (1985).
- **Forecasting a Sentence under Structured Sentencing.** The courts have warned that "even a well-intentioned argument purporting to forecast a sentence under Structured Sentencing will almost invariably be misleading" and should be avoided. *State v. Lopez*, 363 N.C. 535, 540-42 (2009).
- **General Deterrence.** It is improper for the prosecution to argue general deterrence (that the jury should find the defendant guilty to deter others from committing crime). *See, e.g., State v. Abraham*, 338 N.C. 315, 339 (1994).
- **Appealing to Juror's Fears.** It is improper to make an argument designed to appeal to the jurors' fears, such as a suggestion that if the defendant is acquitted he or she might harm a member of the jury. *State v. Berry*, 356 N.C. 490, 522 (2002).
- **Appellate Review and Other Post-Conviction Procedures.** It is improper for counsel to speculate on the outcome of possible appeals, paroles, executive commutations or pardons. *See, e.g., State v. Hunt*, 323 N.C. 407, 428 (1988); *State v. Jones*, 296 N.C. 495, 497-500 (1979).

Although this series of posts doesn't provide exhaustive lists of permissible and impermissible argument, hopefully it will help keep you out of trouble.