This post summarizes the published criminal opinions from the Court of Appeals of North Carolina released on October 1, 2025.
There was sufficient evidence of misdemeanor child abuse and contributing to the delinquency of a minor; the prosecutor’s statements during closing arguments about the facts of similar appellate cases were not improper; the prosecutor’s race-neutral reasons for striking jurors were not pretextual and survived the defendant’s Batson challenge.
State v. Benton, No. COA25-92 (N.C. Ct. App. Oct. 1, 2025) (Tyson). In this Mecklenburg County case, the defendant was charged with misdemeanor child abuse and contributing to the delinquency of a minor after leaving her six-year-old daughter unattended in a park. Her daughter was alone long enough to walk over a mile from the park, where she was found by another woman who saw the girl standing near a city street talking to two men in a car. The defendant was convicted after a jury trial. On appeal, the defendant argued (1) that there was insufficient evidence of the crimes charged, (2) that the prosecutor made improper remarks at closing, and (3) that the trial court erred in denying her Batson motion. The court of appeals found no error. As to the sufficiency of the evidence, the court of appeals concluded that the evidence of both crimes was sufficient. The court noted that misdemeanor child abuse can be established by a parent creating or allowing to be created a substantial risk of physical injury to a child, and that prior cases have established that failing to appropriately supervise a child can establish such a risk in light of the age of the child, whether she was left truly alone, the duration of time the child was left unsupervised, and the physical environment in which she was left. Considering those factors, the court concluded that leaving a six-year-old alone for long enough to walk one and a half miles on crowded streets was a sufficient basis for a reasonable juror to find the defendant guilty of child abuse. Similarly, the court concluded that a reasonable juror could find that the defendant neglected a child by allowing substantial risk of physical impairment by leaving her daughter unsupervised, well out of her line of sight, and exposed to an injurious environment.
As to the prosecutor’s closing remarks, the defendant argued that the trial court erred by allowing the prosecutor to relay the facts of prior appellate cases involving child abuse by negligent supervision, saying “Those are the [facts and circumstances] you must consider when determining whether or not there’s a substantial risk of physical injury.” Slip op. at 11. The court concluded that the State’s arguments were appropriate and remained within the confines of presenting analogous facts to the jury without arguing that the defendant should be convicted due to the similarity of her behavior.
Finally, the court of appeals concluded that the trial court did not err in denying the defendant’s Batson challenge. The prosecutor used peremptory strikes against three prospective black jurors. The defendant made a sufficient prima facie case, and the prosecutor provided a sufficient race-neutral reason for his use of peremptory strikes: that all of those jurors were single parents, who might be more sympathetic to the defendant. The court of appeals found no error in the trial court’s conclusion that the rationale was not pretextual.
Defendant’s condition did not qualify as a drug-related overdose within the meaning of the Good Samaritan law; over a dissent, the defendant received the benefit of his bargain on the plea arrangement.
State v. Branham, No. COA24-927 (N.C. Ct. App. Oct. 1, 2025) (Murry). In this Rowan County case, a person called 911 upon seeing the defendant unconscious in a running vehicle. Responding officers saw a needle and heroin in the car and charged the defendant with possession of a Schedule I controlled substance. The trial court denied the defendant’s motion to dismiss under G.S. 90-96.2, the Good Samaritan Law. When the defendant pled guilty to felony possession of a schedule I controlled substance, habitual felon status, and related misdemeanors, he asked to preserve the issue of the trial court’s denial of his pretrial motion for appeal—though no statute preserved his right to do so after a guilty plea.
The court of appeals exercised its discretion to consider the defendant’s immunity argument by way of a writ of certiorari. The court reasoned that issuing the writ would head off later proceedings about whether the defendant’s plea was the product of an informed choice, and would also give the court an opportunity to shed light on the proper application of a relatively new statutory scheme. The court explicitly said, however, that it was not establishing a per se rule that all unappealable motions must be granted appellate review. Slip op. at 8.
On the merits of the defendant’s motion under the Good Samaritan Law, the court concluded that the defendant’s condition was not an “acute illness” sufficient to qualify as a drug-related overdose within the meaning of G.S. 90-96.2(b). Officers were able to awaken him quickly by tapping on his car window, and he was not “cyanotic, sweating, or clammy,” indicating that he was unconscious, but not in the midst of an overdose.
