This post summarizes the published criminal opinions from the North Carolina Court of Appeals released on September 3, 2025.
In defendant’s trial for felonious possession of stolen goods, admission of police chief’s testimony about defendant’s record of charges for breaking and entering was not plain error.
State v. Clark, No. COA25-13 (N.C. Ct. App. Sept. 3, 2025) (Griffin). In this Wilson County case, the defendant was tried before a jury and convicted of felonious possession of stolen goods and attaining habitual felon status for stealing landscaping equipment from the grounds of the Wilson Community College. On appeal, the defendant argued that the trial court plainly erred by permitting the chief of police for the community college to testify that before securing an arrest warrant for the defendant she “ran his record,” noting “[t]here were B&E’s for break ins.” The defendant contended that these statements, to which he did not object at trial, were impermissible under Rule 404(b) of the North Carolina Rules of Evidence because they were offered to prove his character.
The court rejected the defendant’s argument. The court explained that Rule 404(b) is a general rule of inclusion of relevant evidence of other crimes, wrongs, or acts by a defendant subject to the exception that such evidence should be excluded if its only probative value is to show the defendant’s propensity or nature to commit the kind of offense with which he is charged. The court stated that the testimony in question was admitted for the purpose of allowing the police chief to explain how he correctly identified the defendant when securing the warrants for his arrest. Moreover, the court stated that the challenged testimony was insignificant in light of the State’s other evidence, which included video evidence of a man driving a red truck that matched defendant’s entering and leaving the premises where the equipment was stolen and the discovery of equipment matching that which was stolen in the bed of defendant’s truck. Thus, even if the admission of the testimony was error, it did not arise to plain error.
Trial court did not err by admitting with a limiting instruction a recording that implicated the defendant in the solicitation of a murder unrelated to the case at hand when that evidence was inextricably tied to the solicitation of murder charge on which the defendant was being tried.
State v. Eanes, No. COA24-1130 (N.C. Ct. App. Sept. 3, 2025) (Tyson). In this Rockingham County case, the defendant was tried by a jury and convicted of first-degree sexual offense with a child, two counts of indecent liberties with a child, and solicitation of murder. The charges arose from the defendant’s alleged sexual abuse of the victim more than ten years earlier, when she was six or seven years old, and his alleged solicitation of her murder after being arrested for those charges. At trial, a cell mate of the defendant’s testified that the defendant offered to pay him $10,000 to murder the victim. To corroborate this testimony, the State introduced a recorded conversation between the cell mate and a detective in which the cell mate told the detective about the defendant’s solicitation of the victim’s murder as well as the defendant’s solicitation of another woman’s murder. After determining that the evidence was more probative than prejudicial and that the recording could not be redacted to remove the reference to the other woman, the trial court admitted the recording with a limiting instruction. On appeal, the defendant argued that the trial court abused its discretion by admitting the recording and by failing to grant a mistrial on its own motion after introducing the recording.
The Court of Appeals rejected the defendant’s argument, determining that the trial court’s decision to admit the recording prefaced with a curative instruction rested within its discretion. The court also held that the trial court’s decision not to grant a mistrial on its own motion was not so manifestly unsupported by reason or so arbitrary that it could not have been the result of a reasoned decision.
Defendant, who was charged with assault with a deadly weapon with intent to kill inflicting serious injury, was entitled to instruction on lesser included offenses given evidence of his intoxication at the time of the assault.
State v. Powell, No. COA24-556 (N.C. Ct. App. Sept. 3, 2025) (Dillon). In this Robeson County case, the victim started an altercation with the defendant by threatening the defendant and his elderly mother and by punching the defendant in the face. The defendant, who was noticeably intoxicated, beat the victim unconscious with his fists and then stomped on his face. The assault was captured on video. As a result of the injuries, the victim lost his vision and his ability to care for himself. The defendant was charged with assault with a deadly weapon with intent to kill inflicting serious injury (AWDWIKISI) and tried before a jury. The trial court denied the defendant’s request to submit lesser-included assault offenses to the jury. The jury, which initially indicated that it was deadlocked and was then provided a written Allen charge, convicted the defendant. The defendant appealed, arguing that (1) the trial court erred in denying his motion to dismiss based on the sufficiency of the evidence; (2) the trial court erred by allowing the State to question him about prior convictions that were more than ten years old; (3) after the jury began deliberating, the trial court erred by (a) responding to the jury’s request for a definition of specific intent by instructing the jury on intent generally, (b) making statements tending to coerce the jury into reading a verdict, and (c) failing to give an Allen charge in open court; and (4) failing to instruct on lesser-included offenses, which did not require specific intent.
