Under G.S. 15A-1380.5, a law that existed from late 1994 to late 1998, North Carolina defendants sentenced to life without parole for offenses committed between October 1, 1994, and November 30, 1998, are entitled to a judicial review of their sentence after 25 years of imprisonment. I’ve written about it on the blog twice before, here and here, and those posts cover the statutory framework and background. Now that the review window has opened for most, if not all, of the affected inmates—and with many now undergoing their second and subsequent reviews—we’re beginning to see appellate case law that both clarifies and raises questions about how the process is meant to work.
In State v. Walker, ___ N.C. App. ___ (2025), the defendant was sentenced to life without parole in 1999 for a murder that happened on November 14, 1998 (about two weeks before G.S. 15A-1380.5 was repealed). In September 2023, the defendant requested his 25-year review. In February 2024—after the defendant’s eligibility window opened—a superior court judge made a recommendation against alteration or commutation.
The defendant raised three arguments on appeal. First, that the reviewing judge erred by making a recommendation without making findings of fact. Second, that the judge failed to consider the trial record. And third, that the judge erred by not conducting a hearing as part of his review.
As to the first argument, the court concluded that G.S. 15A-1380.5 requires only a recommendation, not an order with findings or conclusions of law. Regarding the second, the reviewing judge expressly stated that he considered “the trial record” and “the record proper.” And as to the third, the court relied on State v. Young, 369 N.C. 118, 124 (2016), for the proposition that the statute “guarantees no hearing.”
Walker indicates that a reviewing judge need not issue a formal order, and the general standards for appellate review of judicial orders (sufficiently detailed findings of fact to support sufficiently detailed conclusions of law) do not apply. As the court put it, “[h]ad the legislature intended for findings of fact and conclusions of law to be required, it could have chosen to require the reviewing judge to issue orders, rather than recommendations.” Slip op. at 6.
Contrast Walker with State v. Dawson, 295 N.C. App. 203 (2024). In that case the reviewing judge made ten findings of fact before concluding that it was not appropriate for the defendant’s sentence to be altered or commuted.
Applying the traditional standards for the required specificity of an order—with findings that support conclusions, and conclusions that support the judgment—the Court of Appeals vacated the order. Id. at 209 (“[T]he only finding in the Order concerning the information the trial court reviewed was that Defendant was in poor health . . . , a finding which would support an opposite recommendation than that ultimately made by the trial court.”).
It seems like the more detailed order at issue in Dawson may have been affirmed under the “recommendation” standard applied to the less detailed recommendation in Walker, but these are the early days in the emerging jurisprudence of a law that lay dormant for a quarter century. Subsequent cases will likely offer additional guidance on how a reviewing judge should properly memorialize the outcome of the 25-year review.
Other aspects of the law are starting to come into focus.
Must the reviewing judge make a recommendation? Yes, according to unpublished State v. Ballon, 909 S.E.2d 394 (2024) (unpub.) (“[T]he trial court must make a recommendation as to ‘whether or not the sentence of the defendant should be altered or commuted.’”).
Does pretrial jail credit count toward the 25-year imprisonment period? It appears so. In State v. Walker, the defendant was charged with murder and arrested in November 1998 and convicted and sentenced in October 1999. The parties and the reviewing judge agreed that the defendant became eligible for review in November 2023—exactly 25 years from the date of arrest.
A related question of timing comes up regarding subsequent two-year reviews. When does the two-year clock start? When a superior court judge completes the preceding review? Or when the Governor’s office ultimately responds to the judge’s recommendation? The statute says “[t]he defendant’s sentence shall be reviewed again every two years as provided by this section, unless the sentence is altered or commuted before that time.” Correspondence from the Governor’s office declining clemency after a judicial review describes the timeline differently, telling an inmate “your case will be eligible for judicial review two years from the date of this letter”—that is, the letter from the Governor’s office.
My reading of the statute is that a judge should review the matter every two years, with the intervals measured between the reviews themselves. The “unless” in the statute suggests to me that the clock is running from the date of the previous judicial review, and stops only if the sentence is altered through gubernatorial action in the meantime. That’s roughly how things played out in Ballon (again, unpublished), where the defendant had his first judicial review on July 12, 2021, but didn’t receive notification from the Parole Commission (the board designated by the Governor to receive recommendations) until October 7, 2022, that it likewise did not recommend relief. The second judicial review began on July 12, 2023—with an approving footnote from the Court of Appeals quoting the statutory language requiring subsequent reviews “every two years.” So, based on the statutory language—and a footnote in an unpublished opinion—my reading of the law is that the clock runs from the time of the prior judicial review.