In State v. Aspiote, ___ N.C. App. ___ (May 21, 2025), the North Carolina Court of Appeals determined that the trial court erred in holding a defendant in direct criminal contempt for appearing in court to plead guilty with impairing substances in his system. This post will review the circumstances that led to the contempt finding in Aspiote and the Court of Appeals’ analysis of why the trial court erred and will consider a trial court’s authority to hold a person in contempt for appearing in court while impaired.
The facts. The defendant in Aspiote appeared in court to enter a guilty plea for uttering a forged instrument and identity theft. During the plea colloquy, the defendant answered “yes” when the judge asked if he was “now using or consuming alcohol, drugs, narcotics, medicines, pills, or any other substance.” Slip op. at 2. The defendant said he had used such a substance first thing that morning, that he knew how the substance he used affected his body, that he believed his mind was clear, and he understood the nature of the hearing. The trial court did not ask the defendant to identify the substance he had used, and the defendant did not volunteer that information.
The trial court then heard the prosecutor’s statement of the factual basis for the charges and heard from the victim of the theft, who made a lengthy statement in which she described the defendant as a drug addict.
The trial court then announced that he would require the defendant to submit to a drug screen before deciding whether to accept the plea. The defendant did not immediately provide a urine sample but did provide one a couple of hours later. A probation officer reported to the court that the sample tested positive for methamphetamine.
Upon learning of the test results, the trial judge announced that he was not going to accept the defendant’s plea. The judge reasoned that the plea was not knowing, voluntary and intelligent since the defendant tested positive for an impairing substance.
The trial court then held the defendant in direct criminal contempt in a summary proceeding, making the following finding:
Defendant tested positive for methamphetamine, and [the] court inquired whether defendant would test positive and defendant said he would not. This inquiry occurred after the plea was taken but before sentence was given. After waiting more than 2 hours, [Defendant tested positive] for methamphetamine, so plea was stricken.
Slip op. at 5.
The court sentenced the defendant to 20 days in jail.
The Court of Appeals’ analysis. The defendant appealed, arguing that the trial court erred by holding him in contempt. The Court of Appeals considered two bases upon which the defendant’s behavior might have been considered contemptuous:
- willful behavior committed during the sitting of a court and directly tending to interrupt its proceedings (G.S. 5A-11(a)(1)); and
- willful or grossly negligent failure to comply with schedules and practices of the court resulting in substantial interference with the business of the court (G.S. 5A-11(a)(7)).
Based on the trial court’s finding, the appellate court reasoned that the trial court held the defendant in direct criminal contempt “for lying that he would not test positive for a controlled substance, thus wasting the court’s time having to wait for Defendant to complete a drug test.” Slip op. at 5. Yet the Court found no evidence to support the finding that the defendant said he would not test positive for an impairing substance. Instead, the Court noted that the defendant said he was of clear mind and understood the nature of the proceedings, notwithstanding his admission that earlier in the day he had used some type of medication or substance that was never identified. Moreover, the Court reasoned that the results of the urine test did not disprove the defendant’s statement that he was of clear mind. Testing positive for an impairing substance, the Court noted, is not conclusive proof that the person was under the influence of that substance during the proceeding.
As for the trial court’s reference to the delay occasioned by the wait for the defendant’s urine sample, the Court noted that any delay associated with the obtaining of the defendant’s urine sample could not be the basis of direct criminal contempt. That is because direct criminal contempt must be committed within the sight or hearing of a presiding judicial official and in or in immediate proximity to the room where proceedings are held. G.S. 5A-13(a). The actions associated with the collection of the urine sample did not take place before the court; thus, a judge could only find them contemptuous at a hearing held after the defendant was afforded a reasonable time to prepare, see G.S. 5A-15(a). Finally, the Court also noted there was no finding that the defendant acted willfully in failing to provide the sample more immediately, and an act is not contemptuous unless done willfully.
For these reasons, the Court reversed the contempt judgment and remanded the case for further proceedings.
Takeaways. Aspiote is a useful reminder of the limited bases upon which a person may be held in criminal contempt (which are set forth in G.S. 5A-11) and the distinction between direct contempt, which must occur in the presence of the presiding judicial official and may be punished summarily, and indirect contempt, which may only be punished in a plenary proceeding of which the potential contemnor receives advance notice and a reasonable time to prepare, see G.S. 5A-13, -14, -15.
Aspiote does not foreclose a judge from sanctioning a person for appearing in court while impaired. In many such circumstances (in contrast with Aspiote), the person is suspected of being impaired because they are outwardly displaying signs of impairment. That might occur, for example, when a person admits to drinking, has a reddened complexion, and is unsteady on her feet (see State v. Ford, 164 N.C. App. 566 (2004)), falls into a deep sleep in court (see State v. Corpening, 2024 WL 939679, No. COA23-707, 292 N.C. App. 671 (2024) (unpublished op.)), emits an odor of alcohol (see State v. Starkey, No. COA03-454, 164 N.C. App 414 (2004) (unpublished op.)), or has slurred speech, dilated pupils, and an inability to express thoughts in a rational manner (see In re Botros, 265 N.C. App. 422 (2019)). When a person displaying such symptoms is a party to a proceeding or an attorney (or sometimes even a person in the gallery), the act of appearing in court in an impaired condition may constitute willful behavior that interrupts court proceedings (see G.S. 5A-11(a)(1)) or willful behavior committed during the sitting of a court that impairs the respect due its authority (see G.S. 5A-11(a)(2)). See Corpening, 2024 WL 939679 (affirming trial court’s order holding the defendant, who fell asleep in the courtroom and was difficult to wake, in direct criminal contempt). If the presiding judge observes the defendant’s symptoms and behavior in the courtroom, the judge may address and (assuming facts establishing contempt are found beyond a reasonable doubt) punish the conduct summarily. G.S. 5A-14.
In Aspiote, the judge did not personally observe signs of impairment. Nevertheless, if the defendant’s answers to the questions posed in the plea colloquy raised concerns, the judge might have inquired about the substance the defendant consumed the morning of the hearing. Had the judge done so and had the defendant advised that the substance he consumed that morning was methamphetamine, the judge might reasonably have declined to accept the defendant’s plea on the basis that it was not knowing, voluntary, and intelligent. Cf. State v. Powell, 11 N.C. App. 194, 195 (1971) (stating that “[i]n a proper case, it might be more appropriate to postpone the arraignment of an intoxicated defendant, and possibly to adjudge him in contempt of court,” but finding on the facts of this case that the judge “who had the opportunity to observe the defendant closely, examined him painstakingly and found him competent to plead to the indictment” did not err in accepting the defendant’s guilty plea). The interruption and delay occasioned by the postponing of the plea proceeding could constitute contempt under G.S. 5A-11(a)(1) and (3). And if the facts leading to charges of contempt were based on the defendant’s answers to questions posed by the judge in court (as opposed to drug testing conducted outside the courtroom), the judge could address that conduct summarily.