This post summarizes the published criminal opinions from the North Carolina Court of Appeals released on February 19, 2025. These summaries will be added to Smith’s Criminal Case Compendium, a free and searchable database of case summaries from 2008 to the present.
Court rejected defendant’s argument that “serious injury” requires medical attention beyond an examination.
State v. Reaves, COA24-663, ___ N.C. App. ___ (Feb. 19, 2025). In this Durham County case, defendant appealed his convictions for assault with a deadly weapon inflicting serious injury, arguing error in denying his motion to dismiss because the victim’s injuries were not “serious” under G.S. 14-32(b). The Court of Appeals found no error.
In 2022, defendant and the victim, defendant’s on-and-off girlfriend, rekindled their relationship and the victim moved into defendant’s apartment. Their relationship soured and defendant became abusive towards the victim, culminating in September 2022 when defendant punched and kicked the victim and hit her with a curtain rod and the butt of his handgun. The victim eventually escaped by jumping from the balcony and running to a nearby mail carrier for help. At the hospital, an examination documented bruising, swelling, and tenderness on the victim’s body. At trial, the State called law enforcement, EMS, and a nurse from the hospital to testify to the victim’s injuries, and admitted photographs of her injuries and hospital reports.
On appeal, defendant argued that the State provided insufficient evidence of the severity of the victim’s injuries, pointing to State v. Brunson, 180 N.C. App. 188 (2006), and State v. Ramseur, 338 N.C. 502 (1994), and arguing “Brunson and Ramseur stand for the proposition that a serious injury, at a minimum, requires medical attention that goes beyond a mere cursory examination.” Slip Op. at 10. The Court of Appeals rejected defendant’s argument, explaining that North Carolina courts have declined to establish a threshold for serious injury, and to accept his argument here “would be to adopt a threshold requirement contrary to longstanding case law.” Id. After reviewing the record in this case, the court held that “[t]he State presented sufficient evidence to allow the jury to decide whether Defendant inflicted serious injury upon [the victim].” Id. at 11.
State offered adequate evidence to justify defendant’s term of SBM despite the lack of high-risk Static-99 score.
State v. Belfield, COA24-640, ___ N.C. App. ___ (Feb. 19, 2025). In this Nash County case, defendant appealed the order imposing a 25-year term of satellite-based monitoring (SBM), arguing error as defendant was not at high risk to reoffend and did not require the highest level of supervision and monitoring. The Court of Appeals disagreed, finding no error.
In August of 2020, defendant pleaded guilty to one count of indecent liberties with a child and was sentenced; subsequently the trial court held a SBM hearing and determined defendant was subject to SBM. In State v. Belfield, 289 N.C. App. 720 (2023) (unpublished), defendant appealed the SBM order, pointing out that the trial court’s order was on form AOC-CR-615, with a box checked indicating the decision was based on additional findings from “the attached form 618.” Slip Op. at 4 (cleaned up). This was significant as defendant’s Static-99 score was a four, which alone was not “high risk” and did not justify SBM, so the trial court had to consider additional evidence to justify the order. However, the order did not contain the referenced form 618, so the court vacated and remanded for the trial court to make findings of fact regarding the imposition of SBM. In October of 2023, the trial court heard the matter, considering the evidence from the previous SBM hearing and entered new findings, again imposing SBM. Defendant appealed that order, leading to the current decision.
Taking up defendant’s appeal a second time, the Court of Appeals explained that when, as here, a defendant does not have a “high risk” Static-99 score, the State must offer additional evidence, and the trial court must make additional findings, to justify a SBM sentence. Defendant argued that the trial court’s additional findings in this case were based upon “the trial court’s consideration of improperly duplicative evidence of matters already addressed in Defendant’s Static-99 risk assessment.” Id. at 11. The court disagreed with defendant, noting that while “additional findings cannot be based solely on matters already addressed in the Static99 risk assessment,” four of the additional findings here were supported by “competent evidence other than that of a defendant’s risk assessment” and justified the imposition of SBM. Id.
Trial court’s failure to consider stipulated mitigating factor justified remand for resentencing.
State v. Curtis, COA24-204, ___ N.C. App. ___ (Feb. 19, 2025). In this Wake County case, defendant appealed after pleading guilty to felony death by vehicle, felony serious injury by vehicle, and driving while impaired, challenging the sentencing he received for his convictions. The Court of Appeals vacated and remanded for resentencing.
