This post summarizes the published criminal opinions from the North Carolina Supreme Court released on August 22, 2025. Previously, summaries were added to Smith’s Criminal Case Compendium, but due to personnel changes and resource limitations, that resource is no longer available. We will continue to post and archive new summaries here on the blog.
Trial court properly found that the defendant voluntarily consented to the search of his backpack after finding law enforcement returned his identification.
State v. Wright, No. 258PA23, __ N.C. __ (August 22, 2025) (Newby). In this Mecklenburg County case, a confidential informant submitted a tip to law enforcement on the night of January 29, 2020. The informant reported that a man matching the description of the defendant was riding a bicycle and carrying an illegal firearm. Law enforcement officers located the defendant riding a bicycle on the same street named by the informant. The officers intercepted the defendant, asked for his identification, and asked him to step off his bicycle and remove his backpack. The defendant complied. With the defendant’s permission, officers then conducted a pat-down. After the pat-down, officers asked for permission to search the defendant’s backpack for weapons. The defendant agreed to the initial request, then declined multiple times, telling officers he was scared. After returning the defendant’s identification, an officer asked the defendant to open his backpack so the officer could look inside, and the defendant agreed. The officer further asked the defendant to lower the backpack, at which point the officer could see the grip of a handgun. The officers placed the defendant in handcuffs and searched him, finding cocaine. The defendant was subsequently charged with possession with intent to sell cocaine, unlawfully carrying a concealed weapon, possession of a stolen firearm, possession of a firearm by a felon, and attaining the status of a habitual felon.
The defendant moved to suppress the evidence obtained during the search, arguing that the officers lacked reasonable suspicion and probable cause. The trial court denied the motion, finding the officers had reasonable suspicion and probable cause, and that the defendant consented to the search. The defendant pled guilty and appealed. At first, the Court of Appeals vacated and remanded for further findings of fact and conclusions of law related to whether the defendant was trespassing at the time of the encounter. The trial court entered an amended order denying the defendant’s motion to suppress, finding again that the defendant voluntarily consented to the search and that the officers had reasonable suspicion and probable cause. A unanimous Court of Appeals panel then reversed the trial court, finding the officers did not have reasonable suspicion or probable cause and the defendant did not voluntarily consent. The State sought discretionary review with the Supreme Court. The Supreme Court allowed discretionary review, and reversed the Court of Appeals, finding that the trial court properly denied the defendant’s motion to dismiss. The Court found that competent evidence supported the finding that law enforcement returned the defendant’s identification before he complied with the officer’s request to open his bag and lower it for better viewing. Other factors included that officers maintained a calm and conversational tone, that the defendant stated he was scared but did not explain why, and that he initially agreed to the search before withdrawing his consent. As a result, the Court concluded that his ensuing consent was voluntarily given, and that this permitted the search of the backpack. Because the Court found the defendant gave his consent, the Court did not address whether the officers had reasonable suspicion or probable cause.
Justice Earls, joined by Justice Dietz, dissented. The dissent noted that the question of consent is mixed question of law and fact and is not entirely dependent on factual findings made by the trial court. The dissent considered the characteristics of the accused, the details of the interrogation, and the psychological impact of the officers’ conduct, as well as noting a lack of clarity regarding whether or when the defendant’s identification was in fact returned. As a result, the dissent would have concluded that the defendant’s consent was the product of coercion rather than free will and would have suppressed the evidence obtained.
Justice Riggs did not participate in the consideration of the case.