As for the validity of the defendant’s plea, which was conditioned on preserving the right to challenge the denial of his pretrial motion, the court concluded that its grant of certiorari provided him the benefit of his bargain.
In dissent, Judge Hampson wrote that he would have deemed the plea arrangement invalid and not the product of an informed choice. He would therefore have vacated it and remanded the matter to the trial court for trial or the negotiation of a new plea agreement.
There was sufficient evidence of three predicate felonies presented in support of a felony murder prosecution; under binding precedent, discharging a firearm within an enclosure under G.S. 14-34.10 applies regardless of whether the victim is in the enclosure; the State’s race-neutral explanation for striking a black juror was not pretextual.
State v. Hardaway, No. COA24-538 (N.C. Ct. App. Oct. 1, 2025) (per curiam). In this Alamance County case, the defendant was convicted after a jury trial of first-degree murder based on felony murder. After an argument, the defendant fired a gun from a moving vehicle, hitting the victim in his chest and killing him. At trial, the State presented three felonies in support of the felony murder theory: assault with a deadly weapon with intent to kill, firing into an occupied dwelling, and discharging a firearm within a motor vehicle. On appeal, the defendant argued that there was insufficient evidence of the three alleged predicate felonies to warrant instructing the jury on them. As to the assault with a deadly weapon with intent to kill and the firing into an occupied dwelling, the court rejected the defendant’s argument that there was insufficient proof that the defendant fired “at” anyone or at the house. The court said the evidence was sufficient to submit the charges to the jury when witnesses saw the defendant holding the gun and saw it discharge, the victim was shot, and at least one bullet entered the house.
As to the discharging a firearm within a motor vehicle under G.S. 14-34.10, the defendant argued that there was insufficient evidence to establish that the defendant discharged a firearm “within” the car. He argued that the statute should be interpreted to mean an event happening entirely within the car, rather than emanating from it (which would be covered by other crimes). The court of appeals majority held that the issue was foreclosed by precedent, as another panel of the court of appeals recently concluded in State v. Jenkins, ___ N.C. App. ___ (No. COA24-889, 2025 WL 2232043 (N.C. Ct. App. Aug. 6, 2025), that G.S. 14-34.10 could be committed when a defendant fired within an enclosure, regardless of whether the victim was within the same enclosure.
The defendant also argued on appeal that the trial court erred by denying his Batson challenge when the State challenged the only black prospective juror on the panel. The court of appeals concluded that the trial court did not err by accepting the State’s race-neutral explanation for the challenge: that the stricken juror was inattentive, uninterested, and seemed annoyed to be there. The defendant’s comparison to a white juror who was not struck did not prove the State’s explanation to be pretextual. That juror also gave one-word answers indicating he didn’t want to be there, but there was no indication he was uninterested or inattentive.
Judge Hampson concurred dubitante, agreeing the court was bound by the prior panel’s decision in Jenkins, but explaining why he believed that opinion was wrongly decided.
Judge Dillon concurred, expressing doubt that assault with a deadly weapon with intent to kill should serve as a predicate felony for felony murder.
The State did not give sufficient notice of its intent to prove an aggravating factor, but the defendant waived the right to notice and was not prejudiced by any error related to it; in the absence of any prejudice the defendant did not receive ineffective assistance of counsel.
State v. Hooks, No. COA24-217 (N.C. Ct. App. Oct. 1, 2025) (Stroud). In this Pitt County case, the defendant was charged with interference with an electronic monitoring device and attaining habitual felon status. The State gave the defendant notice on February 15, 2023, that it intended to pursue aggravating factor (12a), that the defendant had a prior probation violation within the past 10 years. The defendant’s trial began 28 days later on March 15, 2023. The defendant was convicted and sentenced in the aggravated range. On appeal, the defendant argued that he did not receive the requisite 30-day notice under G.S. 15A-1340.16(a6), and that he received ineffective assistance of counsel. As to notice of the aggravating factor, the court of appeals agreed, but nonetheless concluded that the defendant waived his right to notice when he raised no objection to the evidence or jury instructions related to the factor. The court also noted that the defendant was not prejudiced by the lack of notice, as the factor was established by undisputable evidence. As to the ineffective assistance claim, the court likewise noted the lack of prejudice and thus concluded that the claim was without merit.
