This post summarizes the published criminal opinions from the Supreme Court of North Carolina released on March 21, 2025. These summaries will be added to Smith’s Criminal Case Compendium, a free and searchable database of case summaries from 2008 to the present.
Court affirms case holding hydrocodone represented opiate for controlled substance conviction.
State v. Miller, 81A24, ___ N.C. ___ (Mar. 21, 2025). In this Henderson County case, the Supreme Court affirmed per curiam the Court of Appeals decision State v. Miller, 292 N.C. App. 519 (2024), where the majority held that hydrocodone, an opioid, qualified as an “opiate” for purposes of G.S. 90-95(h)(4) at the time of the offense, supporting defendant’s conviction.
Defendant’s life without parole sentences complied with Miller v. Alabama.
State v. Borlase, 33A24, ___ N.C. ___ (Mar. 21, 2025). In this Watauga County case, the Supreme Court majority affirmed the Court of Appeals decision finding no error with the imposition of two consecutive life sentences without parole for defendant’s first-degree murder convictions.
In April of 2019, when defendant was a senior in high school and seventeen years old, he stabbed his mother and father to death with a large kitchen knife. Defendant then took steps to cover up the murder, washing away the blood inside their home and hiding the bodies under bags of mulch and leaves from the yard, and went to smoke marijuana with his friends. After defendant was convicted of two counts of first-degree murder, the sentencing court performed the analysis required by G.S. 15A-1340.19B and -1340.19C, and sentenced defendant to two consecutive sentences of life imprisonment without the possibility of parole. The Court of Appeals majority found no error, but defendant appealed based on the dissent, leading to the current opinion.
Taking up defendant’s appeal, the Supreme Court first explained the body of law around sentencing juveniles to life sentences without parole, including Miller v. Alabama, 567 U.S. 460 (2012), and North Carolina’s statutes implementing Miller’s process requirements in G.S. 15A-1340.19A to -1340.19D. Defendant argued that the Court of Appeals did not conduct a thorough appellate review of the sentencing court’s order, a proposition the Court rejected, noting “the majority below determined that the sentencing court’s written order showed that it exercised discretion consistent with the Eighth Amendment in sentencing defendant.” Slip Op. at17. The Court also rejected defendant’s argument that the Court of Appeals failed to apply the abuse of discretion standard, as the majority opinion concluded the sentencing court’s decision “was not arbitrary” Id. at 20. Finally, the Court rejected defendant’s challenges to the sentencing court’s consideration and weighting of evidence, as “the sentencing court considered defendant’s mitigating evidence and made explicit findings in its written order.” Id. at 22. The Court explained “[i]n the absence of express evidence that demonstrates a sentencing court did not consider mitigating evidence or exercise its discretion, we will not presume error.” Id. Here, defendant did not demonstrate the sentencing court refused to consider mitigating evidence, but instead challenged the weight and conclusions it reached, arguments the Court held had no merit.
Justice Earls, joined by Justice Riggs, dissented and would have reversed the judgment of the Court of Appeals and remanded for a new sentencing hearing. Id. at 27.
Court affirms decision limiting cross-examination on Sell hearing.
State v. Gregory, 23A24, ___ N.C. ___ (Mar. 21, 2025). In this Wake County case, the Supreme Court affirmed per curiam the Court of Appeals decision State v. Gregory, 291 N.C. App. 617 (2023), where the majority held that limitation on cross-examination for the State’s expert in forensic psychiatry about the purpose of her testimony at a hearing held under Sell v. United States, 539 U.S. 166 (2003), i.e., to involuntarily medicate defendant so that he would be competent to stand trial, was not error.
Justice Riggs, joined by Justice Earls, dissented and would have held that the limitation of cross-examination regarding the purpose of the expert’s testimony at the Sell hearing represented a violation of defendant’s Confrontation Clause rights.
Court affirms decision finding no error with waiver of counsel after trial court miscalculated range of punishment.
State v. Macon, 10PA24, ___ N.C. ___ (Mar. 21, 2025). In this Randolph County case, the Supreme Court modified and affirmed per curiam the unpublished Court of Appeals decision State v. Macon, COA23-357, finding no error with defendant’s convictions for sexual exploitation of a minor after he waived counsel and represented himself at trial. The Court modified and affirmed based on the decision in State v. Fenner, 289PA23, issued contemporaneously with this opinion.