(1) The Court of Appeals held that the conviction was supported by sufficient evidence from which the jury could concluded that the defendant’s hands and feet were deadly weapons that he used to assault the victim. And given the “violent nature and extent of Defendant’s attack as Victim lay helpless” and the defendant’s statement to a neighbor during the assault that he wanted to kill the victim, the court found the evidence sufficient for the jury to reasonably infer that the defendant had the specific intent to kill the victim.
(2) The Court of Appeals held that the trial court did not abuse its discretion under Rule 609 in allowing evidence during the State’s cross examination of the defendant of defendant’s 1994 conviction for financial fraud and his 2010 conviction for assaulting a government official. The court explained that the fraud conviction was probative of the defendant’s trustworthiness and the conviction for assault was probative to rebut the defendant’s testimony that he acted in self-defense; the court did not find that it was an abuse of discretion to admit them. The court further concluded that even if there was error, it was not prejudicial given the strength of the State’s evidence.
(3) The jury began deliberating at 4 p.m. on the fourth day of trial. At 4:30 p.m., the jury asked the trial court to define “intent to kill” and “specific intent to kill.” At that point, the trial court gave the patten instruction on intent generally. At 5 p.m., the jury notified the court that it was deadlocked. The court addressed the jurors in the courtroom, telling them, “[W]e’ve got four days invested in this case. . . . So I’ve got to give you an instruction and tell you to give your best efforts to try to settle it. And I’m going to give you, like, 30 minutes . . . [a]nd then have you come back in.” After the jury returned to the deliberation room, the trial court told the bailiff to take a printed copy of the Allen charge instruction to the jury. At 5:45 p.m. the jury returned with a verdict of guilty.
Because the defendant did not object to the trial court’s instructions, the Court of Appeals reviewed for plain error. The court concluded the defendant failed to show the jury probably would have reached a different verdict had the trial court instructed on specific intent or had it not told the jury about the “four days invested” and giving them “30 minutes.” As to the latter statements, the court said it was not clear from the context whether the jury viewed those statements as a directive to reach a quick verdict or a statement that they would end for the day after 30 more minutes.
As to the trial court’s failure to give the Allen charge in open court as required by G.S. 15A-1235, the Court of Appeals concluded that because the trial court had discretion about whether to give the charge at all, it was not reversible error for it to fail to give the written charge it provided to the jury in open court.
(4) The Court of Appeals explained that if there was evidence showing that the defendant was voluntarily intoxicated to the extent that he could not have formed a specific intent to kill, he was entitled to the instruction on lesser-included assault offenses (which required only general intent) that he requested. Viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the defendant, the court found such evidence and concluded that the defendant was entitled to the instruction he requested as “there was a reasonable possibility that at least one juror could have decided to convict Defendant of a lesser included offense instead of the one charge presented to them.” For that reason, the court vacated the defendant’s conviction and remanded for a new trial.
Judge Wood concurred but wrote separately to state that she would have held that the trial court committed prejudicial error in its response to the jury’s report that it was deadlocked.
In defendant’s trial for first-degree murder, the trial court did not err by (1) excluding hearsay evidence that defendant’s associate who had fled to Mexico admitted to killing the victim and (2) denying defendant’s motion to dismiss.
State v. Quiterio-Morrison, No. COA24-955 (Sept. 3, 2025) (Hampson). In this Forsyth County case, the defendant was tried by a jury and convicted of first-degree murder (on the theory of felony murder predicated on robbery with a firearm) and of concealing unnatural death by secretly burying a dead human body. The victim encountered the defendant and his friend Kevin Cisneros at a bar the evening before the victim was killed. Cisneros had briefly dated the victim’s girlfriend. In the early morning hours that followed that encounter, the victim’s girlfriend received a call from defendant’s number. The victim answered and had a verbal altercation with the person on the phone. The victim then drove with his cell phone to the defendant’s house where the defendant and Cisneros were both present. The victim was shot and killed with the defendant’s gun in the defendant’s driveway, and the defendant and Cisneros buried the victim several hours later at a horse track in Yadkin County. The victim’s car was later recovered near the defendant’s cousin’s house. The victim’s phone, which last connected with the network at defendant’s cousin’s house around 10 a.m. on the morning of the murder, was never found.
