This post summarizes the published criminal opinions from the North Carolina Court of Appeals released on April 16, 2025. These summaries will be added to Smith’s Criminal Case Compendium, a free and searchable database of case summaries from 2008 to the present.
Circumstances surrounding arrest and discovery of pipe supported conclusion that defendant intended to use the pipe for controlled substances other than marijuana.
State v. Bryant, COA24-436, ___ N.C. App. ___ (Apr. 16, 2025). In this Union County case, defendant appealed his conviction for misdemeanor possession of drug paraphernalia, arguing insufficient evidence that he intended to use the paraphernalia, a pipe, for a controlled substance other than marijuana. The Court of Appeals disagreed, finding no error.
Defendant was arrested after an encounter in September 2021 where police officers thought defendant and his two acquaintances were shoplifting from a local Belk. The officers did not find any store merchandise, but while searching one of the acquaintances, the officers found a medicine bottle with small baggies filled with a brown powder. Defendant ran from the officers, throwing a bottle that also contained the brown powdery substance. When defendant was detained, officers found a glass pipe, red straw, and plastic baggies containing power on his person. The brown substance was confirmed to be heroin after testing. Defendant came to trial on charges of felony trafficking in heroin by possession and transporting, as well as the misdemeanor charge. Defendant moved to dismiss the misdemeanor, but the trial court denied the motion, and defendant was subsequently convicted.
On appeal, defendant pointed to G.S. 90-113.22, which makes it a misdemeanor offense to “knowingly use, or to possess with intent to use, drug paraphernalia to . . . inject, ingest, inhale, or otherwise introduce into the body a controlled substance other than marijuana which it would be unlawful to possess.” Slip Op. at 5. Defendant argued insufficient evidence to show he intended to use the pipe for a controlled substance other than marijuana. The Court of Appeals noted a lack of controlling authority, but looked to State v. Gamble, 218 N.C. App. 456, 2012 WL 380251 (2012) (unpublished), and State v. Harlee, 180 N.C. App. 692, 2006 WL 3718084 (2006) (unpublished), for guidance regarding circumstances that supported intent with paraphernalia like crack pipes. The court found similar support here, as the pipe was found in the same pocket of defendant’s pants as the baggies of heroin, and the pipe was visibly charred, showing previous use.
Trial court’s finding that defendant consented to the search of her vehicle did not clearly extend to search of her wallet outside the vehicle, justifying remand.
State v. Peters, COA24-475, ___ N.C. App. ___ (Apr. 16, 2025). In this McDowell County case, defendant appealed after pleading guilty to possession of methamphetamine, arguing error in denying her motion to suppress the evidence found during a warrantless search. The Court of Appeals agreed, vacating and remanding for consideration of whether defendant clearly and unequivocally consented to the search of her wallet.
In July of 2022, defendant and a man were living in a camp near Pisgah National Forest when they were approached by Wildlife Resource Commission officers. The officers asked for proof that defendant owned the vehicle in the camp, and she provided proof of title. The officers then asked if they could check out the car, to which the man residing with defendant said yes; this man had been the driver of the vehicle as defendant did not have a valid license. Due to circumstances unknown, defendant’s wallet ended up on the roof of the vehicle and the officers searched her wallet while looking through the vehicle, finding a bag of methamphetamine. Nothing legally significant was found inside the vehicle, and defendant came to trial on a charge of possession based on the methamphetamine found in her wallet. At trial, defendant moved to suppress, arguing that the search of her wallet was unconstitutional, but the trial court denied the motion. Defendant pleaded guilty, reserving her right to appeal the issue.
The Court of Appeals first established that defendant impliedly consented to the search of her vehicle, based on her failure to object to the search when a third party gave consent, and her actions attempting to facilitate the search by cleaning an area of the vehicle. However, the court noted the distinction between consent to search the inside of the vehicle and consent to search defendant’s wallet, as “[t]he wallet was neither inside nor otherwise attached to the vehicle.” Slip Op. at 6. Because the trial court did not make a determination as to whether defendant consented to the search of her wallet, “the trial court’s findings cannot support its order denying Defendant’s motion to suppress.” Id. at 7. The court then reasoned through the appropriate remedy, concluding that the trial court must determine based on the evidence whether the officer objectively believed that defendant placing her wallet on the roof represented “giving her clear and unequivocal consent to the officer’s search of her wallet.” Id. at 9.
Trial court was not required to hold a hearing or make findings of fact when considering the record and making a recommendation on life without parole sentence under G.S. 15A-1380.5.
State v. Walker, COA 24-615, ___ N.C. App. ___ (Apr. 16, 2025). In this Wake County case, defendant appealed the order determining that his sentence of life without parole should not be altered under G.S. 15A-1380.5. The Court of Appeals found no abuse of discretion or error and affirmed the trial court’s order.
Defendant was found guilty of first-degree murder in 1999 and received the sentence of life without the possibility of parole. In September of 2023, defendant requested review of his sentence under G.S. 15A-1380.5. After the trial court reviewed the trial record, defendant’s record from the Department of Corrections, the degree of risk posed to society, and other issues, the trial court determined defendant’s sentence should not be altered. Defendant subsequently filed a petition for writ of certiorari to appeal this decision, and the Court of Appeals granted certiorari in April 2024.
