This post summarizes the published criminal opinions from the Supreme Court of North Carolina released on August 23, 2024. These summaries will be added to Smith’s Criminal Case Compendium, a free and searchable database of case summaries from 2008 to the present.
Trial court erred by giving jury instruction that defendant did not have the right to use excessive force under the castle doctrine.
State v. Phillips, 281A23, ___ N.C. ___ (August 23, 2024). In this Cumberland County case, the Supreme Court modified and affirmed the Court of Appeals decision vacating defendant’s conviction for assault with a deadly weapon with intent to kill inflicting serious injury due to an erroneous instruction on excessive force and the castle doctrine. The Court affirmed the Court of Appeals’ finding of error but vacated the finding of prejudice and granting of a new trial, instead remanding to the Court of Appeals for a proper consideration of whether defendant was prejudiced by the error.
In April of 2021, the victim approached defendant’s front door, leading to a confrontation between the two over defendant’s complaints to their landlord about the victim. After the confrontation escalated, defendant fired several shots at the victim, hitting her in the left side and causing injuries that left her disabled. At trial, defendant asserted self-defense and defense of habitation under the castle doctrine. The trial court expressed concern over giving a castle doctrine instruction, and ultimately altered the instruction with the following: “However, the defendant does not have the right to use excessive force.” Slip Op. at 5. Defense counsel objected that this limitation was from common law, not statutory law, but the trial court went forward with the altered instruction. When the matter reached the Court of Appeals, defendant argued that the trial court’s instruction was error, and the panel’s majority agreed. The dissenting judge did not see error in the instruction, and reasoned that the castle doctrine law aligned with common law defenses, leading to the State’s appeal based on the dissent.
Taking up the State’s appeal, the Supreme Court first gave an overview of the castle doctrine’s evolution from a common law defense to the modern G.S. 14-51.2. The Court then spent a significant amount of the opinion exploring the text of G.S. 14-51.2 and the presumptions it contains, including the presumption that a lawful occupant who uses deadly force “is ‘presumed to have held a reasonable fear of imminent death or serious bodily harm’ and has no duty to retreat from the intruder.” Id. at 15. The Court emphasized this presumption was rebuttable, but that “the castle doctrine’s statutory presumption of reasonable fear may only be rebutted by the circumstances contained in section 14-51.2(c).” Id. at 16. This precluded any common law concept of excessive force as provided in the trial court’s instruction. Having established the instruction was error, the Court then moved to whether defendant was prejudiced, determining that the Court of Appeals “failed to conduct an appropriate inquiry” into the prejudice determination. Id. at 21. As a result, the Court remanded to the Court of Appeals for a proper analysis.
Justice Earls, joined by Justice Riggs, concurred in the conclusion that the castle doctrine instruction was error, but dissented from the majority’s decision to remand to the Court of Appeals, reasoning that the Court had the ability to decide whether defendant was prejudiced based on the briefing.
(1) Court of Appeals improperly reviewed evidence of robbery in isolation instead of as a whole when dismissing charge, (2) defendant could not show prejudice based on Rule 404(b) evidence of gang affiliation, (3) quick phone conversation represented excited utterance under Rule 803(2).
State v. Davenport, 155PA22, ___ N.C. ___ (August 23, 2024). In this Martin County case, the Supreme Court reversed an unpublished Court of Appeals decision granting defendant a new trial for first-degree murder and finding that the robbery with a dangerous weapon charge should have been dismissed. The Court held that (1) the State admitted substantial evidence of every element of the robbery charge, (2) admitting Rule of Evidence 404(b) evidence related to defendant’s gang affiliation and tattoos was not plain error, and (3) admitting a statement as an excited utterance under Rule of Evidence 803(2) was not error.