The day after the murder, the defendant and Cisneros fled to Mexico. Months later, the defendant learned there was a warrant for his arrest. He retained a lawyer and flew back to North Carolina to turn himself in. A detective testified at trial that Cisneros had not been seen since he left the country.
On appeal, the defendant argued that the trial court erred by (1) excluding testimony from the defendant’s father that Cisneros told him the defendant was “not involved,” and that Cisneros killed the victim because he was choking the defendant, and (2) denying the defendant’s motion to dismiss.
(1) The Court of Appeals determined that the trial court did not err in excluding the proffered testimony under Rule 804(b)(3) as the defendant did not meet the burden of showing that Cisneros was unavailable for trial and there were insufficient corroborating circumstances to show the statement was trustworthy. The trial court concluded that Cisneros was unavailable because the defendant and his family helped Cisneros flee to Mexico. The Court of Appeals agreed that the evidence supported this finding and further rejected the defendant’s arguments that because the federal government had been unable to locate Cisneros, he was unavailable for purposes of Rule 804. The court stated that the burden was on the defendant “to show he has ben unable to procure Cisnero’s attendance.” The Court of Appeals also determined that the trial court’s findings supported its conclusion that there were insufficient independent, non-hearsay indications of the statement’s trustworthiness. Those findings included that the defendant’s father was an interested witness, that he did not provide the information to law enforcement officers when he spoke to them two years earlier, and that the statement was inconsistent with other testimony in the case.
(2) The Court of Appeals determined that the trial court did not err in denying the defendant’s motion to dismiss the charge of first-degree murder on the basis of felony murder. The defendant argued there was insufficient evidence that he committed the predicate felony, robbery with a firearm. The appellate court disagreed, finding sufficient evidence that the defendant committed robbery with a firearm in the chain of events after the victim’s murder. That evidence included the taking of the victim’s body to defendant’s cousin’s house shortly after the victim was shot, the taking of the victim’s car and cell phone to the defendant’s cousin’s house, the defendant’s admission that he told Cisneros to get rid of the victim’s car, and the victim’s car being found near the defendant’s cousin’s house. The court stated that the jury could have found from this evidence that the defendant was involved in taking the victim’s car and cell phone while he was in possession of or with the use of a firearm.
Trial court did not abuse its discretion or deprive the defendant of a constitutional right when it denied the defendant’s motion to continue, which the defendant based on his having a degenerative eye condition that blurred his vision.
State v. Scott, No. COA24-376 (N.C. Ct. App. Sept. 3, 2025) (Stroud). In this Mecklenburg County case, the defendant appealed from his convictions following a jury trial of first-degree murder and possession of firearm by a felon. The defendant’s principal argument on appeal was that the trial court erred by denying his motion to continue the trial.
The defendant was indicted in January 2017 for charges arising from the shooting of a convenience store owner inside the victim’s store. The defendant’s trial was calendared for May 15, 2023. Ten days before the trial was set to begin, the defendant filed a motion to continue on the basis that he suffered from keratoconus, a degenerative eye condition that caused blurred vision and would make it difficult for him to see the court, witnesses, jurors, and exhibits. The motion initially was heard by a judge other than the judge who was set to preside over the trial. That judge did not rule on the motion but instead made findings about the procedural history of the case, noting that three years earlier the defendant refused surgery to repair his eye condition. At that time, the court had advised the defendant that based on his decision not to receive surgery, his eye condition would not later be a basis for continuing the trial. At the initial hearing on the motion to continue, defense counsel advised the court that the defendant now wished to have surgical repair given medical advances.
The presiding trial judge then heard the defendant’s motion to continue. He disclosed to the parties before the hearing that he suffered from the same condition as the defendant. He stated that he was “not going to substitute [his] own experience or . . . expertise” for evidence, but that he was “in a unique position . . . to evaluate the assertions of the defense in terms of what [Defendant] can or cannot view, in terms of whether accommodations are or are not appropriate[.]” The trial court ultimately denied the defendant’s motion. It did, however, ensure that the defendant was provided with high-definition cameras pointed at the witness stand and the jury box that transmitted the picture to monitors a few feet in front of the defendant. In addition, the trial was held in a smaller courtroom, and the State provided the defendant with a device that magnified documents up to six times.