Defendant argued three issues on appeal: (1) abuse of discretion in failing to make findings of fact to support the denial, (2) error in failing to consider the trial record, and (3) abuse of discretion by not holding a hearing. The Court of Appeals looked to the text of G.S. 15A-1380.5 and caselaw interpreting it to determine the applicable requirements. The court first dispensed with the hearing issue (3), explaining “[o]ur Supreme Court has held that [G.S.] 15A-1380.5 ‘guarantees no hearing, no notice, and no procedural rights.’” Slip Op. at 5 (quoting State v. Young, 369 N.C. 118, 124 (2016)). Next the court moved to (1), noting the structure of G.S. 15A-1380.5 did not call for an “order” with findings of fact and conclusions of law, but instead called for a “recommendation,” and “[h]ad the legislature intended for findings of fact and conclusions of law to be required it could have chosen to require the reviewing judge to issue orders, rather than recommendations.” Id. at 6. Finally, the court noted in (2) that the trial court clearly stated it had considered the record, and the court determined the record supported the trial court’s conclusion.
Assault with a deadly weapon inflicting serious injury may serve as the predicate for felony murder when defendant acted with actual intent to commit the act forming the basis of the murder charge; G.S. 20-166 is ambiguous regarding the unit of prosecution, leading the court to apply the rule of lenity and conclude the unit is per crash, not per victim.
State v. Watlington, COA23-1106, ___ N.C. App. ___ (Apr. 16, 2025). In this Guilford County case, two defendants, Watlington and Felton, both appealed from judgments entered after a trial where the defendants were tried jointly. Watlington was convicted of first-degree murder and additional felonies related to her attempts to run over multiple people at a gas station after a fight. Felton was convicted of eleven counts of accessory after the fact to Watlington’s convictions. The Court of Appeals arrested judgment on three of Watlington’s convictions for hit and run and three of Felton’s convictions for accessory after the fact to hit and run, but found no error with the other convictions, remanding for resentencing.
One early morning in October of 2019, Felton drove an SUV to a gas station in Greensboro, with Watlington as a passenger. After hitting a parked car, a confrontation ensued between Watlington, Felton, and the car’s owner. The argument escalated into a brawl involving multiple people over the course of twenty-five minutes, and testimony showed Felton was the primary aggressor. Around thirty minutes after the confrontation began, Watlington got into the driver’s seat of the SUV and backed over a group of people; it took her approximately ten seconds to completely run over the victims. After stopping completely clear of the victims and sitting for eight seconds, Watlington drove forward, running over the same group of people at full speed. Felton watched the entire incident without stopping Watlington, then stood over the victims yelling at them. One victim died at the scene, and several others sustained serious injuries. The two defendants drove away in the SUV but were apprehended nearby a short time later.
The Court of Appeals took up Watlington’s arguments first, beginning with her argument that it was error for assault with a deadly weapon inflicting serious injury to be the predicate felony for her first-degree murder conviction. In State v. Jones, 353 N.C. 159 (1994), the Supreme Court held that “[f]or assault with a deadly weapon inflicting serious injury to serve as the predicate felony for a felony murder conviction . . . the individual must have acted with a ‘level of intent greater than culpable negligence.’” Slip Op. at 11 (quoting Jones at 167). Here, Watlington argued that Jones represented a “bright-line rule” that assault with a deadly weapon inflicting serious injury could never be a predicate felony, an argument the court rejected. Id. Instead, the court explained that “assault with a deadly weapon inflicting serious injury, as a matter of law, can serve as the predicate felony for a felony murder conviction when the defendant acts with the ‘actual intent to commit the act that forms the basis of [the] first-degree murder charge.’” Id. at 13 (quoting Jones at 166). The trial court properly instructed the jury in this case, and the court noted that sufficient evidence supported the conclusion that Watlington acted intentionally when driving over the victims with the SUV. The court also rejected Watlington’s challenge to the jury instruction for felony murder and the lack of an instruction on voluntary manslaughter, finding no errors in the instruction given and no evidence to support an additional voluntary manslaughter instruction.
The court next considered Watlington’s argument regarding her multiple hit and run counts, and agreed that the structure of the statute did not support all the convictions. G.S. 20-166 “does not clarify whether its unit of prosecution is the conduct of leaving the scene of a crash or the number of victims injured as a result of the crash,” resulting in an ambiguity for the court to resolve. Id. at 18. Here the court applied the rule of lenity, interpreting the ambiguity in Watlington’s favor. The court explained that there were five victims, but only two crashes, one when Watlington backed over the victims and the second when Watlington drove forward over the victims. As a result, Watlington could only be convicted twice, “one conviction for Watlington’s conduct of leaving the scene of each crash,” and the court arrested judgment on the other three hit and run convictions. Id. at 21.
Arriving at Felton’s arguments, the court first dispensed with her argument that there was insufficient evidence to support her convictions for accessory after the fact. Here, evidence showed that Felton watched Watlington hit the victims with the SUV, then left the scene with her and took the keys to the SUV, concealing the identity of Watlington as the driver. The court found this evidence sufficient to support Felton’s convictions. The court also rejected Felton’s challenge to the language of her indictments, finding no fatal variance from the evidence at trial.
Felton argued that she should not be subject to multiple convictions for accessory after the fact; the court rejected this, explaining “the context of [G.S.] 14-7 clearly indicates that the legislature intended the allowable unit of prosecution to be each felony for which the principal committed and the accessory assisted after the fact.” Id. at 27. The court then considered Felton’s argument that she was convicted as accessory after the fact to hit and run for merely leaving the scene. Rejecting this argument, the court pointed to the many other aspects of Felton’s culpability after the crashes, including taking the SUV’s keys and concealing Watlington’s identity as the driver. However, the court arrested judgment on three of Felton’s convictions, as it had done for Watlington’s hit and run convictions discussed above.
Felton then challenged the jury instructions, arguing they provided a theory of guilt not alleged in the indictments, specifically that she assisted Watlington in attempting to escape. The court noted the circumstantial evidence of Felton possessing the SUV keys and that this did not represent a stand-alone theory of guilt, rejecting Felton’s argument. Finally, the court rejected Felton’s challenge to the closing argument, noting that law enforcement body cam footage supported the inference that Felton and Watlington were together when apprehended.