Although the trial court misstated the possible range of punishment to defendant when advising him before proceeding pro se, the trial court informed defendant that he effectively faced a life sentence, satisfying the statutory requirement.
State v. Fenner, 289PA23, ___ N.C. ___ (Mar. 21, 2025). In this Wake County case, the Supreme Court affirmed and modified the unpublished Court of Appeals decision finding no error with defendant’s sentence despite the trial court’s failure to accurately advise him of the full sentencing range he faced if he were convicted.
Before going on trial for various felonies in 2022, defendant told the trial court he wished to waive his right to counsel and proceed pro se, and the trial court followed G.S. 15A-1242 by providing defendant with the required colloquy, including the range of permissible punishments he faced. Unfortunately, the trial court miscalculated, informing defendant he faced “75 to 175 years in prison” when he was actually sentenced after his conviction to “121 to 178 years in prison.” Slip Op. at 2. On appeal, the Court of Appeals rejected defendant’s argument that this was error, explaining that he understood he was subject to a life sentence. Defendant petitioned for discretionary review, arguing the Court of Appeals’ precedent on this issue conflicted with the Supreme Court’s interpretation of G.S. 15A-1242, leading to the current case.
The Supreme Court explained the issue as the practical consideration of how long a defendant could be imprisoned, as “the ‘range of permissible punishments’ described in [G.S.] 15A-1242 contains a ceiling equivalent to the defendant’s natural life.” Id. at 8. Here the trial court made a miscalculation, but if “the miscalculation and the actual range are tantamount to the remainder of the defendant’s life, the trial court complies with the statute.” Id. Put more simply, defendant was informed “if convicted, he could spend the rest of his life in prison,” and “[t]hat accurately conveyed the sentencing range that [defendant] faced in this case and therefore confirmed that [defendant] comprehended the range of permissible punishments.” Id. at 9.
The Court dispensed with defendant’s other issues with the Court of Appeals decision, but modified the decision to the extent that it did not call for the trial court to advise defendant of all the charges against him. Although the Court did not interpret the Court of Appeals decision to say this, the Court provided the following guidance to trial courts:
When calculating the permissible range of punishments, the best practice is for trial courts to use the checklist of inquiries we articulated in State v. Moore, 362 N.C. 319, 327–28 (2008). This includes informing the defendant of all charges in the case and the minimum and maximum possible sentence the defendant faces if convicted of all those charges.
Id. at 11.
Defendant’s life without parole sentence satisfied Miller v. Alabama requirements and his jury selection claim was barred by statute.
State v. Sims, 297PA18, ___ N.C. ___ (Mar. 21, 2025). In this Onslow County case, the Supreme Court affirmed the Court of Appeals decision finding no error in defendant’s sentence of life without parole for first-degree murder. Defendant’s co-defendant for this murder also appealed, and the Supreme Court considered that appeal in State v. Bell, 86A02-2, issued contemporaneously with this opinion.
In January of 2000, defendant and a co-defendant kidnapped and killed an eighty-nine-year-old woman. In 2001 defendant was tried for murder, and although the State sought the death penalty, defendant was sentenced to life without parole. The Supreme Court upheld this conviction on defendant’s initial appeal. Subsequently, defendant filed a motion for appropriate relief (MAR), arguing his mandatory life without parole sentence was unconstitutional under Miller v. Alabama, 567 U.S. 460 (2012), and a superior court concluded his sentence was valid in a hearing held in 2014. Defendant then appealed; however, before the Supreme Court could take up the appeal, defendant filed a second MAR arguing gender discrimination in jury selection under J.E.B. v. Alabama ex rel. T.B., 511 U.S. 127 (1994). The superior court considering this second MAR found a violation of J.E.B., and both MARs form the basis of the current opinion.
Taking up the J.E.B. claim first, the Supreme Court explained G.S. 15A-1419 operates as a bar to post-conviction review of certain issues like defendant’s J.E.B. claim, unless the defendant can demonstrate good cause under G.S. 15A-1419(c) or a fundamental miscarriage of justice under G.S. 15A-1419(e). For the reasons stated in State v. Bell, the Court held that defendant’s claim was barred under G.S. 15A-1419.
The Court then moved to the life without parole sentence, explaining defendant challenged the sentence on two fronts, that the sentence violated his Eighth Amendment rights and that the sentencing court disregarded mitigating evidence and failed to properly weigh the evidence. The Court disagreed with both of defendant’s assertions, highlighting that the procedure in G.S. 15A-1340.19, the Miller-fix statute, conforms to federal law.