In January of 2022, defendant caused a head-on collision that killed two passengers in the other vehicle and injured several more. Officers found used nitrous oxide containers in the vehicle, and defendant admitted to also using alcohol and marijuana the evening of the collision. Defendant pleaded guilty pursuant to an agreement that avoided second-degree murder; the State stipulated to a mitigating factor that defendant “has accepted responsibility for [his] criminal conduct.” Slip Op. at 3. Defendant waived his right to appeal in the plea agreement. However, along with his appeal in this case, defendant filed a writ of certiorari, which the Court of Appeals granted to consider this case. The State did not oppose defendant’s writ and conceded that an error was committed.
Defendant argued on appeal that the trial court failed to consider his mitigating factor that he and the State stipulated to in the plea agreement. The Court of Appeals agreed, quoting State v. Albert, 312 N.C. 567, 579 (1985), for the proposition that “when the State stipulates to the facts supporting the finding of a mitigating factor, ‘the trial court err[s] in failing to find this fact in mitigation.’” Slip Op. at 7. Defendant also argued he was entitled to a different trial judge on remand. The court disagreed on that point, noting that the trial judge was not exposed to any prejudicial information beyond the plea agreement, and defendant could not demonstrate a risk to his bargained-for agreement if the case was remanded to the same judge. Thus the court vacated and remanded to the trial court for resentencing.
Underlying felony of AWDWIKISI supported felony murder conviction despite defendant’s merger doctrine argument; discussion of robbery attempt did not represent double jeopardy; evidence of victim’s convictions and gang affiliations were properly excluded.
State v. Greenfield, COA23-597, ___ N.C. App. ___ (Feb. 19, 2025). In this New Hanover County case, defendant appealed his convictions for first-degree murder and assault with a deadly weapon with intent to kill inflicting serious injury (AWDWIKISI), arguing error in (1) jury instructions regarding felony murder, (2) permitting the State to contend defendant committed robbery when he was previously acquitted, (3) improperly excluding evidence of the victim’s convictions and gang affiliations, and (4) not intervening in the State’s closing argument. The Court of Appeals found no error.
In February of 2015, defendant went to the apartment shared by the murder victim and his girlfriend to buy marijuana. An argument ensued, and both parties produced firearms. Testimony differed on what happened next, but defendant ended up shooting and killing the victim, and hitting the girlfriend with gunfire as well. Defendant went to trial in 2017 and was convicted of first-degree murder and AWDWIKISI, but acquitted of attempted robbery. Defendant appealed, and in State v. Greenfield, 375 N.C. 434 (2020), the Supreme Court granted defendant a new trial because the trial court did not provide instructions on self-defense and transferred intent. Defendant was retried in 2022 and again convicted, leading to the current case.
In (1), defendant argued that the jury instructions improperly allowed the jury to find him guilty of felony murder without the requisite intent, as the underlying felony was AWDWIKISI for the girlfriend, and defendant argued he was aiming for the murder victim and accidentally hit the girlfriend. The Court of Appeals explained that defendant’s argument rested on an interpretation of the “merger doctrine,” where the assault on a victim cannot be the underlying felony for felony murder of that victim. Here, the jury received instruction on transferred intent, where if defendant intended to harm one victim and instead harmed another, the legal effect would be the same. The court rejected defendant’s interpretation of the situation, explaining “this is not a case where the assault of a single victim resulted in the death of the same single victim.” Slip Op. at 14. Instead, the court found that the trial court’s instructions were correct and did not present the matter in a way that would mislead the jury.
For (2), defendant argued that allowing the State to introduce evidence and argument about the robbery charge represented double jeopardy; because defendant failed to preserve the majority of his objection, the court only considered whether it was error to allow the State to discuss the robbery in closing argument. The court looked to State v. Agee, 326 N.C. 542 (1990), as “both cases involve a continuous series of events that resulted in an acquittal for one charge at a prior trial,” explaining “[t]he State’s discussion of robbery was only used to explain the chain of events that led to the intentional shooting of [the murder victim and his girlfriend].” Slip Op. at 19-20. Based on applicable precedent, allowing this discussion was proper and “whether or not a robbery occurred, the evidence was without objection and tended to explain the chain of events leading to the shooting.” Id.