The defendant was convicted and appealed. On appeal, he argued that the trial court denied the defendant constitutional protections and erred by relying on its personal experience when denying the motion to continue. The Court of Appeals rejected that argument, concluded that the defendant failed to show how the trial judge’s experience with keratoconus affected his decision regarding the denial of the defendant’s motion. Moreover, the Court of Appeals stated that the defendant failed to show how the denial of the continuance prejudiced his ability to prepare a defense during the six years that elapsed between his indictment and trial. Thus, the court concluded that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying the motion nor did it deprive the defendant of due process.
The defendant also argued on appeal that his conviction for possession of firearm by a felon was unconstitutional. Because the defendant did not raise that claim before the trial court and did not demonstrate any exceptional circumstances justifying suspension of the appellate rules, the Court of Appeals dismissed that argument as unpreserved.
Trial court did not err by denying the defendant’s motion to suppress evidence seized from his car or the defendant’s motion to dismiss charges of possession of a firearm by a felon on constitutional grounds.
State v. Watkins, No. COA24-1056 (Sept. 3, 2025) (Murry). In this Wake County Case, the defendant was tried before a jury and convicted of obtaining property by false pretenses and possession of a firearm by a felon. The jury deadlocked on several related charges, and the defendant thereafter plead guilty to robbery and burglary charges in exchange for the dismissal of other charges. The defendant appealed from his convictions for obtaining property by false pretenses and possession of firearm by a felon, arguing that (1) the search warrant that led to the discovery of a handgun under the hood of his vehicle was not supported by probable cause and (2) G.S. 14-415.1, the statute restricting his possession of a firearm, violates his federal and state constitutional rights to bear arms.
(1) The Court of Appeals determined that the search warrant contained sufficient facts to establish probable cause that the defendant had incriminating evidence in his car. The search warrant specified that two men who had recently burglarized a home (zip-tying its occupants while they raided the house) fled the scene in a vehicle owned by the defendant’s associate, and that four days earlier the defendant and this associate were alleged to have slashed a person’s tires and to have fled the scene in the defendant’s vehicle. Additional evidence connected the defendant to the burglary, including his pawning of a stolen ring and several calls between the defendant and one of the men who burglarized the home. The court determined that the facts alleged established a nexus between the defendant’s vehicle and his alleged criminal activity sufficient to establish probable cause; thus, the trial court did not err in denying the defendant’s motion to suppress.
(2) The Court of Appeals determined that its recent decisions precluded consideration of defendant’s facial challenge to G.S. 14-415.1 on the basis that it violated the defendant’s federal and constitutional rights to bear arms, and that precedent also foreclosed the defendant’s as-applied federal claim. The court thus proceeded to consider only the defendant’s as-applied state constitutional claim, ultimately agreeing with the trial court’s denial of the defendant’s motion to dismiss on this ground.
The court analyzed the defendant’s as-applied challenge under the state constitution by weighing his conduct under the five factors set forth in State v. Britt, 363 N.C. 546 (2009) and clarified in State v. Johnston, 224 N.C. App. 282 (2012). Those factors are:
(i) the degree of violence or the threat of violence involved in the felony convictions responsible for the unlawful possession of a firearm conviction;
(ii) the length of time between the felony and the unlawful possession of a firearm conviction;
(iii) the defendant’s history of law-abiding conduct;
(iv) the defendant’s history of responsible, lawful firearm possession when that possession was lawful; and
(v) the defendant’s proactive compliance with G.S. 14-415.1.
The court concluded that those factors supported the constitutional application of G.S. 14-415.1 to the defendant’s conduct. It reasoned that while the facts underlying the false pretenses offense for which the defendant was convicted at trial (selling a ring at a pawn shop) were not violent nor was his prior conviction for cocaine possession, and the defendant had not been convicted of any violent felonies since he was 16, other factors weighed heavily in the State’s favor. The defendant did not have a history of law-abiding conduct following his conviction for cocaine possession as he pled guilty to the burglary and robbery charges on which the jury deadlocked. In addition, the defendant did not challenge G.S. 14-415.1’s application to his conduct until he was convicted of a violation. And the defendant did not show compliance with the statute because he pled guilty to felonies that involved the possession of a deadly weapon at the time of their commission.