This post summarizes the published criminal opinions from the North Carolina Court of Appeals released on May 21, 2024. These summaries will be added to Smith’s Criminal Case Compendium, a free and searchable database of case summaries from 2008 to the present.
Mistaken identification of paramedic as “emergency medical technician” did not represent fatal variance for purposes of G.S. 14-34.6.
State v. Juran, COA23-881, ___ N.C. App. ___ (May 21, 2024). In this Onslow County case, defendant appealed her conviction for assault on an emergency personnel, arguing a fatal variance between the offense charged and the offense proved by the State’s evidence, and the same fatal variance between the indictment and the jury instructions and verdict sheet. The Court of Appeals found no error.
In September of 2019, Defendant called 911 after experiencing chest pains. An ambulance arrived to take defendant to the hospital, but during the trip, defendant became agitated and squeezed a paramedic’s hand so hard that the driver of the ambulance pulled over and police were called. After defendant was released from the hospital, she was arrested. While the indictment identified the victim as an “emergency medical technician” and the jury instruction and verdict sheet likewise identified the victim as an EMT, the victim testified at trial that she was a paramedic.
Taking up defendant’s arguments, the Court of Appeals noted that G.S. 14-34.6 makes it an offense to cause physical injury to “(1) An emergency medical technician or other emergency health care provider [or] (2) A medical responder.” Slip Op. at 8. The statute does not define “emergency medical technician,” but the court explained this was “a distinction without difference for the purpose of the charging statute” and defendant would have been charged under G.S. 14-34.6 regardless of the classification of the victim. Id. at 9. The court could not identify any way that defendant was prejudiced in preparing her defense based on this discrepancy, and also noted that double jeopardy would be impossible as the victim and her employer were clearly identified. When considering the jury instruction argument, the court applied the same reasoning, noting there was no danger the jury would have reached a different result if the victim was a different classification of medical professional. The court also rejected defendant’s argument that the various terms may have called the jury’s unanimity into question, explaining “the inclusion of additional or similar terms in referencing the victim did not create additional theories on which Defendant could be convicted.” Id. at 15.
Denial of defense counsel’s motion to withdraw did not represent Sixth Amendment structural error.
State v. Melton, COA23-411, ___ N.C. App. ___ (May 21, 2024). In this Forsyth County case, defendant appealed his convictions for possession of methamphetamine and habitual felon status, arguing structural error in denying his court-appointed counsel’s motion to withdraw. The Court of Appeals majority found no error.
In July of 2022, defendant was represented by court-appointed counsel, and requested a trial on his charges. A trial date was set for September 12, 2022. On September 9, an attorney who was not the court-appointed counsel contacted the State to negotiate a plea deal or continuance for defendant’s case. The State did not agree to the continuance, but offered a plea deal, which defendant rejected. Court-appointed counsel learned of this negotiation on September 11, and subsequently filed a motion to withdraw. The trial court heard and denied the motion to withdraw on September 12. The next day, the case came for trial, and defense counsel informed the trial court (who was a different superior court judge) that defendant wished to be heard on the motion again; after hearing from both parties, the trial court repronounced the motion to withdraw. Defendant was subsequently convicted, and filed notice of appeal.
The Court of Appeals first noted the framing of defendant’s argument, that depriving him of his Sixth Amendment right to counsel was structural error, and explored the proper standard for reviewing an indigent defendant’s request to substitute appointed counsel with counsel of his choice. Looking to applicable precedent, the court noted that a trial court should only deny a motion like defendant’s when “granting the motion would ‘result in significant prejudice to the defendant or in a disruption of the orderly processes of justice unreasonable under the circumstances[.]’” Slip Op. at 7, quoting State v. Goodwin, 267 N.C. App. 437, 440 (2019). Although the majority opinion noted possible issues with Court of Appeals precedent around the Goodwin standard, it proceeded to apply this reasoning to the present case, holding that “the trial court conducted an inquiry which revolved around issues concerning the further disruption and delay of trial.” Id. at 12. As a result, the court found no structural error with the trial court’s initial denial of the motion.
The court then moved to defendant’s request for reconsideration of the motion on September 13. Normally a superior court judge is not authorized to overrule another, but when the order is (1) interlocutory, (2) discretionary, and (3) subject to a substantial change of circumstances, an exception to this rule applies. The court held that while the order was both (1) and (2), “the record does not reflect a substantial change in circumstances” and the trial court did not err in repronouncing the denial of the motion. Id. at 14.
Judge Stroud concurred by separate opinion, and concurred with the majority opinion except as to the citation of certain unpublished cases that were not argued by the parties.
Judge Thompson dissented, and would have held that the trial court committed a structural error by denying defense counsel’s motion to withdraw.
Conviction for possession of firearm on educational property was unconstitutional where gun was found in vehicle parked in hospital parking lot.
State v. Radomski, COA23-340, ___ N.C. App. ___ (May 21, 2024). In this Orange County case, defendant appealed his conviction for possession of a firearm on education property, arguing the application of G.S. 14-269.2 to his case was unconstitutional and that the trial court erred by denying his motion to dismiss for insufficient evidence. The Court of Appeals majority agreed on both grounds, reversing the trial court and vacating defendant’s conviction.
In June of 2021, defendant drove his vehicle to UNC Hospital for treatment. Defendant was homeless at the time, and kept all his possessions, including his firearms, inside his vehicle. A UNC Hospital police officer received a report that defendant’s vehicle was suspicious, and while investigating, the officer discovered that the vehicle had no license plate or insurance coverage. The officer questioned defendant about the contents of the vehicle, and defendant admitted he had firearms inside, but that he was unaware he was on educational property. The officer cuffed defendant and searched the vehicle, finding several firearms along with ammunition. Defendant was subsequently arrested and charged with one count of possession of a firearm on educational property.
The Court of Appeals first explained that defendant failed to raise the constitutional argument at trial, but that it would invoke Rule of Appellate Procedure 2 to consider his arguments. The court then moved to the substance of defendant’s argument, that applying G.S. 14-269.2(b) to defendant under the facts of his case violated his Second Amendment rights under the “historical tradition of firearm regulation” analysis required by New York State Rifle & Pistol Ass’n, Inc. v. Bruen, 597 U.S. 1 (2022). Slip Op. at 9. The court noted that the purpose of the open-air parking lot where defendant’s vehicle was located was “not educational in nature” as it was intended to serve the hospital and could not be considered an obvious sensitive place for purposes of Bruen. Id. at 10. The court also rejected that the hospital’s “affiliation” with UNC made it qualify as a sensitive place under Bruen. Id. at 12. Under these facts, the court held that applying G.S. 14-269.2(b) to defendant would be unconstitutional, regardless of the various signs and administrative links between the hospital and the educational campus.
The court then moved to defendant’s motion to dismiss, considering whether evidence supported that defendant was on educational property and whether he knew he was on educational property. Considering the first issue, the court held “Defendant’s car was located on the UNC Chapel Hill Campus.” Id. at 15. However, the majority opinion held that the State did not present sufficient evidence of defendant’s knowledge he was on educational property. To support this holding, the court looked to the arresting officer’s testimony, concluding “[t]he State failed to present any evidence, direct or circumstantial, as to which path Defendant took, what signs he saw, or any other indication of personal knowledge that he was on educational property.” Id. at 21.
Chief Judge Dillon concurred by separate opinion as to the Second Amendment holding, but did not agree with the majority’s holding regarding insufficient evidence that defendant knew he was on educational property.