In 2015, defendant was released from prison and rekindled a relationship with the victim. Both men had a history of being in prison and had previously been in a relationship in the 1990s. In December of 2015, the two had an argument, which led to a physical altercation and threats of violence, including reference to defendant’s gang affiliation. In January of 2016, the victim was found dead in his home from stab wounds, and the victim’s cellphone and wallet with a large amount of cash were missing. Defendant was tried and convicted for robbery with a dangerous weapon and first-degree murder, but on appeal, the Court of Appeals issued a unanimous unpublished opinion holding the robbery conviction should be dismissed and granting a new trial for first-degree murder. The State appealed and the Supreme Court granted discretionary review.
Taking up (1), the Court explained that the Court of Appeals improperly “reviewed the evidence of robbery with a dangerous weapon ‘in isolation,’” instead of reviewing the evidence as a whole. Slip Op. at 9. The Court then laid out the three elements of robbery with a dangerous weapon under G.S. 14-87(a), and looked to the record for support. Here, defendant had made an extrajudicial confession to a cellmate after his arrest, and the money and cellphone from the victim were never found, meaning the corpus delicti doctrine applied. The corpus delicti doctrine required the State to admit corroborating evidence to support “the trustworthiness of the accused’s confession.” Id. at 12. The Court concluded that the confession, along with the independent testimony and evidence, represented substantial evidence that defendant committed the offense.
Moving to (2), the Court approached the issue of the Rule 404(b) evidence of defendant’s prior incarceration, gang affiliation, and tattoos by considering the second prong of the plain error standard, whether defendant could demonstrate prejudice by “showing that without the admission of the evidence in question, the jury probably would have reached a different result.” Id. at 19. The Court concluded defendant could not meet this standard, as additional evidence supported defendant as the perpetrator and connected him to the victim.
Finally in (3), the Court considered the admission of the victim’s statement “Dianne to the house” as an excited utterance under Rule 803(2). The victim made this statement on a quick phone call with his niece, and it was offered to prove defendant went to the victim’s house the night of the murder, with “Dianne” being a codeword for defendant. The Court outlined the applicable standard for an excited utterance, and determined that because “the statement [the victim] made followed a startling experience and was brief and quick, this statement qualifies as an excited utterance.” Id. at 21.
Defendant could be convicted of multiple counts of human trafficking under G.S. 14-43.11; error in calculating prior record level was not prejudicial.
State v. Applewhite, 39A22, ___ N.C. ___ (August 23, 2024). In this Cumberland County case, the Supreme Court affirmed the Court of Appeals decision finding no error in defendant’s convictions for human trafficking and promoting prostitution. The Court held that (1) defendant could be convicted of multiple counts of human trafficking for each victim under G.S. 14-43.11, and (2) the trial court erred in calculating defendant’s prior record level, but this error was not prejudicial.
Between 2012 and 2015, defendant supplied heroin to several women, and used their addiction to manipulate them into prostitution. Defendant used online solicitations to set up customers, and he transported the women to various locations to engage in prostitution. Defendant was ultimately indicted and convicted of multiple charges for each victim, and he appealed. At the Court of Appeals, the majority found no error, but the dissenting judge “argued that human trafficking is a continuing offense because the statute criminalizing human trafficking does not define the unit of prosecution.” Slip Op. at 4.
Taking up (1), the Supreme Court first examined the structure of G.S. 14-43.11, noting that subsection (a) provides the conduct representing an offense, and subsection (c) “clarifies that human trafficking is not a continuing offense . . . demonstrat[ing] that each distinct act of recruiting, enticing, harboring, transporting, providing or obtaining a victim can be separately prosecuted.” Id. at 7. The Court also noted the anti-merger provision in subsection (c). Having established that each act was a separate offense under the statute, the Court moved to a double jeopardy analysis, determining that defendant did not suffer “multiple punishments for the same conduct.” Id. at 12. The Court also considered the sufficiency of the indictments, as each “tracked the language of the statute but included variations for the names of the victims and the date ranges of the alleged violations.” Id. at 14. These were sufficient as “none of the indictments rendered the charged offenses uncertain” and the statute did not provide for alternative offenses, meaning defendant was given sufficient notice of the charges against him. Id. at 16.