An acquittal at an earlier trial did not collaterally estop the State from remarking on an alleged sexual assault and kidnapping related to the defendant’s murder prosecution; the State’s rhetorical question during closing arguments did not amount to an improper comment on the defendant’s election not to testify; the defendant’s right to a fair trial was not violated by cumulative error.
State v. Lamm, No. COA24-982 (N.C. Ct. App. Oct. 1, 2025) (Murry). In this Johnston County case, the defendant was convicted after a jury trial of second-degree murder and obtaining [violent] habitual felon status and sentenced to life without parole. This was the second trial related to these crimes; the first resulted in the trial court dismissing first-degree rape and first-degree kidnapping charges for insufficiency of the evidence (which had the effect of an acquittal), and a mistrial on the first-degree murder charge. On appeal, the defendant argued that trial court erred by denying the defendant’s motion for a mistrial based on the State’s remarks during jury selection, opening arguments, and closing arguments that the defendant raped, kidnapped, and sexually assaulted the victim. The court of appeals concluded that the defendant’s acquittal on the rape and kidnapping charges at the first trial “did not collaterally estop the State from introducing or arguing the truth of evidence tending to show that he committed a certain crime in service of his ultimate murder of the victim.” Slip op. at 10.
The defendant also argued that the trial court erred by failing to declare a mistrial based on the State’s closing argument, in which it played one of the defendant’s interrogation videos for the jury and then asked the defendant “Was that a lie or did you just forget it?” The court of appeals concluded that the question did not amount to an improper comment by the prosecutor on the defendant’s election not to testify.
Finally, the court of appeals rejected the defendant’s argument that the trial court’s purported errors cumulatively violated his right to a fair trial, because the “trial court did not err in any respect.” Slip op. at 15.
The trial court did not err by precluding repetitive testimony about a witness’s prior record; a three-year delay did not violate the defendant’s right to a speedy trial in light of the valid reasons for the delay and the seriousness of the charges; the defendant’s constitutional argument was not preserved for appeal and did not warrant discretionary review; the defendant was not prejudiced by his lawyer’s decision not to show a video to the jury and therefore did not receive ineffective assistance of counsel.
State v. McClinton, No. COA24-1096 (N.C. Ct. App. Oct. 1, 2025) (Gore). In this Guilford County case, the defendant was convicted in 2024 of first-degree murder, discharging a weapon into occupied property, and possession of firearm by a felon for a shooting at a Greensboro nightclub in 2021. He was sentenced to life without parole and other concurrent sentences. On appeal, he raised arguments related to (1) confrontation, (2) speedy trial, (3) the Second Amendment, and (4) ineffective assistance of counsel. The court of appeals found no error.
The defendant argued that the trial court violated his rights under the Confrontation Clause by not allowing him to question a witness about the possibility that the witness would attain habitual felon status if convicted of his pending charges. The court of appeals concluded that the defendant was able to elicit the information he sought about the witness’s pending charges, and that the trial court did not err by precluding repetitive testimony.
As to the defendant’s speedy trial argument, the court of appeals noted that the delay beyond one year triggered an inquiry under Barker v. Wingo, 407 U.S. 514 (1972), but ultimately concluded that the delay here was for valid reasons—namely, the defendant’s intervening service of an 18-month sentence for a federal supervised release violation, the four defense attorneys involved in the case, the fact that one of the detectives involved in the case was called for military duty, and the seriousness of the charges.
The defendant next argued that the felony firearm prohibition is unconstitutional on its face under the federal and state constitutions and as applied to his case. The court of appeals concluded that the issue was not preserved for appeal and did not warrant discretionary review under Rule 2 of the Rules of Appellate Procedure.
Finally, the defendant argued that his lawyer’s failure to show the jury a video of an investigatory interview of a witness amounted to ineffective assistance of counsel. The appellate court found no prejudice, concluding that, even had the jury seen the video, there was no reasonable possibility that the result of the proceeding would have been different.