The Court first clarified that “the inquiry is not whether a defendant is permanently incorrigible or irreparably corrupt; nor is it potential for redemption[,]” meaning that the only requirement was that the superior court comply with the Miller-fix statute when conducting its inquiry. Slip Op. at 18. After establishing this framework, the Court walked through defendant’s specific challenges to the various conclusions of the superior court, finding no abuse of discretion. The Court concluded by dismissing defendant’s argument that the Court of Appeals applied an improper standard of review, and affirmed the Court of Appeals decision.
Justice Earls, joined by Justice Riggs, concurred in the result only, and wrote to highlight issues with the majority’s analysis. Id. at 36.
Defendant’s claim of gender-based discrimination in jury selection was barred, as claim could have been brought on direct appeal.
State v. Bell, 86A02-2, ___ N.C. ___ (Mar. 21, 2025). In this Onslow County case, the Supreme Court granted certiorari to review defendant’s post-conviction motion for appropriate relief (MAR), and an amendment to the MAR, after receiving a sentence of death for first-degree murder. The Court affirmed the superior court’s judgment denying defendant’s MAR, concluding that defendant’s claim of gender-based discrimination in jury selection was not preserved for review and barred by G.S. 15A-1419. Defendant’s co-defendant for this murder also appealed, and the Supreme Court considered that appeal in State v. Sims, 297PA18, issued contemporaneously with this opinion.
In January of 2000, defendant and a co-defendant kidnapped and killed an eighty-nine-year-old woman. In 2001 defendant was tried for murder, receiving the death penalty. The Supreme Court upheld this conviction on defendant’s appeal. Subsequently defendant filed his initial MAR, which he then amended in 2012 by arguing unconstitutional gender-based discrimination at his trial based on the affidavit of one of the State’s prosecutors at defendant’s trial. This affidavit referenced a specific female juror who was struck on the basis of her gender, as the prosecution was attempting to get more male jurors on the panel. The superior court determined that defendant was in a position to raise the gender-based discrimination claim on direct appeal and his MAR claim was barred. After this, an evidentiary hearing was held in 2022, and the superior court reviewing the MAR of defendant and his co-defendant found gender-based discrimination under J.E.B. v. Alabama ex rel. T.B., 511 U.S. 127 (1994). The procedural history and findings of the superior court are detailed in pages 6-14 of the slip opinion.
Taking up defendant’s petition for certiorari, the Supreme Court first reviewed whether defendant had preserved his claim “that the prosecutor impermissibly struck a juror on the basis of gender.” Slip Op. at 16. The Court concluded defendant failed to preserve his claim, as constitutional issues not raised on direct appeal are waived, and even if defendant preserved his J.E.B. claim, it was procedurally barred under G.S. 15A-1419. Defendant argued that he was not able to raise his discrimination claim on direct appeal because he was not yet in possession of the prosecutor’s affidavit, meaning he did not have sufficient evidence to adequately raise the claim at that time. The Court rejected this argument, as “[t]he jury selection transcript reveals pointed statements baldly communicated by the State—in open court—that it wanted to place more men on the jury at the expense of seating women.” Id. at 20. Additionally, the Court noted “the transcripts and questionnaires provide the basis for a statistical analysis of the State’s use of peremptory strikes based on gender.” Id. at 22. Essentially, the Court held that the evidence of discrimination was obvious from the proceedings and defendant could have performed the statistical analysis supporting the discrimination claim without the prosecutor’s affidavit; defendant’s own statistical expert performed the analysis during the MAR evidentiary hearing with this information.
The Court also rejected defendant’s argument that the later discovery of the prosecutor’s affidavit represented good cause under G.S. 15A-1419(c) to overcome the mandatory procedural bar. As noted above, the Court did not agree that the prosecutor’s affidavit was essential to raising the claim, as “[i]t is evident from the cold record that the remarks made by the State during voir dire put defendant on notice that he needed to raise a J.E.B. objection.” Id. at 27. While acknowledging that the discriminatory behavior in this matter was reprehensible, the Court held that statutory and procedural requirements barred consideration of defendant’s claim as he did not raise it on direct appeal.
Justice Earls, joined by Justice Riggs, concurred in the result only, writing separately to note that precedent constrained the possible methods of post-conviction relief in situations like the current case. Id. at 31.