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When it comes to giving proper notice of a probation violation, what is the critical thing: identifying the condition actually violated, or describing the behavior constituting the violation? The supreme court tells us in State v. Moore.
The chart available here summarizes the rules for the proper place of confinement for felonies, misdemeanors, and impaired driving. But additional questions come up from time to time that don’t fit neatly in a chart. Today’s post attempts to answer some of them.
I wrote a comic book about prison. Let me explain why.
Two new sentencing enhancements related to gangs will come into effect for offenses committed on or after December 1, 2017.
I get at least one jail credit question almost every day. How jail credit is tabulated and applied can be as important as the sentence itself in determining how long a person will be behind bars. Today’s post covers the basics, which are sometimes misunderstood.
Many of you probably remember the “I’m Just a Bill” segment from the Schoolhouse Rock! series. It explained—through a musical number that will be stuck in your head all day—how a bill becomes a law. I didn’t compose a song, but in today’s post I’ll attempt to explain what actually happens to the thousands of civil judgments entered for various monetary obligations in criminal court.
Maybe so, if two decisions from earlier this month are any indication. They are: State v. Bishop, ___ N.C. App. ___ (Oct. 3, 2017), where the court refused to consider arguments about the reasonableness of satellite-based monitoring (“SBM”) when the issue was not preserved or properly appealed, and State v. Greene, ___N.C. App. ___ (Oct. 3, 2017), where the court refused to remand a SBM hearing when the State failed to present sufficient evidence of the reasonableness of SBM. Before I discuss those cases, some background first.
One of the statutory aggravating factors for felony sentencing is that the defendant has, during the 10-year period prior to the commission of the offense now being sentenced, been found to be in willful violation of probation, post-release supervision, or parole. G.S. 15A-1340.16(d)(12a). It sounds straightforward enough, but it turns out to be a little tricky to apply in practice.
Under G.S. 7A-304(a), when a defendant is convicted, court costs “shall be assessed,” unless the court waives them pursuant to a written order determining that there is just cause to do so. Assess or waive—those are, in general, the statutory options. They are not, however, the only things that happen in real life. We can see in the AOC’s annual report on court cost waivers (discussed and linked here) that there are other possible outcomes, including costs being flagged as “not assessed.” That is the subject of today’s post.
I wrote a post in July asking whether conditional discharge under G.S. 90-96(a) is discretionary or mandatory for a consenting defendant. A case decided this week offers some clarification.