Law enforcement officers in North Carolina must have good moral character to be certified, and may lose their certification if they lose their good moral character. The requirement of good moral character is neither unique to North Carolina nor exclusive to law enforcement officers. At the same time, it is a difficult standard to apply, as illustrated by a recent decision issued by the Supreme Court of North Carolina. This post provides context for that decision and explores its reasoning.
Background: the good moral character requirement. State and municipal police officers in North Carolina are certified by the North Carolina Criminal Justice Education and Training Standards Commission (“CJ Commission”). The CJ Commission requires officers to have, and to maintain, good moral character. See G.S. 17C-10(c) (“[T]he Commission, by rules and regulations, shall fix other qualifications for the employment, training, and retention of criminal justice officers including . . . good moral character . . . .”); 12 NCAC 09B .0101(12) (officers must “be of good moral character as defined in” various appellate decisions).
Similarly, deputy sheriffs and detention officers are certified by the North Carolina Sheriffs’ Education and Training Standards Commission (“Sheriffs’ Commission”). The Sheriffs’ Commission also requires good moral character. See G.S. 17E-7(c) (directing the Sheriffs’ Commission to set standards including good moral character); 12 NCAC 10B .0301(12) (requiring good moral character as defined in court decisions).
The requirement that law enforcement officers have good moral character is not unique to North Carolina. See, e.g., Fl. Stat. § 943.1395 (providing that an officer’s lack of “good moral character” may result in revocation of certification or other consequences); S.D. Laws § 23-3-42 (directing the state’s standards and training commission to implement standards for officers including “good moral character”). Nor, in this state, is the good moral character requirement unique to law enforcement officers. Indeed, a majority of the appellate cases we have about good moral character arise from disputes about whether individuals seeking licensure as attorneys possess such character. See, e.g., Matter of Legg, 337 N.C. 628 (1994) (discussing attorney applicant who omitted information on his application and had a history of financial impropriety); Matter of Elkins, 308 N.C. 317 (1983) (discussing attorney applicant who had previously provided false testimony).
The Devalle case. The state supreme court recently addressed the good moral character requirement in Devalle v. North Carolina Sheriffs’ Education and Training Standards Commission, __ N.C. __, __ S.E.2d __, 2025 WL 2427583 (2025). The procedural history of the case is lengthy, but interesting and important to the disposition of the case.
For many years, Maurice Devalle was a trooper with the Highway Patrol. He became the subject of an internal affairs investigation after someone submitted a tip claiming that Devalle was sitting at home, not working, but claiming to be on duty. An internal affairs investigation concluded that he “had given a false home address to make it seem as though he lived within the mandatory twenty-mile radius of his duty station in Wayne County when he in fact lived forty-four miles away” and that he “had submitted false time sheets—and therefore received a taxpayer-funded paycheck—for the time he spent at home.” He was fired for “untruthfulness, neglect of duty, and insubordination” and for violating the residency policy. The Secretary of Public Safety upheld the termination.
A few days later, Devalle was hired as a deputy sheriff and school resource officer with the Columbus County Sheriff’s Office. As required, he applied for certification with the North Carolina Sheriffs’ Commission, but that Commission’s probable cause committee determined – based on Devalle’s conduct with the Highway Patrol – that he lacked the good moral character required to be a deputy sheriff.
Devalle then requested a hearing before an Administrative Law Judge. He presented testimony from the sheriff for whom he worked, and from the principal of the school to which he was assigned. Both were effusive about Devalle’s character and contributions. Devalle also testified. The ALJ found the testimony from the sheriff and the principal to be compelling, but thought that Devalle’s testimony was “evasive and elusive” and lacked candor. Nonetheless, the judge found that Devalle’s character had been rehabilitated since his misconduct with the Highway Patrol.