Reaching (3), the court parsed whether the exclusion of the murder victim’s prior convictions, gang affiliation, thug tattoo, and possession of assault rifles were properly excluded. Defendant argued this in two ways, first that the murder victim was the actual aggressor, and second that the evidence was admissible to rebut evidence of the victim’s peaceable character and gun habits. The court rejected both. First, the court noted these arguments had been rejected previously when defendant appealed his first conviction, but again noted that Rule of Evidence 403 and 405(b) did not support admission under these circumstances. The court then rejected defendant’s arguments about the gun habits and peaceable character, noting defendant was able to testify regarding some of the guns in the home, and the excluded evidence of firearms was not relevant. Regarding the peaceable character of defendant, the court explained that the evidence identified by defendant “does not go to [the victim’s] character for peacefulness and are not pertinent character traits as to whether the [victim] was violent.” Id. at 30. This led the court to conclude that “the testimony cited by Defendant does not open the door to rebuttal evidence of [the victim’s] character for violence.” Id. at 31.
Finally in (4), the court dispensed with defendant’s argument that a detective and prosecutors were permitted to give improper and prejudicial opinions on defendant’s credibility and guilt. The court looked for plain error as defendant did not object at trial. First the court looked at the detective’s testimony, where the detective testified he did not believe defendant acted in self-defense, and noted that the detective “was explaining why he brought that up in his interviews with Defendant” as it was a strategy to keep defendant talking and not a comment on the ultimate issue of self-defense in the case. Id. at 37. The court then looked at the statements made in closing argument, noting that the prosecutor did not explicitly call defendant a liar but instead highlighted the various stories he gave throughout the investigation about the events. The court found no issues justifying intervention ex mero motu and overruled defendant’s arguments.
Possession of a firearm by a felon under G.S. 14-415.1 was not facially unconstitutional or unconstitutional as applied to defendant’s case; defendant’s statements showing racial motivation were properly admitted.
State v. Nanes, COA24-487, ___ N.C. App. ___ (Feb. 19, 2025). In this Wake County case, defendant appealed his convictions for first-degree murder and possession of a firearm by a felon, arguing (1) G.S. 14-415.1, the statute making possession of a firearm by a felon an offense, was unconstitutional, and (2) error in admitting defendant’s own statements. The Court of Appeals held G.S. 14-415.1 was constitutional and found no error.
During August of 2020, defendant shot and killed two victims he had never met, one in Raleigh and another in Cary. Defendant’s probation officer recognized a BOLO put out by police, and reported him, leading to his arrest. Defendant had previously been convicted of felony animal cruelty for stealing his parent’s dog and decapitating it with a knife. At trial, the State offered statements from defendant made during a phone call with his mother, where she questioned why he posted a picture of a firearm on social media despite being convicted of a felony. Defendant responded “[t]his is a hard time for our country, and you’ve got racist black people out here.” Slip Op. at 18.
In (1), defendant argued that G.S. 14-415.1 was unconstitutional both facially and as-applied to his situation, pointing to N.Y. State Rifle & Pistol Ass’n, Inc. v. Bruen, 597 U.S. 1 (2022), and United States v. Rahimi, 602 U.S. 680 (2024), to support his arguments. The Court of Appeals began with the facial challenge, noting “the State must only show that section 14-415.1 ‘is constitutional in some of its applications.’” Slip Op. at 6 (quoting Rahimi at 693). The court acknowledged that G.S. 14-415.1 regulated some conduct covered by the Second Amendment, but concluded the section was “sufficiently analogous to historical laws to show that prohibiting convicted felons from possessing firearms is within the nation’s history and tradition of firearm regulation.” Id. at 6-7. Because G.S. 14-415.1 could be “applied constitutionally to numerous circumstances” the court found no merit in defendant’s facial challenge. Id. at 10.
