This post summarizes the published criminal opinions from the North Carolina Court of Appeals released on February 5, 2025. These summaries will be added to Smith’s Criminal Case Compendium, a free and searchable database of case summaries from 2008 to the present.
(1) Trial court failed to articulate findings on speedy trial motion, justifying remand; (2) decision not to inquire further into juror who allegedly fell asleep was within trial court’s discretion; (3) omission during clarification of jury instructions did not rise to plain error.
State v. Boyd, COA 24-36, ___ N.C. App. ___ (Feb. 5, 2025). In this Pasquotank County case, defendant appealed his convictions for first-degree murder, possession of a firearm by a felon, and interfering with an electronic monitoring device, arguing error in (1) violation of his right to a speedy trial, (2) failure to inquire or replace a juror who fell asleep, and (3) giving clarification of jury instructions. The Court of Appeals remanded for consideration of the relevant factors in (1), but found no error with (2)-(3).
In October of 2020, the victim was found shot to death in a parked vehicle at an Elizabeth City apartment complex. Witnesses observed the victim and another man, later identified as defendant, arguing in the parking lot before the shooting. Defendant was arrested in New York in November 2020 and was held until his trial in March of 2023. During this time, defendant filed two motions for speedy trial and a motion to dismiss for violation of his speedy trial rights, all of which the trial court denied. During the trial, one juror was observed closing her eyes and apparently sleeping, but the trial court denied the request to replace the juror with an alternate. During jury deliberations, the jurors sent a request for clarification of the difference between first- and second-degree murder, and the trial court provided an explanation involving “premeditation and deliberation.” Slip Op. at 7. Defense counsel argued that this instruction left out “intent to kill” but the trial court declined to further instruct the jury. Id.
Taking up (1), the Court of Appeals looked to Barker v. Wingo, 407 U.S. 514 (1972), and North Carolina precedent adopting the Barker factors for speedy trial violations, noting that “when a delay approaches a year, it is enough to cause concern that the delay may be unreasonable and to trigger examination of all four Barker factors.” Id. at 11. In the current case, the trial court held a hearing in November of 2022 on the motion to dismiss, but the trial court did not reduce its findings to a written order or articulate findings under the Barker factors. Because the trial court’s oral statements did not show conclusions on “the issue of presumptive prejudice” or “whether the trial court ever considered any of the Barker factors,” the court remanded for a determination with findings of fact and conclusions of law. Slip Op. at 13.
Considering (2), the court explained that “[t]he trial court sits in the best position to evaluate the significance of the allegation against the juror” and here, the trial court “acted within its discretion in declining to conduct further inquiry.” Id. at 15. The court found no error in declining to investigate further in the current case.
Reaching (3), the court noted that “[t]he trial court omitted . . . the intent to kill requirement when giving the final mandate, a summary of the charge, to the jury before sending them back to deliberations.” Id. at 16. Applying the plain error standard, the court found no error, as the instruction was “incomplete” but not contradictory, and significant evidence showed defendant’s guilt. Id. at 18.
Trial court did not err by removing a juror and an alternate who discussed the case at a snack bar.
State v. Nobles, COA 24-458, ___ N.C. App. ___ (Feb. 5, 2025). In this Cumberland County case, defendant appealed his conviction for first-degree murder, arguing the trial court abused its discretion by dismissing a juror and an alternate juror. The Court of Appeals found no error.
In January of 2022, a motorcyclist pulled up next to defendant and his son at a stoplight. After an argument between the motorcyclist and defendant’s son, defendant shot the motorcyclist. During defendant’s trial, the trial court announced that several jurors had been overheard discussing the case at the snack bar, in violation of the jury instructions. The trial court examined the jurors in question and heard testimony from a witness who claimed she overheard the discussion and made a recording. The trial court ultimately removed one juror and one alternate, allowing a third juror to remain.
On appeal, defendant argued that “the removal of a juror, which he contends was arbitrary, prejudiced him per se when the trial court refused to reopen voir dire.” Slip Op. at 6. The Court of Appeals noted this was a novel argument, as defendant did not argue the initial voir dire was defective, but instead that he was prejudiced by the alternate juror system. The court noted defendant failed to show any prejudice as the alternate juror was selected during the initial voir dire process along with the rest of the jury. As a result, the court found no abuse of discretion and rejected defendant’s argument.
Trial court’s failure to hold evidentiary hearing on defendant’s MARs justified remand as factual issues about defendant’s guilty plea remained unresolved; sex-offender registration was collateral consequence of guilty plea, but mandatory term of post-release supervision was direct consequence of plea.
State v. Spry, COA24-129, ___ N.C. App. ___ (Feb. 5, 2025). In this Guilford County case, defendant appealed the denial of his motions for appropriate relief (MARs), arguing error in summarily denying his MARs challenging the entry of his guilty plea. The Court of Appeals agreed, vacating the denials and remanding for an evidentiary hearing and findings of fact on defendant’s MARs.
In 2006, defendant was indicted for a robbery at a restaurant, and the charges included second-degree kidnapping and attempted kidnapping of two victims under sixteen years old. Defendant pleaded guilty to three charges and received an active sentence of imprisonment with nine months of post-release supervision; the trial court did not identify the offenses as reportable convictions. Afterwards, the Combined Records Section of North Carolina Department of Correction requested that the trial court clarify the ages of the kidnapping victims, and “[w]ithout prior notice nor Defendant being present, the trial court entered a ‘corrected’ judgment . . . indicating ‘the above designated offense(s) is a reportable conviction involving a minor. G.S. 14-208.6.’” Slip Op. at 2. This change required defendant to register as a sex offender and also required five years of post-release supervision. In defendant’s first MAR, he argued he did not learn of this change until right before his release from prison. The trial court denied defendant’s MARs without holding an evidentiary hearing.
Reviewing the MARs, the Court of Appeals highlighted that the issues before the trial court required settling factual disputes, and thus the trial court erred by failing to hold an evidentiary hearing. The record before the court did not contain a verbatim recording of defendant’s entry of his guilty plea, limiting the court’s ability to consider defendant’s claims. This required the court to remand for an evidentiary hearing and to vacate the previous rulings on the MARs.
Going further, the court also considered whether the sex-offender registration and post-release supervision were direct or collateral consequences of defendant’s guilty plea, as failure to advise defendant of direct consequences would render his guilty plea involuntary. Regarding sex-offender registration, the court held that “sex offender registration is a collateral consequence of a guilty plea to a crime requiring registration.” Id. at 14. However, the court held that “post-release supervision is distinguishable from . . . sex offender registration” and represented a direct consequence of the guilty plea. Id. at 19. The court directed the trial court to consider defendant’s arguments regarding his post-release supervision to determine whether his plea was entered “voluntarily, intelligently and understandingly.” Id. at 21.