Improper counting of a defendant’s prior out-of-state convictions is a common sentencing error. This post collects the law on the subject, including the many appellate cases decided over the past decade or so. I’ll admit, it’s the Atacama Desert of blog posts: long and dry. But the issue comes up often enough—and can have significant enough effect on a defendant’s ultimate sentence—that I thought it was worth a comprehensive review.
Convictions in the courts of the United States, another state, the Armed Forces of the United States, or another country qualify as prior convictions, regardless of whether the offense in question would be a crime if it occurred in the North Carolina. G.S. 15A-1340.11(7)c. A special classification rule applies to these out-of-state prior convictions for purposes of assigning prior record points. By default, a prior conviction for a crime that another jurisdiction classifies as a felony counts as a Class I felony (which carries two points) for record-level purposes in North Carolina. A prior conviction for a crime that another state classifies as a misdemeanor is classified as a Class 3 misdemeanor, and so does not factor into a defendant’s prior record level at all. G.S. 15A-1340.14(e). No special findings are required if the defendant’s prior out-of-state convictions are treated according to the default level. State v. Hinton, 196 N.C. App. 750 (2009).
The State or the defendant can attempt to depart from the default classification by presenting evidence that the offense is substantially similar to an offense in North Carolina with an offense class different from the default. If the State can prove by a preponderance of the evidence that an offense classified as either a misdemeanor or a felony in the other jurisdiction is substantially similar to a North Carolina offense that is classified as a Class I felony or higher, the conviction is treated as that class of felony for prior record level purposes. If the State can prove that a misdemeanor from another jurisdiction is substantially similar to a Class A1 or Class 1 misdemeanor in North Carolina, the conviction is treated as a Class A1 or Class 1 misdemeanor for prior record purposes. Conversely, if the defendant can prove that an offense classified as a felony in another jurisdiction is substantially similar to a North Carolina misdemeanor, the conviction will be treated as that class of misdemeanor for prior record level purposes. Though not classified under Structured Sentencing, impaired driving has been deemed a Class 1 misdemeanor for purposes of applying G.S. 15A-1340.14(e), allowing out-of-state drunk driving offenses to count for one point. State v. Armstrong, 203 N.C. App. 399 (2010).
Substantial similarity is a question of law that must be determined by the trial judge, not by the jury and not by stipulation. A defendant may validly stipulate to the bare fact that an out-of-state conviction exists, and may also stipulate that the crime is felony or misdemeanor in the other jurisdiction. State v. Bohler, 198 N.C. App. 631, 637–38 (2009). Those stipulations are a sufficient basis for the court to treat an out-of-state felony at the default Class I level for prior record purposes. State. v. Hinton, 196 N.C. App. 750 (2009). The defendant may not, however, stipulate to substantial similarity. State v. Palmateer, 179 N.C. App. 579 (2006). The latest version of the Prior Record Level Worksheet, form AOC-CR-600B, includes a check-box for the court to record its determination of substantial similarity.
The General Statutes do not prescribe a particular method for determining whether an out-of-state crime is substantially similar to a North Carolina offense. The cases, however, have made clear that the trial court should compare the elements of the out-of-state offense with the elements of the purportedly similar North Carolina crime. State v. Hanton, 175 N.C. App. 250 (2006). The comparison should be based on the substantive elements of the offenses involved, not on their relative punishments. State v. Sanders, ___ N.C. App. ___, 736 S.E.2d 238 (2013).
An out-of-state crime need not be identical to a North Carolina crime in order to be substantially similar to it. State v. Sapp, 190 N.C. App. 698, 713 (2008) (noting that G.S. 15A-1340.14(e) does not require offenses to “precisely match”). In State v. Claxton, for example, New York’s crime of third degree sale of a controlled substance was deemed substantially similar to Class G sale of a schedule I or II controlled substance in North Carolina in spite of minor differences between the states’ drug schedules. __ N.C. App. __, 736 S.E.2d 603 (2013). But only minor differences are allowed. For instance, a prior burglary from Florida was not substantially similar to burglary in North Carolina when the Florida offense included buildings other a dwelling, did not require that the offense occur at night, and did not require that there be a breaking in addition to an entry. State v. Rollins, __ N.C. App. __ __, 729 S.E.2d 73 (2012).