The Court also considered (2), the calculation of defendant’s prior record level. Defendant did not stipulate to his prior convictions, and the State did not offer any evidence that defendant’s prior federal firearm conviction was similar to a North Carolina offense. However, the Court explained it was not prejudicial, as “[defendant’s] federal firearms conviction is substantially similar to a Class G felony in North Carolina . . . [and if] remanded for resentencing, defendant’s sentence would not change.” Id. at 19.
Justice Riggs, joined by Justice Earls, concurred in (2), but dissented from (1), and would have held “that the indictments are only sufficient to support one count of human trafficking per victim within the dates provided in the indictment.” Id. at 23.
Court of Appeals improperly considered G.S. 17-33 when affirming the denial of defendant’s application for writ of habeas corpus; public interest exception to mootness justified consideration of defendant’s petition after his release.
State v. Daw, 174PA21, ___ N.C. ___ (August 23, 2024). In this Wake County case, the Supreme Court modified and affirmed the Court of Appeals decision affirming the denial of defendant’s petition for writ of habeas corpus. Defendant argued that he was unlawfully and illegally detained because the Department of Public Safety could not ensure he was not exposed to COVID-19. The Supreme Court affirmed the denial, but modified the Court of Appeals decision as it was error to consider portions of G.S. Chapter 17 beyond G.S. 17-4.
Defendant pleaded guilty to multiple counts of obtaining property by false pretenses in 2019, and was imprisoned when the COVID-19 pandemic began. Defendant applied for a writ of habeas corpus in Wake County Superior Court, arguing “the potential viral spread of COVID-19 within the correctional institution, combined with petitioner’s medical history and condition, rendered his continued confinement cruel and/or unusual.” Slip Op. at 2. The trial court denied defendant’s application under G.S. 17-4(2), as defendant had a valid final judgment in a criminal case entered by a court with proper jurisdiction. Defendant then petitioned the Court of Appeals, who allowed his petition and issued a decision affirming the denial, but repudiating the trial court’s basis for its decision. The Court of Appeals pointed to G.S. 17-33(2) as an exception to G.S. 17-4(2), although defendant’s claim did not represent a violation of his rights. Although defendant’s application was never granted, he was released in February 2021 under the Extended Limits of Confinement Program, prior to the issuance of the Court of Appeals decision. The Court of Appeals acknowledged defendant’s issue was moot in its decision. The State petitioned the Supreme Court for discretionary review of this Court of Appeals decision, leading to the current case.
The Supreme Court first confirmed that mootness did not prevent its review of the Court of Appeals decision as the public interest exception applied. Then the Court offered an overview of the history related to writs of habeas corpus and explained how the current provisions of G.S. Chapter 17 govern applications for the writ. For applications, G.S. 17-4 provides “a general rule and an exception; application of the writ is available to any person restrained of their liberty regardless of whether such restraint resulted from a criminal or civil matter, unless the restraint stems from those instances specified in section 17-4.” Id. at 10.
Relevant for the current case, “the writ of habeas corpus is expressly not available in this State to persons ‘detained by virtue of the final order, judgment or decree of a competent tribunal of civil or criminal jurisdiction.’” Id. at 12. Because defendant did not assert a jurisdictional defect, defendant’s application was properly denied by the trial court under G.S. 17-4(2), and the Court of Appeals’ reference to G.S. 17-33 was erroneous. The Court pointed out that G.S. 17-33 was “inapplicable in this matter” as that provision applies to those “in custody by virtue of civil process,” as opposed to defendant, who was imprisoned after a final judgment. Id. at 14. Additionally, the Court took pains to clarify that the two provisions could not conflict due to the operation of G.S. Chapter 17. Id. at 18.
Justice Earls dissented and provided a lengthy discussion disagreeing with the majority’s invocation of the public interest exception to mootness, and disagreement with the majority’s interpretation of the provisions in G.S. Chapter 17. Id. at 21.
Justice Riggs dissented and agreed with Justice Earls’ analysis of the mootness issue but wrote separately to emphasize her disagreement with the majority’s invocation of the public interest exception. Id. at 61.