The trial court did not err in denying the defendant’s motion to suppress evidence found in his bag when competent evidence supported the court’s conclusion that the defendant abandoned his reasonable expectation of privacy in it.
State v. Pardo, No. COA24-1036 (N.C. Ct. App. Oct. 1, 2025) (Carpenter). In this Carteret County drug trafficking case, the defendant appealed the denial of his motion to suppress after pleading guilty. The drugs were found in a camera bag that the defendant left unattended at a Best Buy for approximately 40 minutes during an investigation of a prior incident by loss prevention officers. The trial court denied the motion to suppress based on its conclusion that the defendant intended to abandon the bag and therefore relinquished his reasonable expectation of privacy in it. In reviewing the trial court’s denial of the defendant’s motion to suppress, the court of appeals reviewed the trial court’s findings of fact and found they were supported by competent evidence. The appellate court concluded that by leaving the bag unattended in a public place for 40 minutes, knowing it contained drugs and $65,000 in cash, and not mentioning it or attempting to retrieve it once officers arrived on the scene, the defendant abandoned it and relinquished his reasonable expectation of privacy in it.
A cell phone video was properly admitted for illustrative purposes despite a lack of evidence about who filmed it; the trial court did not err by declining to instruct the jury on an assault for a defendant charged with murder by a short form indictment.
State v. Ramsey, No. COA25-145 (N.C. Ct. App. Oct. 1, 2025) (Flood). In this Mecklenburg County case, the defendant was convicted after jury trial of involuntary manslaughter. The charges resulted from a fight the defendant had with the victim. The defendant argued on appeal that the trial court erred by admitting video evidence without proper authentication, and by denying the defendant’s motion for additional jury instructions on simple assault after the jury had started deliberations. The video evidence came from a cell phone that an officer found at the scene of the fight. The court of appeals concluded that the trial court did not err by admitting the video for illustrative purposes despite a lack of evidence about who filmed it. The trial court gave a limiting instruction and the State laid a proper foundation by eliciting testimony from a witness that the video fairly and accurately illustrated the fight. As to the request for an instruction on assault, the court of appeals cited binding precedent holding a jury instruction on simple assault improper for a defendant—like the defendant here—charged with a short form murder indictment. The court declined the defendant’s request to reconsider that precedent in light of State v. Singleton, 386 N.C. 183 (2024).
The trial court had no authority to order a civil judgment for a fine immediately at sentencing.
State v. Santana, No. COA24-946 (N.C. Ct. App. Oct. 1, 2025) (Collins). In this Burke County case, the defendant was convicted after a jury trial of drug trafficking and other offenses. In addition to the mandatory active sentence, the trial court ordered a $250,000 fine—in the form of a civil judgment. The trial court also ordered $1,615 in costs and attorney fees as civil judgments. Through a petition for writ of certiorari, the defendant challenged the civil judgments for the fine and costs, arguing that the trial court had no authority to impose them immediately at sentencing. The court of appeals agreed. Under G.S. 15A-1365, a judge may docket costs or a fine when a defendant has defaulted, but there is no authority to do so without first determining that Defendant had defaulted in payment. The court noted that the defendant was prejudiced by the premature entry of the judgment, as over $17,000 in interest had accrued on the civil judgment in the year since its entry. The court vacated the judgments. The court also remanded the matter for correction of a clerical error as to the offense classification.
There was sufficient evidence of the defendant’s drug convictions; the trial court did not commit plain error by failing to read a portion of the jury instruction on constructive possession; the trial court erred by not considering the defendant for conditional discharge under G.S. 90-96.