The Commission reviewed the ALJ’s recommendation and rejected it, refusing to certify Devalle based on what it concluded was a lack of good moral character. Devalle appealed that decision to superior court, where a judge ruled that the Commission’s decision was unsupported by substantial evidence and ordered Devalle to be certified. The Commission appealed to the North Carolina Court of Appeals, which affirmed, and then to the state supreme court.
The state supreme court’s ruling. In an opinion by Chief Justice Newby, the Supreme Court of North Carolina reversed the Court of Appeals. Everyone agreed about the pertinent standard of review. Administrative decisions are subject to review under the “whole record” test. They must be affirmed if there is “substantial evidence” to support them, but reversed if the decisions are arbitrary and capricious.
Turning to the merits of the case, the high court acknowledged that the concept of good moral character is inherently vague. However, it is not unconstitutionally vague. After reviewing precedents on the issue, the court summarized that collectively, “the principles that compose good moral character—such as honesty, sincerity, integrity, candor, and forthrightness— . . . should be familiar to every North Carolinian . . . . They make up the implicit moral code guiding how we treat others and expect others to treat us.” As an interesting aside, among the authorities cited by the court is a 98-year-old article about good moral character by School of Government founder Albert Coates. Some legal issues are not quickly settled!
The court noted that the testimony of the sheriff and the principal were evidence that Devalle’s character had “progressed” since his time with the Highway Patrol. On the other hand, the court agreed that Devalle’s testimony before the administrative law judge showed a lack of candor. And it emphasized the severity of his misconduct with the Patrol, including his dishonesty and his initial lack of cooperation with the Patrol’s internal investigation. Taken together, the court determined that this was substantial evidence to support the Commission’s decision, and that the Commission’s decision was not arbitrary and capricious. The court did, however, recommend that the Commission define good moral character more precisely in its administrative rules.
The dissent. Justice Riggs, joined by Justice Earls, would have affirmed the lower courts. In her view, Devalle presented significant evidence of good character, while there was no significant evidence of bad character after Devalle’s misconduct as a member of the Highway Patrol. She did not view Devalle’s testimony at the administrative hearing as negatively as the majority did, instead critiquing the majority’s focus on the “performative” question of whether Devalle was “sufficiently self-flagellating” in his testimony.
Justice Riggs also disagreed with the majority about when Devalle’s character should be assessed. The majority reasoned that his character should be assessed at the time of his application – in this case, just a few days after he was fired from the Highway Patrol. Justice Riggs argued that it should be assessed at the time of the Commission’s ultimate decision about whether to certify him – in this case, two years later, after Devalle had worked dependably as a school resource officer.
Discussion. The Devalle case illustrates several points that may be of interest to law enforcement officers.
First, although the concept of good moral character is an elastic one, honesty is a major part of it. In fact, the Supreme Court’s list of qualities that are part of good moral character consists mainly of the word “honesty” and its synonyms: “honesty, sincerity, integrity, candor, and forthrightness.” Most people envision morality as going much further, to include things like being diligent, being fair, and not being selfish. The extent to which these other traits may be the basis of certification decisions is not illuminated by Devalle.
Second, although there are cases suggesting that character is rarely revealed by a single incident, when the single incident is bad enough – like submitting false time sheets in order to get paid for work while actually sitting at home – it may be sufficient to support a finding of a lack of good moral character.
Third, an officer’s demeanor and candor before an ALJ and before either of the law enforcement commissions can be crucial. An officer who admits an error and takes responsibility for it may be more likely to get a second chance than one who is “evasive and elusive.” That has certainly been my observation from sitting on the CJ Commission for many years.
Fourth and finally, judicial review of the commissions’ decisions is deferential. As the court put it: “We do not second-guess how [the Sheriffs’ Commission] weighed the evidence. Rather, we ensure that [it] reasonably grounded its decision in the evidentiary record, even if we might have concluded differently if addressing the question anew.” That doesn’t mean that it is never worthwhile to seek judicial review of the commissions’ determinations. But it is an uphill battle.