In general, the process of determining substantial similarity should be done with the rule of lenity in mind—any ambiguities should be resolved in the defendant’s favor. For example, an Ohio conviction for “Intentional shooting, cutting, or stabbing” was not substantially similar to North Carolina’s Class E assault with a deadly weapon with intent to kill because the Ohio crime did not require an intent to kill, but could also be completed with an intent to wound or maim. State v. Phillips, __ N.C. App. __, 742 S.E.2d 338 (2013). If an out-of-state offense is similar to more than one North Carolina offense, the court should find it substantially similar to the least serious similar offense. Hanton, 175 N.C. App. at 259 (holding that the court erred by finding New York’s second-degree assault crime to be substantially similar to North Carolina’s Class A1 assault inflicting serious injury instead of Class 2 simple assault).
The proponent of the substantial similarity finding should provide the court with statutes or cases from the other jurisdiction sufficient to make the necessary comparison. See, e.g., State v. Rich, 130 N.C. App. 113 (1998) (holding that photocopies of statutes from New York and New Jersey were sufficient proof that the defendant’s crimes in those states were substantially similar to crimes in North Carolina). Providing the names of the crimes alone is not enough. State v. Cao, 175 N.C. App. 434 (2006) (holding that a computerized printout of defendant’s criminal history record from Texas, showing the names of offenses committed there but not their elements, was sufficient to prove existence of the convictions but insufficient evidence of substantial similarity to North Carolina crimes). The submitted information should pertain to the other jurisdiction’s law as it existed at the time of the defendant’s prior conviction there. State v. Morgan, 154 N.C. App. 298, 309 (2004) (trial court erred by basing its substantial similarity determination on the 2002 version of New Jersey’s homicide law when the defendant had been convicted in 1987; the State presented no evidence that New Jersey law was unchanged between 1987 and 2002).
Finally, the burden is on the proponent to present the requisite information. Substantial similarity is not something the judge should consider on his or her own initiative. State v. Davis, __ N.C. App. __, 738 S.E.2d 417 (2013).
Another common area sentencing points are miscalculated involves PJCs. A PJC given in District Court does not count as a prior conviction although a PJC in Superior Court does count as a prior conviction. This is because under 15A-1340.11(7) a District Court conviction does not count as a prior conviction for sentencing purposes until after the 10-day window for appealing has expired. With a PJC, the 10-day window has not yet begun, let alone expired, so a District Court PJC does not count as a conviction (which is the point of a PJC, usually). Under the same statute a Superior Court PJC will count as a conviction because a superior court conviction counts “regardless of whether the conviction is on appeal to the appellate division.” This comes up commonly in misdemeanor sentencing rather than felony sentencing but it is still significant for those defendants who should get no more than a 45-day sentence but are saddled with a 120-day sentence instead.
Sorry, but that is not correct. In addition to other cases on point, the Court of Appeals specifically held in State v. Canellas, 164 NC App 775 (2004) that a PJC in District Court does count for prior record level points. This case is specifically referenced in the annotation of the statute you cite above (15A-1340.11).
Thanks,
Ted
Walter Rand: In State v. Canellas, 164 N.C. App. 775 (2004), the court of appeals held that a district court PJC for a Class A1 misdemeanor was a conviction and counted for a point. The court did not discuss the time-for-appeal argument in its opinion, but the defendant did raise the argument in his brief. http://www.ncappellatecourts.org/show-file.php?document_id=17806. There may also be some question about whether the purported PJC in Canellas was really a PJC at all — it included a condition requiring the defendant to attend DV treatment, which would most likely convert it to an entered judgment. Nevertheless, be aware that Canellas is out there, and that it appears to stand for the rule that even district court PJCs count as convictions under Structured Sentencing.
From the linked wiki: “Evidence suggests that the Atacama may not have had any significant rainfall from 1570 to 1971.” Now that’s dry.
im in texas and i have been wrongfully sentenced and texas state employee and x-mother in law and ex responsible.year 2000 many defaults i need links here in midland,txoccured,my daughter was killed in foster care due to all the many allegations that never occured in my progovitive . im diagnosed with bipolar and im deslexa but this to me i can still profes they hurt me and my children in all shape forms.thnx for time.