State v. Verdi, No. COA24-1014 (N.C. Ct. App. Oct. 1, 2025) (Gore). In this Stanly County case, the defendant was convicted after a jury trial of possession of methamphetamine and possession of drug paraphernalia. The defendant argued on appeal that the trial court erred in denying her motion to dismiss for insufficiency of the evidence and in its jury instruction on constructive possession. She also argued that the trial court erred by imposing a sentence rather than a conditional discharge under G.S. 90-96. As to the motion to dismiss for insufficiency of the evidence, the court of appeals concluded that it was properly denied when the defendant was seen in or leaving the bedroom where drugs and drug paraphernalia were found and her driver’s license and credit card were found in the bedroom. As to the jury instruction (which the defendant did not object to at trial), the court of appeals concluded that the trial court erred by reading only a portion of instruction N.C.P.I.—CRIM. 104.41 and failing to include the portion that defines constructive possession, but that the omission did not amount to plain error. Finally, the appellate court concluded that the trial court erred by failing to consider conditional discharge under G.S. 90-96. Under the language of that statute, as interpreted in State v. Dail, 255 N.C. App. 645 (2017), conditional discharge is mandatory unless the court determines and the district attorney agrees that it is inappropriate. The court rejected the State’s argument that the statutory language requiring the defendant’s “consent” requires the defendant to initiate a request for conditional discharge to trigger the trial court’s obligation to consider it. To the contrary, the court of appeals said, the court must consider conditional discharge for any defendant—like the defendant here—who is eligible. The court remanded the case for a new sentencing hearing.
Rule 408 did not bar admission of a letter the defendant wrote to law enforcement from the jail offering cooperation in a criminal case; the defendant’s Second Amendment argument was unpreserved for appeal.
State v. Wilson, No. COA24-799 (N.C. Ct. App. Oct. 1, 2025) (Gore). In this Wayne County case, the defendant was convicted of attempted first-degree murder, possession of firearm by a felon, and other serious felonies and sentenced to a lengthy consecutive term of imprisonment. The trial court admitted a letter the defendant wrote to law enforcement from the jail in which the defendant wrote that he “shot a gang banger in Dollar General” and offered to help them “get some meth addicts” in exchange for help with his charges. At trial, the defendant objected to admission of the letter, arguing that it was an offer to compromise under Rule 408 of the Rules of Evidence. The court of appeals upheld the trial court’s admission of the letter, concluding that Rule 408 does not apply in a criminal case in North Carolina. The court distinguished Federal Rule 408, which, unlike North Carolina’s rule, was amended in 2006 and expressly made applicable to both civil and criminal proceedings.
The court of appeals declined to review the defendant’s unpreserved Second Amendment argument.
The trial court erred by considering evidence outside the pleadings when ruling on the defendants’ motion to dismiss the plaintiff’s constitutional claims related to a Giglio letter.
Leech v. North Carolina, No. COA24-1113 (N.C. Ct. App. Oct. 1, 2025) (Wood). [This case is summarized at a high level due to its underlying subject matter, although it turned on questions of civil procedure that are not covered in detail.] In this case arising out of Person County, the plaintiff, a Roxboro police officer, sued the State of North Carolina, the local district attorney, and others after the district attorney sent a Giglio letter to the plaintiff. (Giglio letters are those written in response to a prosecutor’s obligation under Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83 (1963), to disclose evidence that could affect the credibility of a witness, Giglio v. United States, 405 U.S. 150 (1972).) The letter was issued in response to the plaintiff-officer’s involvement in a rape investigation, during which he disposed of a boxcutter found at the scene of the crime after confirming it had no apparent involvement in the crime. The stated bases for the letter were the officer’s purported mishandling of evidence and purported dishonesty in relation to whether a supervising sergeant had approved disposing of the boxcutter. The officer resigned but later asked the North Carolina Department of Justice to conduct an independent investigation. The DOJ did that through the Criminal Justice Education and Training Standards Commission, which found no probable cause to support either of the stated bases in the letter. The district attorney declined to withdraw the letter, prompting the officer to sue the district attorney, the Attorney General, and others for violations of his constitutional rights. He also argued that G.S. 17C-16, the statute governing procedures related to Giglio letters, is unconstitutional on its face and as applied. The trial court granted the defendants’ motion to dismiss and the plaintiff appealed. The court of appeals concluded that the trial court erred by considering evidence outside the pleadings—an affidavit and two letters submitted by the district attorney—when ruling on the defendants’ motion to dismiss. The appellate court remanded the plaintiff’s facial challenge to the constitutionality of G.S. 17C-16 to the trial court for resolution of certain issues before transfer to a three-judge panel, as required by G.S. 1-267.1. The court identified recent supreme court case law concerning the Fruit of Labor clause in Article I, section 1 of the state constitution that might bear on the substance of the plaintiff’s facial constitutional challenge on remand.