Moving to the as-applied constitutional challenge, defendant argued his felony did not represent violent crime against a person, and therefore shouldn’t justify disarming him. The court again disagreed, noting that beheading the dog was a violent crime, and “the record reflects Defendant has a history of victimizing others resulting in convictions for: assault on a government official or employee, simple assault, simple assault again, assault inflicting serious injury, assault on a handicapped person, and assault and battery.” Id. at 11. This led the court to conclude defendant had a history of violence towards others, and removing his right to possess a firearm was well within historical tradition. The court also considered defendant’s arguments under Section 30 of the North Carolina Constitution, applying the five-factor framework from Britt v. State, 363 N.C. 546, (2009). After performing the analysis the court concluded “the Britt factors undoubtedly weigh in favor of upholding the application of section 14-415.1 against Defendant as he has a demonstrated history of violence, victimizing others, and disregarding the law.” Slip Op. at 16.
Arriving at (2), the court explained “[t]he State’s theory of the case was that, because both victims were peaceful individuals whom Defendant had never met that happened to be people of color, the murders were committed out of racial animus on Defendant’s part.” Id. at 18. This made defendant’s comments relevant and probative of his motive for the murders under Rule of Evidence 401. The court then looked to the Rule of Evidence 403 balancing test, concluding the trial court adequately balanced the prejudicial effect with the probative value. The court noted that several of defendant’s statements that were more inflammatory were excluded, and even if it were error to admit the statements, overwhelming evidence supported defendant’s guilt in the matter, meaning he could not demonstrate the jury would have reached a different result without the statement in evidence.
Jury instructions on aiding and abetting properly framed the responsibility of defendant as the biological parent of the victim.
State v. Velasco, COA24-333, ___ N.C. App. ___ (Feb. 19, 2025). In this Johnston County case, defendant appealed her convictions for first-degree forcible rape, first-degree forcible sexual offense, sexual servitude of a child victim, and incest of her daughter, arguing error in (1) omitting a parenthetical phrase from the pattern jury instructions for flight, and (2) instructing the jury on aiding and abetting. The Court of Appeals held that defendant waived (1), and found no error in (2).
In 2020, defendant and her husband lived separately from her daughters, who lived with their father, defendant’s ex-husband. Defendant maintained communication with her daughters, and in August 2020, two of her daughters snuck out of their father’s house to spend the night with defendant at her apartment. While there, defendant gave her daughters alcohol and partied with them, although both were underage. The older daughter and victim in the case became sick at one point, and defendant took her to lay down in a bedroom where her husband was also present. At that point, defendant’s husband began touching the victim in a sexual manner, and defendant returned to the bedroom with a pair of scissors, telling her husband “I know you want to. You can do it.” Slip Op. at 4. The husband used the scissors to cut off the victim’s underwear, and he began raping the victim. Defendant returned to the bedroom and began taking pictures with her cellphone. Eventually, defendant told her husband to stop and brought the victim clothes, and in the morning they drove the daughters back to their father’s house. After the victim reported the incident, defendant was brought to trial and eventually convicted.
Taking up (1), defendant argued it was error to omit the first sentence of N.C.P.I-Crim. 104.35, the pattern instruction on flight. Defendant did not object at trial, and although the Court of Appeals may review instructional errors that were not objected to for plain error, the defendant must “specifically and distinctly” argue the error was plain error under Rule of Appellate Procedure 10(a)(4). Id. at 11. Here, defendant did not and the argument was waived, leading the court to dismiss it.
Moving to (2), defendant argued that it was plain error to instruct the jury on aiding and abetting the crimes as the instruction was based solely on defendant being the victim’s biological mother. The court explained that the objected-to instruction “Aiding and Abetting – Parent” which instructed the jury that a parent who is present and fails to take all steps to protect their child from attack or sexual assault is subject to conviction based on aiding and abetting. Id. at 15. The instruction specifically pointed to State v. Walden, 306 N.C. 466 (1982), where the Supreme Court established parents have a “duty to take every step reasonably possible under the circumstances of a given situation to prevent harm to their children.” Slip Op. at 16 (quoting Walden at 475). However, the court noted a caveat that “one may not be found to be an aider and abettor” solely because they are present, and thus evidence must show “the defendant said or did something showing [their] consent to the criminal purpose and contribution to its execution.” Id. at 16-17 (quoting Walden at 476). Here, the court noted that even if the instruction provided did not fully capture the caveat from Walden, the State provided evidence showing defendant took actions and made statements showing her consent, highlighting that defendant told her husband “you can do it” and bringing him scissors, taking photographs while he raped her daughter, and providing alcohol and marijuana gummies to her daughters while they were underage. As a result, defendant could not show plain error.